

THE KINGDOM OF BĪJĀPUR.

Thesis submitted for the Ph.D. degree.

by

P. M. JOSHI, M.A.

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JOSHI (P.M.)

Ph.D., 1935.

HISTORY

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THE KINGDOM OF BĪJĀPUR.

This thesis deals with the little known but much needed history of the 'Ādilshāhī kingdom of Bījāpur. Flourishing as this kingdom did with the other Deccan sultanates, its policy affords an insight into the disintegration and disunion among the Muslim states of the Deccan during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The significance of this cannot be overrated. For, it was the perpetual quarrels between the sultanates and the bitter dissensions in them between Sunnis and Shias, between Deccanis and Pardesis, that invited the Mughals to the south, and enabled the Marāthas to consolidate their power. The petty principalities with their petty cabals could seldom gauge the common danger or concert common measures for common safety. The only redeeming feature was the formation of the Muslim confederacy which resulted in the destruction of the Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar. The attempts to dislodge the Portuguese, however, proved utterly unavailing. And after the victory over Vijayanagar, the normal internecine warfare once more flared up in the Deccan, never to abate till the

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11

Bahmanīs save for a few incidental modifications. I have, therefore, given only a short sketch of the ‘Ādilshāhī administration. I have devoted two chapters to the social and economic conditions of the kingdom, and I have also made an attempt to deal with the prominent features of the cultural aspects of ‘Ādilshāhī rule.

CONTENTS.

Introduction.	1-v.
Genealogical Table and Dynastic Lists.	vi-ix.
Chapter I. The Background.	1-20.
II. Early History of Bijāpur.	21-47.
III. Vijayanagar and the Deccan Sultanates.	48-74.
IV. Relations with the Portuguese.	75-93.
V. Coming of the Mughals.	94-115.
VI. Rise of the Marāthā Power.	116-139.
VII. Fall of Bijāpur.	140-162.
VIII. A Sketch of 'Adilshāhī Administration.	163-200.
IX. Social Life.	201-222.
X. Economic Resources and Trade.	223-259.
XI. Cultural Aspects of 'Adilshāhī Rule.	260-282.
Conclusion.	283.
Appendix (Lineage of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh).	284-287.
Bibliography.	288-300.
List of Abbreviations.	301-303.

Maps.

The Five Sultanates of the Deccan.	Facing page	21.
Bijāpur during the first quarter of the seventeenth century.	" "	102.
Bijāpur in 1656.	" "	124.
Bijāpur in 1680.	" "	158.

INTRODUCTION.

This thesis deals with the little-known but much needed history of the 'Adilshāhī kingdom of Bijāpur. Flourishing as this kingdom ^{did} with the other Deccan sultanates, its policy affords an insight into the disintegration and disunion among the Muslim states of the Deccan during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The significance of this cannot be overrated. For it was the perpetual quarrels between the sultanates and the bitter dissensions in them between Sunnis and Shias, between Deccanis and Pardesis, that invited the Mughals to the south and enabled the Marāthas to consolidate their power. The petty principalities with their petty cabals could seldom gauge the common danger or concert common measures for common safety. The only redeeming feature was the formation of the Muslim confederacy which resulted in the destruction of the Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar. The attempts to dislodge the Portuguese, however, proved utterly unavailing. And after the victory over Vijayanagar, the normal internecine warfare once more flared up in the Deccan never to abate till the end.

In this period of storm and stress general administration was completely neglected; it remained as it was under the Bahmanī save for a few incidental modifications. I have, therefore, given only a short sketch of the 'Adilshāhī

administration. I have devoted two chapters to the social and economic conditions of the kingdom and I have also made an attempt to deal with the prominent features of the cultural aspects of 'Adilshāhī rule.

I have based this study mainly on contemporary sources, some of which have not been used before. Of these, both Abu'l Qāsim's history of the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh and Astrābādī's Futūhāt-i-'Adilshāhī seem to be unknown in India. The Busātīn-us-Salātīn on page 441 gives the name of a history of the reign of Sikandar 'Adil Shāh (تاریخ سکندری) written in Dekhni Urdū by Nusratī, the author of 'Alināma, and has evidently used it as one of its sources. I traced the MS. to the Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Urdū, Aurangābād, Deccan, but was unable to get it for my use. To my knowledge this is the only copy of the manuscript at present known.

Of the unpublished contemporary sources the Taskirat-ul-Mulūk of Rafī-ud-dīn Shīrāzī covers the same period as Ferishta's history, namely from the foundation of the 'Adilshāhī dynasty to nearly the close of the sixteenth century. Both Rafī-ud-dīn and Ferishta composed their chronicles at the same time in Bijāpur, but strangely enough neither makes any mention of the other in his work. Rafī-ud-dīn came to India as a merchant and in 1560 entered the service of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I., whom he accompanied to the battlefield of Talikota. His history is valuable as a contemporary chronicle

and throws altogether new light on the relations between Rāma Rāya and 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I. and on the utter chaos at Ahmadnagar when the Mughals first invaded the Nizāmshāhī kingdom.

The Futūhāt-i-'Adilshāhī of Fīzūnī Astrābādī is a valuable supplement to Rafī-ud-dīn's history. For the history of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it relies on Ferishta and Rafī-ud-dīn Shīrāzī, but is important when it continues the narrative covering the last twenty-seven years of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh's reign and the first seventeen years of his successor, Muhammad 'Adil Shāh's reign. He deals in detail with the relations between the kingdom of Bījāpur and the Mughal Empire and bears out the official histories of the Mughal historians. Fīzūnī Astrābādī was not in royal service, but wrote under the patronage of Mustafā Khān, one of the leading 'amīr of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh.

The Muhammadnāma of Zuhūr and the Guldashta of Abu'l Qāsim cover the first twenty-two years of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh's reign and are almost identical in their contents. They are particularly valuable for the detailed account they give of the southern campaign of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh - the Guldashta has devoted as many as thirty-one folios to the 'Adilshāhī expedition against and the conquest of Jinjī. As the original MS. of the Muhammadnāma was not available, I have made use of the English translation made by my friend, Prof. B.D.Verma.

The only copy of the Guldasta I know is in the Cambridge University Library.

Some events of the reign of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II. are covered by the Tārīkh-i-'Alī 'Adilshāhī of Syed Nurullāh and the 'Alīnāma of Musratī, the latter written in Dakhni Urdū. But the value of both the works is vitiated by the fact that they are mere panegyrics of the sultān and show more bias than veracity and also suffer from excessive verbiage.

Of the printed works the Busātīn-us-Salātīn is a complete history of the 'Adilshāhī dynasty of Bijāpur. Though written as late as the first quarter of the nineteenth century, it is undoubtedly an authoritative source book. It is based on contemporary Persian chronicles some of which are not now available. The writer discusses all his sources on page 2 of the preface. It is the most valuable chronicle of the kingdom of Bijāpur, being the only history which gives the complete history of the 'Adilshāhī dynasty.

The Indian Historical Research Institute, Poona (Mahārāṣṭra Itihās Samśhodhak Mandal), have laid students of Deccan Muhammadan History under great obligations by publishing from time to time 'firmāns' and various other documents bearing on this subject and by the publication of their two volumes of "Collection of Letters of Shivājī's times". Other sources bearing on the subject have already been discussed by various writers before, particularly by Beni Prasad in the History of Jahāngīr, Saksena in his history of Shāh Jahān

and Sarker in his histories of Aurangzib and Shivaji.

The accounts of the various European travellers who visited the Deccan during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries deserve mention all by themselves. They give information about the social life and economic conditions in the Deccan, topics completely neglected by the Persian chronicles. Thus it would have been difficult to deal with these aspects of 'Adilshahi rule, had it not been for the ample and authoritative information handed down to us by European observers like Barbosa, Garcia de Orta, Linschoten, Pyrard de Laval, Tavernier and Fryer, to mention only a few. Mention must also be made of "The English Factories in India", a veritable mine of information about the trade and industry of the kingdom of Bijapur during the seventeenth century.

I have used volumes V and VI of the comprehensive work of Rao Bahadur L. D. Swamikannu Pillai, "An Indian Ephimeries", published by the Government of Madras, to render Muhammadan and Hindu dates into their corresponding English dates which are according to the old style.

In conclusion I have to express my thanks to my supervisor Sir Edward Denison Ross, who has helped me in many ways in the preparation of this work.

1. Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh (1490-1510)

Isma'il 'Adil Shāh (1510-1534)	Bibi Sati m Prince Ahmad Behmani	Meriyam m Burhān Nizām Shāh	Khadija m 'Alē-ud-dīn 'Imād Shāh
--------------------------------------	---	--------------------------------------	---

Mallū Shāh deposed 1534	4. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I. (1534-1558)	'Abdullāh	'Ali or 'Allū
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Isma'il	5. 'Ali 'Adil Shāh I. (1558-1580)	Tahmasy Ahmad	Tani Bibi m	Hadiya m
		6. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. (1580-1627)	'Ali Barid m	Kurtasā Nizām Shāh

Darvish	Sulaiman	7. Muhammad 'Adil Shāh (1627-1656)	son (name not known)
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	8. 'Ali 'Adil Shāh II. (1656-1672)	son (name not known)
	9. Sikandar 'Adil Shāh (1672-1686, abdicated. Bijāpur conquered d:1700. by Aurangzib.)	

The 'Adilshāhī Kings of Bijāpur.

Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh.	1490-1510.
Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh.	1510-1534.
Mallū 'Adil Shāh.	1534.
Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I.	1534-1558.
'Alī 'Adil Shāh I.	1558-1580.
Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II.	1580-1627.
Muhammad 'Adil Shāh.	1627-1656.
'Alī 'Adil Shāh II.	1656-1672.
Sikandar 'Adil Shāh.	1672-1686.

(Bijāpur conquered by Aurangzīb.)

The 'Imadshāhī Kings of Berar.

Fathullāh 'Imād Shāh.	1490-1504.
'Alā-ud-dīn 'Imād Shāh.	1504-1529.
Daryā 'Imād Shāh.	1529-1562.
Burhān 'Imād Shāh.	1562.
Tufāl Khān (Usurper).	1562-1574.

(Berar conquered by Murtaza Hizām Shāh I.)

The Qutbshāhī Kings of Golconda.

Sultān Qulī Qutb Shāh.	1512-1543.
Jamshīd Qutb Shāh.	1543-1550.
Subhān Qulī Qutb Shāh.	1550.
Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh.	1550-1580.
Muhammad Qulī Qutb Shāh.	1580-1612.
Muhammad Qutb Shāh.	1612-1626.
‘Abdullāh Qutb Shāh.	1626-1672.
Abu'l Hasan Qutb Shāh.	1672-1687.

(Golconda conquered by Aurangzīb.)

The Barīdshāhī kings of Bīdar.

Amīr Qāsim Barīd.	1487-1504.
Amīr ‘Alī Barīd.	1504-1542.
‘Alī Barīd Shāh I.	1542-1579.
Ibrāhīm Barīd Shāh.	1579-1586.
Qāsim Barīd Shāh.	1586-1589.
Amīr Barīd Shāh.	1589-1601.
Mīrsā ‘Alī Barīd Shāh.	1601-1609.
‘Alī Barīd Shāh II.	1609-1619.

(Bīdar conquered by Ibrāhīm ‘Adil Shāh II.)

The Nizāmshāhī Kings of Ahmadnagar.

Ahmad Nizām Shāh.	1490-1509.
Burhān Nizām Shāh I.	1509-1553.
Husain Nizām Shāh I.	1553-1565.
Murtaza Nizām Shāh I.	1565-1586.
Husain Nizām Shāh II.	1586-1589.
Ismā'īl Nizām Shāh.	1589-1591.
Burhān Nizām Shāh II.	1591-1595.
Ibrāhīm Nizām Shāh.	1595-1596.
Bahādur Nizām Shāh.	1596.
(Ahmad - usurper.)	1596-1603.
Murtaza Nizām Shāh II.	1603-1630.
Husain Nizām Shāh III.	1630-1633.

(Nizāmshāhī kingdom annexed to the Mughal Empire.)

THE KINGDOM OF BĪJĀPUR.

CHAPTER I.

THE BACKGROUND.

Muslim Conquest of the Deccan:- The year 1294 marks the beginning of a new era in the history of the Deccan. In that year 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī - the nephew of Jalāl-ud-dīn, the first Khaljī emperor of Delhi - embarked upon the hitherto untried adventure of the invasion of a Hindu kingdom south of the Marbada. Meeting with no resistance, he suddenly appeared before Deogir, the capital of the Yādav dynasty which then held sway over the country of Mahārāshtra. The outcome of the daring raid was that Rām Dev was reduced to subjection and Khaljī returned, content with the payment of a tribute by the Hindu king.¹

Two years later 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī ascended the throne of Delhi. This, however, did not alter the principles of his Deccan policy. He knew only too well that the Deccan as a province of the empire was more likely to disturb its peace than contribute to its prosperity. He was satisfied with

¹ Ferishta I., 165-67, 206; Ibn Batūtāh (E.D., III., 598); T.F.S (E.D., III., 149-50); E.H.D., 207.

imposing his suzerainty on Rām Deo and reducing the Hindu kingdom to the position of a vassal state. Herein lay his political sagacity. For, to hold the Deccan as a province of the empire was, in those days, a truly difficult task. It was far off from the capital and presented a standing temptation to any recalcitrant provincial governor, who felt strong enough, to break off from the empire and set up as an independent king. In fact this was what happened when 'Alā-ud-dīn's successors, blind to the wisdom of his policy, annexed the Deccan.

Early in 1316 'Alā-ud-dīn died. Taking advantage of the confusion which followed his death, Harpāl Deo, the new ruler of Deogīr, threw off his yoke of allegiance to Delhi. The Khaljī dynasty was not to be so easily repudiated; and in 1318 Qutb-ud-dīn, the last of the Khaljī dynasty, entered the Deccan to teach the Hindu king an unforgettable lesson. Harpāl Deo was captured and flayed alive, while his kingdom was annexed to Delhi.² Thus ended the Hindu monarchy of the Deccan and the country became a province of the Muhammadan empire.

The Khaljī dynasty was followed by the Tughluqs in 1321, and the latter had now to consider the question of the retention of the Deccan as a part of the empire. Without it they might have a more efficient and centralized dominion, but the

² Forishta I., 220; E.H.P., 206.

Deccan was an irresistible temptation to imperialist ambition. No Muhammadan power had, as yet, ruled the Deccan. The experience was too new and too intoxicating for the Tughluqs to envisage the consequences of a weak central government in the far off province. So 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī's policy, conceived in wisdom, was sacrificed to territorial ambitions and imperial glory.

The subjugation of the Deccan was only temporary. Remote as the province was from the seat of the imperial government, the forces of disintegration there had free play. And these forces gained further strength from the weak central government which, instead of vigilant supervision, exercised a loose and undefined authority over its distant provinces. Hence even during the twenty-seven years that they remained under Tughluq sway, the provincial governors at Deogir made more than one attempt to overthrow the imperial yoke.⁴

Behmani kingdom founded:- It was during the reign of Muhammad Tughluq, however, that the Deccan made a successful bid for its independence. The 'amirs' of the Deccan tired of Muhammad's fantastic rule, rose in rebellion under the leadership of one of their colleagues, Zafar Khān, better known in history as Hasan, the founder of the Behmani dynasty. It was he who succeeded in defeating the imperial troops and compelled them

³ The Tughluq empire extended as far south as Madura.

⁴ Ferishta I., 222, 232; T.F.S. (E.D., III., 218).

ultimate withdrawal from the Deccan.⁵ Further, his claim to descent from the half-mythical hero Bahman,⁶ son of Isfandiya surrounded him with a halo of royalty. On August 3, 1347, he was acclaimed by his colleagues as their king, and on the same day he ascended the throne at Gulbarga as Abul Musaffar 'Alā-dīn Bahman Shāh.⁷ Thus was founded the Bahmani dynasty which ruled the Deccan till nearly the end of the next century.

The new kingdom had two Hindu neighbours, which, like it self, had emerged on the break-up of the Tughluq empire. One was Warangal, once more under the rule of its original dynasty on the south and south-east, and the other Vijayanagar, a more modern state, but more powerful than Warangal, on the south and south-west. This proximity of two powerful Hindu kingdoms to an equally powerful Muslim kingdom explains the chronic warfare of the next hundred years that characterises the history of the Deccan. The Bahmani kingdom was determined to advance as far south as Madura, the limit of the Tughluq empire, and the Hindu kingdoms were as determined to prevent this advance.

Wars with the Hindus:- Bahman Shāh's first campaign (1350) was against Warangal, when he compelled Kanhaya Nayak, its king, to cede to him the fortress of Kaulās (18.50 N. 77.80 E.) as the price of peace and imposed on him an annual tribute.⁸

⁵ Ferishta I., 524-25; T.F.S. (E.D.III., 261-62).

⁶ J.A.S.B. (Extra Number, 1904), 1-4; Burhān (I.A.XXVIII., 141).

⁷ Burhān (I.A.XXVIII., 142-43; Ferishta I., 525).

⁸ Burhān, l.c. 145-46; Ferishta I., 528.

Henceforward all wars between the Bahmanis and Warangal can be traced either to Kanbayya's neglect to pay the stipulated ^{tribut} or to his demands for the restoration of Kaulās.⁹

The Bahmani kingdom did not come into conflict with Vijayanagar during the lifetime of Bahman Shāh; and when it did, during the reign of his son Muhammad I., it was the Hindu kingdom that was the aggressor. In 1360 Bukka I. of Vijayanagar claimed that the Rāichūr Dēb was a part of his kingdom and demanded its restoration. Kanbayya Nāyāk also made a simultaneous demand for Kaulās.¹⁰ The two made common cause, but their combined armies were defeated by Muhammad. The next move lay with Muhammad; and in 1366 he won a great victory over Bukka. Ferishta records with ill-concealed exultation how Muhammad in his mad frenzy spread desolation in the Hindu kingdom and indulged in a ruthless massacre of its miserable inhabitants.¹¹ Bukka was moved by the suffering of his subjects and sued for peace. On this occasion the Bahmani sult and the Hindu king mutually pledged themselves to forgo the practice of indiscriminate slaughter of the civilian population.¹² During the next forty years the combatants thrice

⁹ Ferishta I., 539; Sewell, 30-31.

¹⁰ Ibid; ibid.

¹¹ Ferishta I., 554; Sewell, 33-38.

¹² Ferishta I., 554; Sewell, 39.

went to war and on the last occasion in 1417, in the reign of Firūz Shāh Bahmanī, the Doāb was conquered by the Hindus.¹³ Firūz was unable to recover it in his lifetime, and passed on the task to his successor Ahmad Shāh Valī.

In the very first year of his accession, Ahmad Shāh decided to carry out the unfulfilled wishes of his brother. In 1423 he declared war on Devarāya II. of Vijayanagar. He invited the 'rājā' of Warangal to help him, but that chief returned an evasive answer, unwilling to help a Muslim against a brother Hindu. Alone, Ahmad inflicted a defeat on Devarāya and once more planted the Bahmanī standard in the Doāb.¹⁴

The 'rājā' of Warangal soon paid the penalty for his scruples. After the close of his campaign against Vijayanagar Ahmad Shāh marched towards Warangal in 1425. The 'rājā' was defeated and slain, and Warangal was finally annexed to the Bahmanī kingdom.¹⁵

Vijayanagar was left in peace for the next twenty years. But in 1443 in the reign of 'Alā-ud-dīn Shāh, Devarāya made one more attempt on the Doāb and succeeded in occupying the disputed territory; ultimately, however, he was defeated and compelled to relinquish the Doāb.¹⁶

¹³ Ferishta I., 608-10.

¹⁴ " 619-20.

¹⁵ Burhān (I.A., XXVIII., 187); Ferishta I., 621.

¹⁶ Burhān, l.c. 238; Scwell, 76-77.

During the next fifty years relations between the neighbours were those of passive animosity. Vijayanagar was busy recuperating, while the Bahmani kingdom was too preoccupied with internal faction fights and revolts to think seriously of any offensive. Moreover, the Bahmani kingdom now began to feel the effects of its unwieldy administrative framework.

Party strife in the Bahmani kingdom:- Hasan, the founder of the Bahmani dynasty, had divided his kingdom into four provinces termed 'tarafs' and placed them under governors designated 'tarafdārs'.¹⁷ These provincial governors enjoyed great powers. In their respective dominions they were supreme. "They collected the revenue, raised and commanded the army and made all appointments both civil and military in their provinces."¹⁸ The system worked smoothly as long as it had behind it the momentum of a strong personality - either of the king himself or of an able minister like Mahmūd Gāvān. But when it became rigid and the 'tarafdārs' acquired local prestige, it became difficult even for a strong minister like Mahmūd Gāvān to cope with its separatist tendencies.

The progress of these centrifugal forces was further

¹⁷ Forishta I., 532-33.

¹⁸ C.H.I., III., 383.

accentuated by the conflicting claims of the Deccani and Pardesi Muhammadans and their faction fights at the Bahmani court. In fact the most remarkable feature of Deccan politics during the days of the later Bahmani kings, was the perpetual strife between these Deccani and Pardesi nobles. The mutual hatred nursed by both parties flashed into flame, and the political strife arising from it assumed serious dimensions in the reign of 'Alā-ud-dīn Ahmad Shāh (1436-1458) and remained a source of danger ever after in the history of the Deccan sultanates. Indeed this insane rivalry was primarily responsible for the disintegration of the Bahmani kingdom.

The question next arises, what was it that divided these parties and led to the clash of their interests? To go to the root of this problem we have to analyse the composition of the ruling class, the Muhammadan aristocracy. By about the middle of the fifteenth century, this class had split itself into two rival groups, the Deccanis and the Pardesis or 'foreigners' (غاربه). The Deccanis were the domiciled Muhammadans. No doubt they had originally come from outside the Deccan. But a stay in the Deccan extending over generations had changed their manners, ways of living and outlook on life, and had even altered their complexions. Thus, for instance, the Muhammadans of the Navayat clan in the Konkan¹⁹ had in the process

¹⁹ The coastal strip of the Deccan between the Sahyādri range and the sea is known as the Konkan.

of time become completely Deccanised. They came to the Konkan from Arabia in the latter half of the eighth century and after the lapse of a hundred years began to consider themselves as natives of the Deccan.²⁰ Also the descendants of the Muslims whom Hasan, the first Bahmanī king, entertained in his service, had a century later, become natives of the country, and had no longer any extra-territorial interests. Many of them had native blood in their veins, for a number of the Muslim invaders originally coming into the Deccan had married women belonging to the country. This class also contained Hindu converts to Islām. Fathullāh 'Imād Shāh, the founder of the 'Imādshāhī dynasty of Berar and Ahmad Nizām Shāh, who established the sultanate of Ahmadnagar, were both originally Brāhmīns.²¹ Naturally, therefore, the Deccanis looked upon their native land, as their particular preserve and viewed with suspicion every foreigner entering the Deccan as a future rival and a possible competitor for a position at court and a place in the king's favour.

The Pardesis, as their name implied, were not natives of the Deccan; year by year they came into the country from abroad in increasing numbers. The Bahmanī kings made it a matter of policy to employ these Pardesi adventurers freely

²⁰ M.U.I., 164-65. Cf. Kolaba D.G. 74-75, Thana D.G. I., 216; Colloquies, 445.

²¹ Ferishta II., 180, 343.

in their army and a continuous supply of foreigners, mostly soldiers, poured into the country. A number of Pardesis came for trade and found it to their advantage to remain connected with the politics of the country. The Deccan in those days was the land of adventure and promise to these soldiers of fortune from Persia, Turkey, Central Asia, Arabia, Afghanistan a land where valour was recognised and statesmanship was rewarded.

From the very beginning of the Bahmanī kingdom the 'foreigners' wielded considerable influence in the politics of the country. Bahman Shāh himself had persuaded many Afghan and Mughal 'amirs' - fresh recruits in the Tughluq service from abroad - to join his standard.²² This policy was continued by his successors who, by their patronage, attracted and ensured a continuous supply of 'foreigners'. Mujāhid Shāh Bahmanī (1375-1378), in particular, showed a conspicuous preference for Persians and Turks.²³ It was this policy of preference and exclusion that created in the Deccan a feeling of grievance and ill usage.

At first the 'foreigners' were few in number and Deccanis did not feel their competition. But with the lapse of time they gained in strength and formed a distinct party. This

²² Ferishta I., 523.

²³ " I., 564.

also checked the process of assimilation. When, as at first, the Pardesis were few in number, they intermarried with the native Deccanis and were soon merged into the bigger community. But with the growth of the Pardesi party the 'foreigners' became conscious of a separate entity. This hindered the process of assimilation. Thus came into being the two distinct parties - the Deccanis and Pardesis. As a rule the Pardesis were more energetic and enterprising than the native-born Deccanis. They were employed in preference to their less active and hardy rivals, and seldom failed to acquit themselves well. Many rose to the highest offices in the state to the prejudice of the native Deccani who found himself surpassed in the battlefield as well as in the council chamber. This resulted in recriminations and quarrels, the forerunners of the internecine struggle which followed and weakened the power of the Bahmanī kingdom and ultimately led to its dissolution.

Moreover, the ill-feeling between the parties created by opposing interests was complicated by religious differences. A majority of the 'foreigners' were Shias, while most of the Deccanis were Sunnis.²⁴ The religious factor brought to the

²⁴ Ahmad Shāh Valī showed a preference for the Shia creed, donated money to Shia holy places and invited Shia saints to his court. *Ferishta* I., 632-33. Yūsuf 'Adil Khān and Sultān Qulī, two of the Pardesi provincial governors, who in the last Bahmanī period declared their independence, were Shias, where their two Deccani colleagues, Fathullāh 'Imad-ul-Mulk and Ahmad Nisām-ul-Mulk, were Sunnis.

side of the Deccanis one class of foreigners, the Abyssinians who were mostly Sunnis. In competition with the fair, handsome, cultured Pardesis from Persia, Turkey, etc., the dark-skinned, illiterate, unprepossessing Abyssinians were at a great disadvantage and were treated with contempt by the fair Pardesis. The religious factor and the contempt shown towards them by the other foreigners had the effect of throwing the Abyssinians into the arms of the Deccanis. Thus in the feud that followed between the Deccanis and Pardesis, it will be seen that the former party consisted of the Deccanis and Abyssinians while the latter was composed of Turks, Mughals, Persians and Arabs.

Towards the close of the fourteenth century the Deccanis realised that they were being gradually displaced from power and place by their successful rivals the Pardesis. But they did not retaliate immediately and patiently waited for an opportunity to gain the upper hand at the Bahmani court. This came during the latter half of the reign of Ahmad Shāh Valī (1422-1436) when the king suffered a decline alike in his mental and in his bodily powers. By well-calculated flattery, judicious self-praise and subtle insinuation against their rivals, the Deccanis manoeuvred themselves into the sultan's favour. During 1430-31 the Bahmani army was defeated on three successive occasions by the Gujarātis.²⁵ Khalaf Hasan, the

²⁵ Ferishta I., 631

Pardeesi minister who had been honoured with the title of Malik-ut-Tujjār²⁶ by Ahmad Shāh, attributed these reverses to the cowardice of the Deccanis. But the latter seem to have convinced the king of the incompetence of his Pardeesi adviser. The result was that the Deccanis were raised to power and the administration of government was entrusted to a member of their faction, one Miyān Mahmūd Nizām-ul-Mulk, who was invested with the coveted title of Malik-ut-Tujjār.²⁷

On coming to power, the Deccanis openly manifested their desire to suppress the 'foreigners', and, in 1446, massacred a large number of them by shameless treachery. In that year an army of Deccanis and Pardesis was sent against the Shirka of Konkan, but suffered an unfortunate defeat with the result that the survivors retreated to the fort of Chakan²⁸ (18.45 N. 73.32 E.). Taking advantage of this, the Deccanis "who from olden times had been deadly enemies of the foreigners",²⁹ misrepresented this affair to the sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Ahmad Shāh. The sultān "not knowing the perfidy, concurred with

²⁶ This title meaning "chief of the merchants" was highly esteemed by the foreigners, whose first visit to the Deccan was usually in the capacity of merchants.

²⁷ Ferishta I., 631; C.H.I., III., 404.

²⁸ In Khed Talukā, Poona district. Twenty miles due north of Poona.

²⁹ Burhān (I.A., XXVIII., 239).

14
the nobles that the surviving foreigners should be put to death."³⁰ The unfortunate Pardosis were lured out of Chākan and slaughtered, victims of their rivals' jealousy.

After the massacre of Chākan, a few foreigners' who, with great difficulty, effected their escape, represented to the king the deception which had been practised on him and gave him the correct version of what had taken place. Enquiries were set on foot which exposed the duplicity of the Deccanis and their desire for the extermination of the 'foreigners', with the result that they were severely punished and degraded in the court and the 'foreigners' regained their ascendancy.³¹

Murder of Mahmūd Gāvān: the dissolution of the Bahmani kingdom

Thus arose on the horizon a cloud which soon darkened the political firmament of the Deccan. The massacre of Chākan set the final seal on a hatred that had been steadily increasing for fifty years. Matters at length had gone too far; compromise was now unthinkable; each party wanted to destroy and uproot the other. In 1481, by a perfidy reminiscent of the massacre of Chākan, the Deccani party contrived the murder of one of the greatest statesmen in the history of India, Khwāja Mahmūd Gāvān, the Pardosi minister of Muhammad Shāh Bahmanī I. The false accusation and violent death of this upright minister

³⁰ Burhān (I.A., XXVIII., 239-40).

³¹ Ferishta I., 651.

constitute one of the tragedies of mediaeval India.

The Khvāja, who in the reign of Muhammad Shāh III. (1463-1482) had risen to the highest office in the state, was by birth a Persian. He was honoured by the king with the title of Malik-ut-Tujjār and he and his followers were permitted to take precedence at court over Hasan Nizām-ul-Mulk Bahri the leader of the Deccani party and 'tarafdār' of Telingana. With the welfare of the kingdom at heart and with a strict sense of justice Gāvān tried to maintain the balance between the Deccanis and Pardesis by an equal division of offices between the rival parties. But Hasan Nizām-ul-Mulk was jealous of the position of Gāvān and was waiting for an opportunity to overthrow the popular minister.

Mahmūd Gāvān initiated many reforms. He sub-divided each of the four main divisions into two and framed regulations for their government which curtailed the powers of the provincial governors.³³ These excellent reforms made for administrative efficiency but became extremely unpopular among the Deccanis and caused widespread resentment against their originator. The crafty and unscrupulous Hasan instigated his followers to put an end to the author of these reforms. So a number of Deccanis, although they had owed their high office

³² Cf. Ferishta I., 702.

³³ Ferishta I., 689-90.

entirely to Gāvān, entered into a conspiracy against their patron and hatched a nefarious plot for his destruction.³⁴ Yūsuf 'Adil Khān, the right-hand man of Gāvān, having been dispatched on an expedition into Telingana, the field was left clear for the conspirators. A forged letter with the minister's seal, purporting to invite the 'rājā' of Orissa to invade the kingdom, was suddenly unearthed. And Mahmūd Gāvān, thus falsely accused, was put to death by the order of Muḥammad Shāh³⁵ (April 5, 1481). This great crime was the immediate

³⁴ "In the midst of these affairs, a clique of jealous and malignant persons who play with the understanding of everyone, and by deceit and knavery, under the semblance of friendship, create ill-feeling between father and son, having conceived pure lies and vile inventions which had the appearance of truth reported them to the sultān." Burhān, l.c. 290-91. Ferishta I., 690-91.

³⁵ Ferishta I., 692-93. The historian quotes two chronograms, giving the date of this tragic event.

قتل نا حق

The unjust execution.

بگنه محمود مجاور شد شهید

Without guilt Mahmūd Gāvān became a martyr.

cause of the dissolution of the Bahmani kingdom. The Pardesi 'amirs' refused to stay in the capital and returned to their provinces without the formality of obtaining the king's permission. Even the respectable members of the Deccani party openly expressed their disapproval of the conspirators and joined the camp of Yūsuf 'Adil Khān. Deserted by the 'foreigners' and some of the Deccanis, the king was forced to throw himself into the arms of the conspirators. Hasan Hishār-ul-Mulk was exalted to the dignity of Malik Nāib and all the affairs of the kingdom were placed in his hands.³⁶ But Muhammad Shāh could not forget that he had shed innocent blood; he tried to drown his remorse in wine and died from its effects within a year of his minister, crying with his last breath that Gāvān was tearing out his heart.³⁷

Muhammad's son and successor Mahmūd being a minor, authority remained in the hands of Malik Nāib. On the eve of the coronation ceremony, when all the 'amirs' had gathered in the capital, the crafty Deccani formed a plot to assassinate Yūsuf 'Adil Khān and to extirpate his followers. But the 'foreigners' were put on their guard by some of their well-wishers in the opposite camp. For no less than twenty days Bīdar was a scene

³⁶ Burhān, l.c. 305.

³⁷ Ferishta I., 700.

of conflict between the rival factions and when peace was restored, Yūsuf 'Adil Khān agreed to retire to Bijāpur and Malik Nāib was left at the helm of affairs in the Bahmani capital.³⁸

The regency of Malik Nāib did not last long. He was disliked by some of his followers for his share in the murder of Mahmūd Gāvān and his subsequent policy towards the 'foreigners' made him intensely hated by a section of the Deccanis. The usual intrigues followed and Malik Nāib, fleeing for safety, was put to death by the Abyssinian governor of Bidar.³⁹ Thus the Deccani minister shared the fate of the great Pardesi noble whose death he had so basely contrived.

Once again the swing of the pendulum brought the Pardesi to power. Once again their rivals conspired to destroy the influence which they still possessed, going to the length, this time, of forming a conspiracy to murder the king and to place another prince of the royal family on the throne.⁴⁰ They suddenly attacked the royal palace one night in October, 1487, but were repulsed by the valour of the Turki guard. The king assembled his foreign troops and next morning ordered

³⁸ Ferishta I., 703-04.

³⁹ Burhān, l.c. 306; Ferishta I., 708-09.

⁴⁰ Ferishta I., 709.

the conspirators to be put to death. The slaughter lasted for three days and the 'foreigners' inflicted a terrible retribution on the Deccanis for the wrongs they had suffered. After these events Mahmūd Shāh took no interest in the affairs of state; the responsibility of government was assumed by Qāsim Barīd a Turkī 'amīr' of the Sunni persuasion. The prestige of the Bahmanīs was lost and the provincial governors were unwilling to acknowledge the supremacy of Qāsim Barīd.⁴¹ The defection of Ahmad Nizām-ul-Mulk, the son of Malik Nāib, began the process of disintegration. Two expeditions were sent against him but they were of no avail.⁴² He had the full sympathy of Yūsuf 'Adil Khān who even suggested that he should secede from the Bahmanī kingdom. Ahmad acted on this welcome suggestion, and in June, 1490, proclaimed himself as an independent king.⁴³ His colleagues, Fathullāh 'Inād-ul-Mulk of Berar and Yūsuf 'Adil Khān of Bijāpur soon followed suit, with the result that by the end of that year the Bahmanī kingdom had definitely lost its sovereignty.

Perhaps the founders of the new kingdoms believed that,

⁴¹ Burhān (I.A., XLII., 103); cf. F.A. 23b.

⁴² Ferishta II., 182.

⁴³ " 186.

by the course they had chosen they would close an unhappy chapter and begin a new one. This, however, was not to be, and the history of the next two hundred years showed only the continued struggle between the Deccan sultanates for the supremacy of the country, a struggle that ultimately led to their decline and downfall.



The Five Sultanates of the Deccan.

100 MILES

CHAPTER II.

EARLY HISTORY OF BIJĀPUR.

Relations between the Deccan Sultanates:- The ten years following the murder of Mahmud Gāvān saw the rapid decline of the Bahmanī kingdom. The elements of disorder, which had apparently been banished by the powerful personality of that minister, made their appearance in forces more formidable than ever and hastened the process of disintegration. Yūsuf 'Ādil Khān was, during this period, the governor of the province of Bijāpur and he considered it more prudent to establish himself in his province than to risk his life and the lives of his followers in the uncertain politics of the Bahmanī court at Bīdar. He, therefore, decided to follow in the footsteps of Ahmad Rīzām Shāh of Ahmadnagar rather than remain a provincial governor at the mercy of Qāsim Barīd, the de facto king at Bīdar. He was sure of the support of his 'foreign' followers. There were in Bijāpur at this time five thousand of these men who were willing to acknowledge him as their king. Both ambition and safety counselled breaking away from Bīdar and at the end of the year 895 A.H.¹ (August-September, 1490) he

¹ Ferishta II., 6; B.S. 16; T.D., I., 244.

ascended the royal throne, caused the 'khutba' to be read in his own name² and, substituting the word 'shāh' for 'khān', proclaimed himself as Yūsuf 'Idil Shāh, king of Bījāpur.³

For the understanding of the events which followed, it is necessary to have an idea of the various parts into which the Bahmanī kingdom was, at this stage, divided. The process of disintegration spread over a period of about twenty-five years, and it was only with the assumption of royalty by Sultān Qulī Qutb Shāh at Golconda that there finally emerged the five states known as the Deccan sultanates. At this time, however, there were as many as twelve divisions in the so-called Bahmanī kingdom.⁴ But the most important were the five which were finally consolidated out of these twelve about the beginning of the sixteenth century. Three of these had already declared their independence, and the rest merely made a show of allegiance to the king at Bīdar, who himself was a prisoner at Qāsim Barīd, the all-powerful Bahmanī minister. But even this show of allegiance was of a shifting nature, for sometimes the smaller governors would find it more convenient to acknowledge the suzerainty of Ahmadnagar or Bījāpur

² Cf. "The khutba largely consisted of ascription of praise and glory to God, and the invoking of blessing upon the Prophet ... It includes a prayer for the reigning sovereign, and the substitution in the khutba of a new name many announce the accession of a new monarch or the transference of authority from one government to another." Arnold, 38-39.

³ Ferishta II., 6; B.S. 16; T.D., I., 244.

⁴ Ferishta II., 14.

as it suited their purpose.

Contiguous to Yūsuf's new kingdom were the districts commanded by Bahādur Gilāni with his headquarters at Goa. Parenda and Sholāpur were in the hands of Khvājī Jahān, a Deccani. Gulbarga and the surrounding districts formed the 'jāgīr' of Dastūr Dīnār, an Abyssinian. On one side of Dīnār's 'jāgīr' was the newly founded kingdom of Ahmadnagar and on the other Bīdar, governed by Qāsim Barīd in the name of the puppet Bahmani king. To the south of Bījāpur, beyond the river Tungabhadra, lay the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar.

From their very inception the Deccan sultanates were at war and the history of the sixteenth century is one continuous struggle between them. The immediate causes of many of these hostilities were trivial, but underlying them was, in some form, the idea of the balance of power. Besides this the religious factor, the Deccani-Pardesi tension, and disputes over the possession of certain territories were mainly responsible for the chronic warfare that characterizes the history of the Deccan sultanates. Ahmadnagar was the first to secede from the Bahmani kingdom; Bījāpur and Berar followed suit and at Bīdar the Bahmani king became a puppet in the hands of the Barīds. And though Golconda did not secede till a later date, Sultān Qulī, the governor of that province was independent for all practical purposes. So that at the beginning of the sixteenth century, there were in the Deccan five

powers. Three of these, Ahmadnagar, Bidar and Bijāpur were inspired by an ambition to succeed to the power of the Bahmani kingdom and become sovereign in the country; their struggle was a struggle for the hegemony of the Deccan. The three protagonists were constantly at war, Bidar and Ahmadnagar together against Bijāpur. Both Berar and Golconda helped Bijāpur whenever they thought that the combination against it had become too powerful, and thus helped to maintain the balance of power in the Deccan. Bidar was soon quietened but Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur fought bitterly, and even when the Mughals came into the Deccan, they did not combine for their common safety. At last Ahmadnagar fell a victim to the might of the Mughals and the fate of Bijāpur was also sealed.

The struggle manifested itself in various ways. It was fostered by military and political ambition, by relations clouded by mutual suspicions of aggressive designs, by a conviction that war was the only remedy for political ills. Moreover the differences of religious belief between Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar always kept them apart. When the Bijāpur kings were Shias, the Nizām shāhs were Sunnis; and the accession of a Sunni king at Bijāpur coincided ^{with} the conversion of Burhān Nizām Shāh I. of Ahmadnagar to the Shia creed. It must also be borne in mind that Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh was the leader of the Pardesi party at Bidar and Ahmad Nizām Shāh, the founder of

Ahmadnagar, was the son of the leader of the Deccanis who were responsible for the murder of Mahmūd Gāvān. Thus the struggle between Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur, in its early stages, was embittered by the memories of the feuds between Deccanis and Pardesis. In addition when Pardesis obtained ascendancy at Ahmadnagar, Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I. began to show a preference for Deccanis at Bijāpur. And so the differences between the neighbours were kept alive.

In such atmosphere of mutual animosity a cause for war was always at hand. At one time it was a grievance over the loss of a fort or a district, at another it was the ill-treatment of a princess married into another house, at still another time it was merely the exchange of maladroit messages or a breach of recognised manners or precedents. Thus small incidents revived old or created new discontents, and tended to keep alive the acrimonious spirit, so dangerous to the peace of the Deccan and the safety of the sultanates.

Only once during the sixteenth century did the sultanates unite for a common end. This was in 1565, the year of the Muslim confederacy which led to the battle of Talikota and the overthrow of the Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar. But the lesson of Talikota was soon forgotten and Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar once again became as estranged as before. Earlier in the sixteenth century the sultanates did combine against Gujarāt

in 1528 when the safety of the Deccan was threatened by that powerful kingdom. But no sooner had the Gujarātis retired than the Deccan states resumed their old wrangles. The only force that could have banded them together was a common danger like the might of Vijayanagar. But after the fall of the Hindu Empire such an external force did not exist till the arrival of the Mughals into the Deccan. By that time the sultanates had become completely demoralised. Moreover the religious incentive that had brought them together against Vijayanagar was absent in the case of the Mughals. Towards the end of the sixteenth century when the Mughals first came into the Deccan, the sultanates of Ahmadnagar, Bijāpur and Golconda did make a combined effort to stem the tide of their advance. But their defence was weak, their enthusiasm half-hearted; after their defeat at Sonpet, Bijāpur and Golconda withdrew and the alliance was not renewed.

Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh's diplomacy:- At the beginning the efforts of Qāsim Barīd and his son Amīr were directed to destroy the power of Bijāpur. The new kingdom founded by Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh was the most powerful of all the other Deccan sultanates. The source of Bijāpur's strength lay in the Pardesis who had followed their leader Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh to Bijāpur. They were the flower of the Bahmanī army and they enabled Yūsuf not only to survive the attacks of the combinations planned by

Qāsim Barīd, but also to extend the kingdom by annexing the Konkan in the west and the 'jāgīrs' of Dastūr Dīnār in the east. Both these territorial acquisitions were essential for the security of the kingdom. The annexation of the Konkan strip gave the kingdom the important ports of Goa and Dābhol and thus ensured the supply of horses for 'Adilshāhī cavalry and Pardesi adventurers for the army.⁵ Dastūr Dīnār's territories, situated as they were on the eastern side of the Deccan plateau were more fertile than some of the regions adjoining the Sahyādri mountain range in the west.⁶ From the moment he declared his independence, Yūsuf endeavoured to extend his kingdom from the sea-board to Gulbarga. This he succeeded in achieving in spite of the repeated efforts of Qāsim Barīd to check his growing power. And by his statesmanship he also succeeded in giving his kingdom strength and stability which enabled it to survive the upheavals that were to follow his death.

Qāsim Barīd and his son Amīr were the central figures in the internecine warfare in the Deccan for the next thirty years. Qāsim Barīd was an orthodox Sunni while Yūsuf was known for his Shia sympathies. But Barīd's activities against Bijāpur were prompted by something more than differences of belief. He had set his heart on Bijāpur of which Yūsuf had deprived him, and since he could not possess it he sought

⁵ It was this factor that determined to a great extent Bijāpur's relations with the Portuguese. See Chapter IV.

⁶ See Chapter I.

its destruction. His plan was a subtle one. He held Mahmūd Shāh Bahmanī as his virtual prisoner and he made adroit use of this fact. In the name of the Bahmanī king he invited the Hindus of Vijayanagar and Bahādūr Gilānī to attack Bijāpur territories. The situation was one which required diplomacy and timely concessions. Yūsuf made peace with both by ceding them the territories they had occupied and turned his attention to Qāsim Barīd. Barīd had made a successful appeal to Ahmad Nizām Shāh for help, but their combined armies were defeated at Haldurg.⁷ Qāsim Barīd was intimidated, so much so that he did not raise his head against Bijāpur for the next ten years.

There were two other reasons which held Qāsim Barīd in check. Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh entered into a matrimonial alliance with the royal house of Bahman by giving his daughter in marriage to the son of Mahmūd Shāh Bahmanī.⁸ Any further hostilities towards Bijāpur by Qāsim Barīd, therefore, would have thrown the titular Bahmanī king into the arms of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh. This was contrary to Barīd's plans as he was ruling at Bīdar in the name of the Bahmanī king. Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh's second move was to secure the neutrality of Ahmad Nizām Shāh. He approached Ahmad with a suggestion for the partition of the Deccan between the four most powerful of its twelve divisions. Each of the four powers were to have their

⁷ Ferishta I., 713-14; II., 6-7, 188.

⁸ Ferishta II., 12-13; Durhān (I.A., XXVIII., 310-11).

respective spheres of influence and as his share of the bargain Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh was to be left free to annex the Konkan and Gulbarga 'jāgīrs'.⁹

Goa came into Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh's possession peacefully,¹⁰ but the conquest of Gulbarga proved more difficult. Though Qāsim Barīd did not openly take up arms against Bijāpur, he was straining every nerve to prevent Gulbarga passing into the hands of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh. For a time his intrigues succeeded.¹¹ But ultimately Dastūr Dīnār was slain in a battle with 'Adilshāhī troops which gave Yūsuf the right of conquest over his fertile 'jāgīr'.¹² The Rāichūr Doab also was recovered from the Hindus about this time.

The annexation of these two provinces was the crowning glory of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh's diplomacy. As has been already observed, their possession was essential to Bijāpur if the kingdom was to survive the machinations of Qasim Barīd and his son Amīr. The 'Adilshāhī army had to be kept in efficient fighting condition and for this purpose it was essential to recruit Pardesi adventurers and also to import horses into the kingdom from Persia and Arabia. This could be achieved only by the possession of the two ports of Goa and Dābhōi. Goa was, at this time, one of the most important ports in

⁹ Ferishta II., 14.

¹⁰ Ferishta II., 14-15; T.D., I., 266.

¹¹ Ferishta I., 719-22; II., 12-13, 15; F.A., 26a-27b.

¹² Ferishta II., 16-17; F.A., 28a-30a.

India and Dābhol second only to Goa in importance in the Deccan and offered not only strategic but commercial advantages. The conquest of Dīnār's territories increased the productive capacity and the wealth of the kingdom. The new acquisitions also provided more recruiting ground for native infantry.

Religious factors in Deccan politics:- The ten years' peace had been utilised by Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh to strengthen his position all round. Not only had he acquired the strategic territories necessary for the security and prosperity of his kingdom, but he also seems to have devoted his attention during this period in reorganising its administration.¹³ He had already married a Marāthā lady;¹⁴ this fact coupled with his perfect toleration towards his Hindu subjects won for him the loyalty and co-operation of the Marāthās. The strength of the kingdom depended on two factors, a continuous supply of Parde adventurers for the army and the support of the people of the country, the Hindus, a majority of whom were Marāthās. It is but natural, therefore, that Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh's statesmanship should have been directed to ensure and maintain both.

Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh had no further territorial ambitions; his desire was to live in peace with his neighbours and to place the administration of his kingdom on a sound footing.

¹³ Cf. Jervis, 75-76, 82-83; Ratnāgiri, D.G., 213-14.

¹⁴ Ferishta II., 22.

But the very first reform he undertook brought on him the wrath of his neighbours and once again kindled the fire of internecine strife which destroyed the strength of the sultantes and led ultimately to their downfall.

When Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh declared his independence the 'khutba' in the capital was recited in the Sunni fashion, though Yūsuf himself was an ardent Shia. He had adopted this course out of political expediency. But now, thinking that his position was secure, he decided to adopt the Shia forms of worship. He was further induced to hasten this reform by the news from Persia where Ismā'il Safavi had just then adopted the Shia creed as the state religion.¹⁵ On a Friday (June 1503) Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh himself attended the Jāmi Masjid in the citadel and caused the 'khutba' to be read in the name of the twelve Imāms with the distinctive Shia formula "I bear witness that 'Ali is the friend of God."¹⁶ And he won the distinction of being the first king in India to establish the "protestant" doctrine.

To Qāsim Barīd, orthodox in his religious beliefs and crafty in his political practices, no better opportunity could have offered itself for a revenge on Yūsuf for what had happened at Maldurg ten years ago. He had stored the humiliation of that defeat in his mind waiting for a favourable opportunity

¹⁵ Favā'id-us-Safaviya, 5a; Browne, 52-54. Ferishta II., 18.

¹⁶ Ferishta II., 17-18; B.S., 19-20; F.A. 30a.

to make one more effort to put a check to the growing strength of Bijāpur. That opportunity had now arrived. The open adoption of the Shia faith by Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh was undoubtedly a daring step; in the eyes of his enemies it was a detestable innovation. To Qāsim Barīd it was more than that, it was to him the last chance of encompassing the downfall of his successful rival. His task seemed easier because of the discontent which the reform had aroused among some of the Bijāpur nobles. This was good news for Qāsim Barīd. Ahmad Nizām Shāh and Sultān Qulī Qutb-ul-Mulk were called upon to fight under the Bahmanī flag.¹⁷ The former, a Sunni, considered it his duty to join in a war against Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh, but strangely enough Sultān Qulī, himself a Shia and secretly in sympathy with Yūsuf's reform, also agreed to join Barīd. His action can be explained only on grounds of political expediency¹⁸ and the fact that he had not declared his independence and considered himself a vassal of the Bahmanī king. Perhaps he thought that Bijāpur was becoming unduly powerful and it was best to throw his weight on Barīd's side to maintain the balance of power.

Fathullāh 'Imād Shāh of Berar was actuated by an identical motive. But he considered that the confederacy against Bijāpur was too powerful. Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh had already applied

¹⁷ Ferishta II., 19; B.S. 21.

¹⁸ Cf. Hadīqat-ul-'Ālam, 25-26; Ferishta II., 20.

to him for help. Fathullāh considered it best to avoid open conflict and advised Yūsuf to suspend his religious reforms. This was the only possibility of saving Bijapur. Once again Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh proved his statesmanship by timely action. The Shia practices at Bijapur were discontinued and Fathullāh prevailed on Golconda and Ahmadnagar to withdraw from the confederacy.¹⁹ It was only after Qāsim Barīd's death²⁰ that Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh reinstated the Shia forms of worship in Bijapur. To avoid discontent among his Sunni nobility he gave them complete religious freedom.²¹

The religious policy of Ismā'īl 'Adil Shāh, Yūsuf's son, was not tolerant. Young, impetuous, inexperienced in statecraft, his intolerance involved the kingdom in constant wars. He dismissed many of his Sunni nobility, who were mostly Deccanis, from his service.²² These officers along with their men entered the service of Burhān Nisām Shāh I. at Ahmadnagar or of Amīr Barīd at Bidar and helped to increase the volume of ill-will against Bijapur. As opposed to Ismā'īl, his successor Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I. went to the other extreme. He was a staunch Sunni and he discontinued the practice of recruiting Pardoesis in his army,²³ with the result that the

¹⁹ Ferishta I., 723, II., 20; B.S. 21; T.M.Q.S. 43b-44a.

²⁰ Ferishta I., 347. The earliest date of this event can be June 1504. The C.H.I. III., 429 is mistaken in supposing that it was Amīr Barīd who formed the confederacy.

²¹ Ferishta II., 19; B.S. 21.

²² Ferishta II., 30-31; B.S. 32-33; F.A. 43b-44a.

²³ B.S. 49; Ferishta II., 49.

efficiency of the Bijāpur army greatly deteriorated during his reign. His constant defeats at the hands of Ahmednagar and the Hindus were undoubtedly due to this fact; his successes due mainly to the generalship of Asad Khān his loyal Pardesi minister. At the same time the policy of Burhān Nizām Shāh I., who had succeeded his father Ahmad Nizām Shāh in 1503, had also changed. He was a contemporary both of Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh and his son Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I. He was a Sunni during the life-time of Ismā'il and waged bitter conflict against him. But the accession of Ibrāhīm at Bijāpur saw a change in Burhān's religious beliefs. In 1537 he was converted to the Shia creed² by his Pardesi minister Shāh Tāhir and began to show preference for Pardesis over Deccanis. Many of the Pardesis that were dismissed from Bijāpur by Ibrāhīm were welcomed with open arms by Burhān at Ahmednagar and the conflict between the neighbours remained as acute as ever.

This difference of religious belief kept Bijāpur and Ahmednagar always apart, so that even when the Mughals came into the Deccan a whole-hearted union between the two became impossible. Ultimately the Shia inclinations of the last two representatives of the 'Adilshāhī dynasty gave Aurangzib his strongest excuse to conquer Bijāpur and to fulfil his imperialistic ambitions under the cloak of outraged orthodoxy.

Amir Barid's intrigues against Bijāpur:—Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh died

²⁴ Ferishta II., 224-25.

in October 1510 and was succeeded by his son Ismā'il, a minor. Yūsuf had nominated one of his officers, Kamāl Khān, a Deccani, as the regent.²⁵ Perhaps he believed that this step would unite the Deccani and Pardesi elements in the common welfare of the kingdom. But Kamāl Khān's ambitions and intrigues nearly cost the young king his throne. One of his first acts was to restore the public profession of the Sunni faith²⁶ by which he won over the Deccani section of the nobility as well as the approval of the neighbouring sultanates. He also made peace with the Portuguese who had conquered Goa.

But Kamāl Khān was not satisfied with the power of a regent, he aspired to possess the crown of his king. Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh was but a child and the Pardesi party in the capital had been suppressed. The way for the regent was clear. In Amīr Barīd, who had succeeded his father Qāsim Barīd at Bīdar, he found a willing ally to further his ambition. They entered into a secret agreement by which it was agreed that Kamāl Khān should imprison Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh and should ascend the 'Adilshāhī throne. In addition he was free to annex the province of Sholāpur while Amīr Barīd was to have Bīdar with as much of the Ahmadnagar territory as he could conquer.²⁷

Kamāl Khān's ambition cost him his life. He was put to

²⁵ Ferishta II., 21, 23.

²⁶ Ferishta II., 24; B.S. 27.

²⁷ Ferishta II., 24-25; B.S. 27-28; P.A. 370-380. At Ahmadnagar Ahmad Nizām Shāh was succeeded by his son Burhān (1509) also a minor. Ferishta II., 198.

death at the instance of Dilshad Agha the king's aunt (1511). This caused a civil war in Bijāpur. After the regent's death his wife urged her son Safdar Khān to avenge his father. The Pardesī rescued Ismā'īl 'Adil Shāh from falling into the hands of the Deccanis who under Safdar Khān had besieged the citadel where the royal family was. In a skirmish Safdar Khān lost his life and the revolt collapsed. The leader of the Pardesī whose timely action saved the person of the boy king was one Muhammad Lārī. In recognition of his services he was given the 'jāgīr' of Belgaum and was honoured with the title of Asad Khān²⁸ by which name he became one of the most celebrated figures in Bijāpur history. Loyal to the highest degree, Asad Khān devoted his life to the service of the 'Adil-shāhī throne. His devotion saved the kingdom from the machinations of Amīr Barīd in the reign of Ismā'īl and from the confederacy between Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar during the reign of Ibrāhīm I. For single-minded devotion and unswerving loyalty to the 'Adilshāhī dynasty his name stands very high.

The reaction against Deccani ascendancy was complete. Sunni forms of worship were discontinued and never during the reign of Ismā'īl were Deccanis admitted into royal service.²⁹

Amīr Barīd was not slow to take advantage of the unrest

²⁸ Ferishta II., 27-31; B.S. 29-32; F.A. 39a-44a; T.E. 33b-34a.

²⁹ B.S. 32-33; Ferishta II., 30-31; F.A. 43b-44a.

in Bijāpur. He instigated the Hindus to attack the Doāb and himself occupied Gulbarga. His triumph was short-lived, for soon after the end of the civil war in Bijāpur he was driven out of the place. He thereupon revived the old confederacy against Bijāpur, but the military skill of Asad Khān triumphed and the confederates were defeated. The attempt to recover the Doāb from the Hindus, however, proved unsuccessful.³⁰

The defeat at Gulbarga only prompted Amir Barīd to further intrigues against Bijāpur. Twice he helped Burhān Nisān Shāh against Ismā'il and even attempted to tamper with the loyalty of the 'Adilshāhī army. Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh at last decided to put an end to his wiles and marched into Bidar territory (1529). Asad Khān his general brought off an audacious coup. He entered Barīd's camp and carried him off, on the bed where he lay in a drunken sleep, before Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh. Bidar was captured and Amir Barīd became practically a vassal of Bijāpur.³¹ The kingdom of Bidar ought to have been annexed to Bijāpur at this time. But soon afterwards Ismā'il restored it to Amir Barīd. This proved a most unwise policy, for once again Amir Barīd, that inveterate plotter, started his game of intrigue against Bijāpur.

³⁰ F.A. 44a; B.S. 26, 33-34; Ferishta I., 724, II., 25, 30-31, 34-36; Muniz, Sewell, 140-47.

³¹ Ferishta II., 36, 38-41; B.S. 36-37, 39-40; F.A. 49b-50a. Bidar was conquered and annexed to Bijāpur in 1619 by Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. B.S. 272-73; F.A. 289a-281b.

Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar: Ismā'īl and Burhān:- It became clear to Asad Khān that the only way to make Amīr Warid powerless for mischief was to win over his ally Burhān Nizām Shāh. An understanding between Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar would certainly have brought peace to the Deccan. Asad Khān's views were shared by Shāh Tāhir, the Pardesi minister of Burhān Nizām Shāh. Through the good office of these two Ismā'īl and Burhān agreed to meet at Sholāpur to discuss future relations between their kingdoms.³² Sholāpur had been conquered by Kamāl Khān early in 1511. It was one of the smaller Bahmani provinces and was in charge of Zain Khān, a brother of Khwāja Jahān Deccani.³³ After the end of Kamāl Khān's regency it automatically became a part of the Bijāpur kingdom. But now Burhān Nizām Shāh cast longing eyes on it and desired to possess it. At the meeting Ismā'īl 'Adil Shāh proposed an alliance between Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur. Burhān welcomed the suggestion adding that if Mariyam, Ismā'īl's sister, were given to him in marriage, it would strengthen the alliance. He also succeeded in inveigling Asad Khān into some sort of understanding on behalf of his master, that Sholāpur was to be the marriage dowry (کابین) of the princess.³⁴ The whole of the month of May 1524 was spent in celebrating the marriage.

³² Ferishta II., 201.

³³ B.S. 28; F.A. 28a; Ferishta II. 25.

³⁴ Ferishta II., 201; B.S. 35-36; F.A. 48b.

each party thinking that it had secured the best bargain.

But soon disillusion came, alliance resulted in hostility. The marriage instead of cementing friendship aggravated the ill-feeling between the two kingdoms. Burhān Nizām Shāh asked for the fulfilment of the contract some days after returning to his capital. Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh at first ignored these demands, and when pressed further, repudiated the understanding altogether. Burhān's retaliation was none too dignified. He insulted his wife Mariyam, and the princess reported the matter to her brother Ismā'il who in his turn remonstrated with the Nizāmahānī ambassadors at his court. In alliance with Amīr Barīd Burhān attacked Sholāpur but Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh repulsed him and carried the day. Another attempt by the two was also unsuccessful.³⁵

The possession of Sholāpur had now become a point of honour between Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar. Both Ismā'il and Burhān were hot-headed and impetuous youths and an alliance between the two seemed psychologically impossible: one was a Shia, the other a Sunni; one favoured Pardosis in his service, the other Deccanis. In short Ismā'il and Burhān represented conflicting ideals, and hostilities between the two seemed inevitable. On and above Amīr Barīd was always ready to fan the embers of hatred in Burhān's heart over Sholāpur. He had never forgiven Ismā'il for his humiliation at the siege of

³⁵ Ferishta II., 36; B.S. 36-37.

Bidar and once again he instigated Burhān Nizām Shāh to make war on Bijāpur. With an army of twenty-five thousand they marched towards Maldurg. It consisted mostly of Deccanis and Marāthas, and had no chance against the Pardesis of Bijāpur though only half in number. Burhān was defeated with the loss of his guns and camp equipage and fled to his capital.³⁶

The move for peace came from Burhān Nizām Shāh himself. He seems to have recognised the futility of fighting against Bijāpur with its army of Pardesi soldiers who were always successful in the field over the Deccanis of Ahmadnagar. He did not go to war against Bijāpur during the life-time of Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh.

Though Golconda had not taken active part in the recent wars, it had secretly helped Amīr Barīd when Ismā'il had besieged Bidar in 1529. Inspired by his successes against Bidar and Ahmadnagar Ismā'il decided to make war on Golconda and thus to prove the supremacy of Bijāpur over the other Deccan sultanates. Towards the end of 1533 he crossed the Rāichūr Doāb and laid siege to the Qutbahānī stronghold of Kovilconda. Here he fell ill of a violent fever and died at Sāgar while returning to Bijāpur³⁷ (August 27, 1534).

In accordance with Ismā'il's wishes his eldest son Mallū was raised to the throne. But he was a worthless and debauched

³⁶ Ferishta II., 44-46, 212; B.S. 45.

³⁷ Ferishta II., 46; Hadīqat-ul-'Alam, 68-70; T.M.Q.S. 64b-68b; B.S., 46.

youth and his iniquitous behaviour disgusted all. With the approval of Asad Khān he was deposed, blinded and imprisoned and soon after he died in captivity. Ibrāhīm, the second son of Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh, now ascended the throne.³⁸

Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar: Ibrāhīm and Burhān:- The military success of Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh was due to the superiority of his Pardesi army over the Deccanis of Ahmadnagar and Bidar, the generalship of Asad Khān, also a Pardesi, and the personal valour of Ismā'il himself. Burhān Nizām Shāh was not slow to perceive the military superiority of Bijāpur over the other Deccan sultanates and soon we find him remodelling his policy. He had already appointed Shāh Tāhir as his minister. Shāh Tāhir, remembered to-day in the Deccan more for his saintliness than his political achievements, was a native of Persia and had arrived at Ahmadnagar during the early part of Burhān's reign; and by his piety, learning, wisdom and saintliness had attained great eminence in the Deccan and by his statesmanship and astute diplomacy had become indispensable to Burhān Nizām Shāh. But though Burhān had appointed Shāh Tāhir as his minister, he had not completely overcome his prejudice against Pardesis. Slowly but surely Shāh Tāhir was exerting his influence over Burhān and in 1537 he succeeded in converting him to the Shia faith. At the same time Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I.

³⁸ Forishta II., 46-47; B.S. 47; F.A. 56a-57b; T.M. 36b.

of Bijāpur had adopted a policy directly opposed to his predecessors' and to the one adopted by Burhān Nizām Shāh. Ibrāhīm was a Sunni; he dismissed his Pardeesi army and encouraged Deccanis and Marāthās in his service. The disbanded Pardeesi soldiery from Bijāpur was readily recruited by Burhān at Ahmadnagar and by Rāma Rāya at Vijayanagar. Only Asad Khān, loyal as ever to the 'Adilshāhī throne remained in Ibrāhīm's service. Thus Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I. and Burhān Nizām Shāh found themselves in opposite camps. This only aggravated the acerbity between the two kingdoms. Hereditary animosity was embittered by religious differences between Ibrāhīm and Burhān. Behind their religious creeds was not passive traditional acceptance, but the zeal of a convert in the case of one and intense reaction in the case of the other. During the whole of Ibrāhīm's reign his relations with Burhān were persistently hostile. More than one reason contributed to this. Burhān coveted Sholāpur and perpetually intrigued against Ibrāhīm. Undoubtedly what enabled him to engage in a continuous struggle was the constant support given to him by Rāma Rāya of Vijayanagar. The Hindu regent, a man of little caution and less scruple, was constantly on the watch for an opportunity to interfere to his own advantage in the affairs of his neighbours. It took the Deccan sultanates twenty-five years to apprehend his machinations and form a confederacy to overthrow him.

As a rule Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh was unsuccessful against Burhān. The reason is not far to seek. The Pardesis who were the mainstay of Bijāpur's military strength were no longer in the army and the Deccanis were inferior to them in military skill. The dismissal of the Pardesis was a great mistake and it weakened the power of Bijāpur. As opposed to this Burhān who had now been convinced of the superiority of Pardesis over Deccanis freely admitted the former in his service. Ahmadnagar, therefore, became superior to Bijāpur in military strength. Moreover, Burhān made a further departure in his policy and allied with the Hindus against Bijāpur. This only shows how deep the hatred of Bijāpur had taken root in him. He even went to the extent of requesting Shāh Tahmāsp Safavī of Persia to send him troops for his wars against the Sunni Ibrāhīm.³⁹

Ibrāhīm possessed neither the statesmanship of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh nor the military skill of Ismā'il. After his quarrel with Asad Khān and especially after Asad Khān's death he degenerated into a licentious tyrant. Although constantly at war he showed deplorable lack of military leadership and his few successes were due to the generalship of Asad Khān. When left to himself he seems generally to have been defeated. No doubt he had to fight against heavy odds; but by his own policy he had weakened his military strength, by his fanaticism increased Burhān's ill-will and by his interference in the

³⁹ Burhān (I.A., XLIX., 199).

internal affairs of Vijayanagar incurred the enmity of the Hindus who to further their own designs entered into an alliance with Ahmadnagar.

In 1538 Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh launched on his reactionary policy by dismissing most of the Pardesis in his service and by declaring the Sunni faith. All efforts of Asad Khān to restrain the king from taking this retrograde step proved of no avail. A misunderstanding sprang up between the two. The rivals of Asad Khān were not slow to take advantage of this estrangement. Asad Khān was the principal man in Bijāpur, and as it always happened in Deccan history, his power and influence excited considerable envy and jealousy. His rivals whispered many a malicious falsehood about him in the receptive ears of the king. The minister found it advisable to retire to his 'jāgīr' at Belgaum⁴⁰ rather than risk his life in the capital seething with intrigue against him.

Encouraged by the reports of the strained relations between Ibrāhīm and Asad Khān, Burhān Nizām Shāh believed that the time was ripe for him to conquer Sholāpur. Further, Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh had offended him by sponsoring a confederacy to annihilate Ahmadnagar altogether and to divide it between Gujarāt, Khandesh and Bijāpur. But Burhān persuaded the kings of Gujarāt and Khandesh to abandon the project and himself made preparations for war on Bijāpur. He formed an alliance

⁴⁰ Ferishta II., 49, 52; B.S. 56.

with Amīr Barīd, invaded the 'Adilshāhī kingdom and occupied Sholāpur.⁴¹

After capturing Sholāpur Burhān turned in the direction of the 'Adilshāhī capital. Asad Khān on his part marched from Belgaum with his Pardesi cavalry to join his master. As he neared Bījāpur, Ibrāhīm lost heart, thinking that Asad Khān had marched forth to join the enemy, and fled to Gulbarga. Asad Khān would certainly have been prevented from joining Ibrāhīm at Gulbarga if his intentions were known to the enemy. He, therefore, thought of a strategic move and simulated submission to Burhān and along with his army marched towards Gulbarga. In the meanwhile he sent an envoy to Daryā 'Imad Shāh of Berar explaining his predicament and demanding Daryā's help in the hour of Bījāpur's difficulty.⁴²

The sultān of Berar, true to his traditional friendship for Bījāpur, at once hastened towards Gulbarga. As he approached the town Asad Khān left Burhān's camp and joined him. The minister's strategy succeeded, his loyalty became evident to Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh. The enemy considered it unwise to fight the augmented 'Adilshāhī forces and retreated towards Bīr and thence to Ahmadnagar. But they were pursued by the combined Bījāpur and Berar armies and Burhān found it necessary to retreat further northwards to Daulatābād, still relentlessly

⁴¹ Ferishta II., 53, 225-226; F.A. 66a.

⁴² Ferishta II., 53; B.S. 56-57.

pursued by the allies. Here Amīr Barīd died (June 1542) and Burhān was compelled to sue for peace. Daryā 'Imād Shāh and Asad Khān prevailed on Ibrāhīm to accept the terms by which Burhān returned Sholāpur and promised to maintain peace,⁴³ a promise which he broke as soon as he had formed another alliance against Bijāpur.

A Retrospect:- It will be observed that the conflict in the Deccan had now resolved itself between Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar. Ambition, religion and hereditary animosity kept the two kingdoms always apart. Originally the Barīds plotted vigorously to reduce the power of Bijāpur, but they soon realised the futility of their attempts and were content to play a subsidiary part in alliance with Ahmadnagar. They were actuated by an ambition quite out of proportion to the resources at their disposal. The territory that Bidar commanded was small as compared to that of Bijāpur or Ahmadnagar. Being inland the kingdom of Bidar was unfavourably situated for the import of horses into the kingdom. Qāsim Barīd was aware of the advantage of possessing Goa and the coastal territory and he did his utmost to prevent them from passing into the hands of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh. But with the acquisition of Goa and the Konkan, Bijāpur was strategically in a better position than Bidar and was able to secure a continuous supply of horses and Pardesi soldiers for the army. And in this respect

⁴³ Ferishta II., 54, 227; B.S. 57-58; F.A. 67a-68b.

it was even more favourably situated than Ahmadnagar. Even when Goa was lost to Bijāpur the conciliatory policy adopted by the 'Adilshāhī kings ensured for the kingdom the strategic advantages of the port. Dābhol also was an important port and with the Portuguese generally well-disposed towards Bijāpur, could be used to similar advantage. The Nizāmshāhī port of Chaul was not so important as Goa or Dābhol, hence the superiority of Bijāpur over Ahmadnagar in respect of the import of horses. Moreover the kings of Ahmadnagar, originally Hindu converts to Islām, were bigoted Deccanis and were averse to recruit Pardesis in their service. Burhān Nizām Shāh was well aware of the efficiency of the Pardesis in the Bijāpur army and when he became a Shia he adopted a policy of recruiting his army with Pardesi soldiers. The military strength of Ahmadnagar increased. At the same time the reactionary policy of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh had ^a detrimental effect on the strength of Bijāpur. This fact and Burhān's alliance with the Hindus nearly brought about the annihilation of the kingdom. But the death of the Nizām Shāh and a sudden change in the policy of the Hindus averted such a catastrophe.

CHAPTER III.

VIJAYANAGAR AND THE DECCAN SULTANATES

Importance of the Rāichūr Doāb:- The disputes about the possession of the Rāichūr Doāb had been a source of constant wars between the Bahmanī kingdom and Vijayanagar. The break-up of the Bahmanī kingdom gave a new orientation to the relations between Vijayanagar and its Muslim neighbours. The sultanates of the Deccan did not pursue a united policy towards the Hindu kingdom till they found that their very existence depended on adopting it. Blinded by mutual jealousy, they sought the help of Vijayanagar to gain their selfish ends. Qāsim Barīd was the first to incite the Hindus to make war on Bijāpur, which as the neighbour of Vijayanagar was the sultanate most immediately affected by its growing power. The struggle between Bijāpur and Vijayanagar which started in the reign of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh ended only with the overthrow of the Hindu power at the battle of Talikota, one of the most decisive battles in Indian History.

The causes for the recurring hostilities between Vijayanagar and its Muslim neighbours, first the Bahmanī kingdom and then Bijāpur, were economic, geographic and religious. The

49

Rāichūr Doāb round which these hostilities centred was not only a fertile tract, but was also rich in mineral resources. There were iron deposits in the Doāb which show evidence of having been worked by Vijayanagar kings.¹ Iron being the most important commodity in the manufacture of arms, both Vijayanagar and Bijāpur coveted to possess these deposits and laid claim to the ownership of the Doāb.

Even more important than the iron deposits was the presence of diamonds in this tract. More than one contemporary account asserts independently that there were diamond mines in the vicinity of Rāichūr. In 1470 Nicolo Conti found that diamonds were produced at Rāichūr.² Both Varthema and Barbosa noted that there were diamond mines in the kingdom of Bijāpur, though they fail to specify their exact location. Garcia de Orta also mentions diamond mines in Bijāpur.³ It is significant that at the time when these three writers made their observations, the Rāichūr Doāb was in the possession of Bijāpur. The 'Adilshāhī boundary extended beyond the Tungabhadra only after the battle of Talikota in 1565. So that the diamond deposits that were mentioned as belonging to Bijāpur before that date, must have been north of the river evidently in the Rāichūr Doāb. Linschoten further supports these accounts.⁴

¹ Major Munn, Director of the Geological Survey of the State of Hyderabad: *Manchester Memoirs* LXIV., No. 5. I.G.I. Hyderabad State, 40. Cf. Gribble I., 27; M.G.S.I., VIII., 265.

² I.F.C., Conti, 21.

³ Varthema, 118; Barbosa I. 202; II. 221.

⁴ Linschoten II., 137.

Colloquies, 305.

Most vital evidence on this point is furnished by the Bijāpur historian, Rafī-ud-dīn Shīrāzī, the author of *Taskirat-ul-Mulūk*, who was in the royal service at Bijāpur from 1560 till the early years of the seventeenth century. He says that there was a diamond mine near Rāichūr which was in the possession of Bijāpur in 1606.⁵ This is further corroborated by an English diamond merchant who visited the Bijāpur and Golconda diamond mines about 1675 and presented his observations in a paper submitted to the Royal Society in 1677.⁶ He mentions at least two diamond mines in the Doāb near the junction of the rivers Tungabhadra and Krishna.⁷ All this evidence leaves no doubt at all that the struggle for the possession of the Rāichūr Doāb was dictated, among other factors, by the diamond deposits that were scattered in the vicinity of Rāichūr.

Beyond the Doāb near Adonī and Karnūl was the diamond mine of Ramallikota, the most important in the Bijāpur group of diamond mines.⁸ This mine of course did not come into the possession of Bijāpur till after the battle of Talikota. But it is interesting to note in this connection the attempt made by Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I. to capture the stronghold of Adonī in

5 در تاریخ یکمزار و پانزده سال بعزری کانی در ولایت رایچور
که از مضامین دکن است و در تصریف درگاه عالمپناه بود. etc.

6 This paper is published in *The Philosophical Transactions*, Vol. XII. (1677). T.M. 321a.

7 Ibid. 913. M.S.S.I., VII., 106. Also V. Ball: *The Diamonds, Coal and Gold of India*, 16.

8 Cf. Tavernier II., 41-43; *Philosophical Transactions* l.c. 913. Tavernier says that this mine was discovered about 200 years before he visited it.

1537. The conquest of this place would have given him the possession of the diamond mines near Karnūl. But it was strenuously defended by Rāma Rāya who sent almost all his army to drive the Muhammadans back into the Doāb.⁹

Further, the Rāichūr Doāb was a fertile tract of land, situated as it was between the two rivers Krishna and Tungabhadra. Its soil was and is of the black cotton variety most suitable for rich crops like cotton and wheat. The cultivators in such a part of the country were bound to be better off than those of other parts less favourably situated. In an age when the utmost was exacted from the cultivator for the doubtful privilege of the protection of the state, such a rich tract could naturally yield more revenue to the royal treasury than other parts where the soil was not so rich. The Doāb, therefore, was a great source of revenue¹⁰ to whoever possessed it.

It had also a strategic importance, especially for Vijayanagar. The capital of the Hindu Empire was situated just beyond the Tungabhadra due south of Mudgal, one of the strongholds, along with Rāichūr, which controlled the Doāb. Lying between two rivers, it could serve admirably as buffer territory between the Hindu capital and Bijāpur, and its possession would safeguard the diamond mines to its south near Karnūl.

⁹ Ferishta II., 51; B.S. 53; F.A. 64a.

¹⁰ Cf. Muniz, Jewell, 368.

With Rāichūr and Mudgal garrisoned by Hindu troops, the Muhammadans would have triple difficulty in attacking Karnūl or Vijayanagar: they would have to cross two rivers and fight their way past Rāichūr or Mudgal. Thus Vijayanagar's anxiety to retain the Doāb in its possession was dictated by a desire to protect itself effectively from its Muslim neighbours. Once the fords of the rivers were guarded it was easy to prevent the Muhammadans from crossing the Doāb and approaching Vijayanagar. The importance of this fact became evident in 1565 when the Muhammadan armies decided to march into the Hindu kingdom. The Doāb was at that time in the possession of the Hindus and the point where the Krishna river could be forded near the memorable battlefield¹¹ of Talikota, was carefully guarded by an advance contingent of the Hindu army. By clever manoeuvring the Muhammadans lured the Hindus away from the ford, doubled back and crossed the ford before the Hindus could retake their position. This proved that the Hindus were bad tacticians. With a vigilant defence of the fords of the Krishna they could have prevented the Muhammadans from crossing the river. But though they understood the strategic importance of the Doāb their carelessness lost them its advantage.

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These disputes, arose out of economic, political and geographical considerations were made more acute by the fundamental religious difference between the rulers of Bijāpur and

¹¹ The village of Talikota after which the battle is known, is twenty-five miles north of the Krishna. It was here that the
(continued on next page)

the rulers of Vijayanagar. Though the idea of a crusade (^{>4}) against the Hindus never predominated in the mind of any of the 'Adilshāhī sultans,¹² the attitude of the Hindu regent Rāma Rāya towards Islām embittered 'Alī 'Adil Shāh and the other Deccan sultans against Vijayanagar.¹³ At first Rāma Rāya helped Ahmadnagar against Bījāpur. Then he suddenly changed his policy and allied with Bījāpur against Ahmadnagar. Behind this apparent inconsistency was the desire to destroy the power of the Muhammadan sultanates of the Deccan. Rāma Rāya would almost have succeeded in his Machiavellian design but for his insulting and arrogant attitude towards Islām. It was his threat to the very existence of Islām in the Deccan that brought the sultanates together to crush him. He was no longer the enemy of an individual Muhammadan state but of all of them. The struggle was no longer a political struggle, it was religious. It was this factor that was responsible for the Muslim confederacy.

Early history of the Doāb:- Both Bījāpur and Vijayanagar set high value on the Doāb for its economic resources and strategic position. It cannot, therefore, be wondered at that this important tract was constantly changing hands. In the year 1443

11 (continued from previous page) Muhammadan armies were encamped before they crossed the Krishna river. Hence the name of Talikota for the battle. The battlefield is on the southern bank of the river.

12 Muhammad 'Adil Shāh (1626-1656) did look upon the wars against the Hindus of the south as a 'jihād', but the attitude of his predecessors against Vijayanagar was not actuated by such motives.

13 This point has been developed in a subsequent section.

it was a Muhammadan possession and was invaded by Devarāya of Vijayanagar who was ultimately defeated and driven back by the Bahmanī forces, and the Doāb continued to remain as a part of the Bahmanī kingdom.¹⁴ At the time when Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh declared his independence it formed a part of his kingdom. The Hindus would have been too willing to recover it, had it not been for the fear of Muhammadan reprisals. Qāsim Barīd's attitude dispelled this fear. At his invitation they crossed the Tungabhadra and occupied the Doāb.¹⁵ But not for long. Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh took the first opportunity to recover this loss. While he was engaged against Qāsim Barīd, a revolution was taking place in the Hindu capital. After defeating Barīd at Naldurg, he at once made for the Doāb. The Hindus raised a defence, but it was unequal to the 'Adilshāhī attack and the Doāb passed into the hands of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh¹⁶ (April, 1493).

The Hindus, though they lost the Doāb, learnt that the newly evolved sultanates were no longer united against their traditional foe. And once they perceived this advantage, they were ever ready to make use of it. So that while Bijāpur was disturbed by civil war, after the fall of Kamāl Khān's regency,¹⁷ they were once again encouraged to attack the

¹⁴ Sewall, 76-77.

¹⁵ Ferishta II., 6; Sewall, 113. See also 28 ante.

¹⁶ Ferishta II., 7-10; B.S. 17-18; H.I.S. 231; Sewall, 111, 114.

¹⁷ See 36 ante.

Rāichūr Doāb. Further, following the policy of Qāsim Barīd, his son Amīr also instigated them in their adventure. Sometime in 1512 the Hindus surprised Rāichūr and occupied it. The garrison could not hold the fort against the Hindu hordes; nor was Ismā'īl 'Adīl Shāh in a position to send succour. When the civil war in Bijāpur was over, Ismā'īl decided to punish Amīr Barīd who was responsible for much of the trouble that had befallen Bijāpur during Kamāl Khān's regency. Any plan for the recovery of the Doāb, therefore, had to be postponed.

Ismā'īl 'Adīl Shāh was determined to recover the Doāb. But he was unable to do so during the life-time of the great Krishnadevarāya under whom Vijayanagar attained to great strength and eminence. His expedition in May 1520 very nearly cost him his life and brought on him a disastrous defeat.¹⁸ The Hindus had, for the time being at least, triumphed over Bijāpur. It was the death of Krishnadevarāya in 1529 and the weakness of his successor Achyuta that gave Ismā'īl his opportunity. Bijāpur was at peace with Ahmadnagar and Borar, Amīr Barīd the mischief-maker had been subdued, the time was in all respects favourable for Ismā'īl's enterprise. Early in 1530 the 'Adīlshāhī army came into the Doāb; its reduction was not a difficult task and both Rāichūr and Mudgal renewed their allegiance to Bijāpur.¹⁹

¹⁸ Ferishta II., 34-36; F.A. 48a-b; Sewall, 140-47.

¹⁹ Ferishta II., 44; B.S. 44; T.M. 35a-b; F.A. 53b-54a; Sewall, 165, 367-68; C.H.I. III., 497-98.

Rāma Rāya and Burhān: Alliance against Bījāpur:- The peace of the Doāb was not disturbed for the next thirteen years. This was because of internal discord in the Hindu capital, where, taking advantage of the weakness of Achyuta, two rival parties were bidding for power. One of these was led by Tirumala, the king's brother-in-law and the other by Rāma Rāya, also a member of the royal family. The policy of Ismā'il's son and successor, Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh, towards the Hindus at this juncture only resulted in increased hostility between the neighbours. He interfered in the internal affairs of Vijayanagar by giving military support to Tirumala against his rivals.²⁰ This step, though it brought immediate material advantage to Ibrāhīm in the shape of cash payments from Tirumala, sowed the seeds of hatred in the mind of Rāma Rāya. Both because of his alliance with Ibrāhīm and because of his treatment of his king, Tirumala became unpopular with the Hindu grandees and lost their support. Rāma Rāya, his astute rival, seized his moment and instigated the nobility to overthrow the regent. In despair Tirumala committed suicide²¹ and Rāma Rāya became absolute at Vijayanagar.

Ibrāhīm's attempt to capture Adonī in 1537 proved unsuccessful and only aggravated Rāma Rāya's hatred towards Bījāpur.

²⁰ Ferishta II., 50; Muniz, Sewall, 367-68; Mackenzie Collection XL., 39.

²¹ Ferishta II., 51; T.M. 39a-b; F.A. 63a-64a; Sewall, 169-71.

Being engaged in consolidating his position in Vijayanagar, the Hindu regent did not plan immediate retaliation against Ibrāhīm, but waited for a favourable opportunity. This came in 1543 when Burhān Nisām Shāh of Ahmadnagar appealed to him for help against Bījāpur. Rāma Rāya wanted to recover the Deāb and Burhān Sholāpur. Thus a common grievance and a common object - the recovery of very much disputed and as much coveted territory - brought the two together. Burhān's change to the Shia creed and Ibrāhīm's adoption of the Sunni doctrine widened the cleavage between them and only urged Burhān to enter into this unnatural alliance with the Hindus. Janshīd Qutb Shāh of Golconda willingly joined Burhān against the Sunni Ibrāhīm²² (1543).

But as long as Asad Khān lived neither Burhān nor Rāma Rāya were able to accomplish their object. Repeated alliances and campaigns against Bījāpur failed to gain for them the possession of Sholāpur and the Bāichūr Deāb.

Burhān's envoy in these negotiations was Shāh Tāhir, a Pardeesi. As a brother Pardeesi, Asad Khān seems to have prevailed on him to advise Burhān to abandon hostilities. Seeing that his ally showed no desire to declare war on Bījāpur, Rāma Rāya also desisted from an attack on the Deāb. Janshīd Qutb Shāh, who had already advanced into Bījāpur territory, was

²² Ferishta II., 227; T.M.Q.S., 75b. Janshīd had just then succeeded his father Sultān Qulī Qutb Shāh.

was now left. Asad Khān marched against him, twice defeated him in the field, pursued him to the gates of Golconda and returned to Bijāpur in triumph.²³

Rāma Rāya felt aggrieved at the behaviour of his ally and prevailed on him to begin hostilities against Bijāpur. Burhān marched against Gulbarga, but was defeated by Ibrāhīm and Asad Khān.²⁴

It was now Burhān's turn to reconstruct the confederacy, and he called on 'Alī Barīd to join him. But the latter refused to wage war against a brother Sunni. Burhān then invaded the kingdom of Bīdar and occupied the forts of Udgir, Ausa and Kandhār. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh tried to help Barīd but was defeated in three successive encounters.²⁵

Burhān's persistent offensive and Ibrāhīm's reverses led the latter to suspect the loyalty of his own officers and he attributed his recent defeats to their treachery. The sultān developed a sudden streak of inhuman cruelty and showed an appetite for carnage unparalleled in the history of the 'Adil-shāhī dynasty. The nobility wanted to depose him and place his brother prince 'Abdullāh on the throne. But rumours of the plot reached Ibrāhīm and 'Abdullāh had to fly to Goa to escape the king's wrath. Once again Asad Khān came under suspicion and had to retire to Belgaum. Even though his loyalty was taxed

²³ B.S. 59-60; F.A. 69a-v; Ferishta II., 55, 332.

²⁴ B.S. 60-61; Ferishta II., 55.

²⁵ Ferishta II., 56, 228-29; cf. C.H.I. III., 441. 'Amir succeeded his father 'Alī Barīd in 1542.

to the utmost. Asad Khān refused to join Burhān Nizām Shāh. But the king's distrust of him broke the great minister's heart and in February 1549 he died, leaving a reputation and a memory cherished in Belgaum to this day.²⁶ Asad Khān was not an administrator, but his generalship, his diplomacy and above all his loyalty to the 'Adilshāhī dynasty, give him a place in Deccan history second only to that of Mahmūd Gāvān, the famous Bahmanī minister.

Shāh Tāhir, the minister of Burhān Nizām Shāh had died a few years earlier. With Asad Khān's death the two forces that endeavoured for moderation in the Deccan passed away. Burhān and Ibrāhīm were left unrestrained to carry on their fratricidal struggle.

In 1549 Burhān Nizām Shāh once again adopted his fatal policy of an alliance with the Hindus. At the end of the rainy season he marched towards Kalyāni. Rāma Rāya moved northwards and, defeating an 'Adilshāhī detachment sent to bar his progress, joined the Ahmadnagar army. The combined forces of Burhān and Rāma Rāya laid siege to the fort of Kalyāni. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh himself arrived to relieve the fort and encamped within sight of the besiegers. Suddenly Burhān and his Hindu allies surprised Ibrāhīm's camp on the early morning of Ramzan 'Id (Wednesday, October 23, 1549).

²⁶ Ferishta II., 56-57; B.S. 51-53; F.A. 71b; Andrade, 26-28.

The Bijāpuris, engaged in celebrating the termination of the fast, were taken completely unawares. The sultān himself was in a warm bath and had scarcely time to put on his clothes before effecting his escape. His troops fled in confusion. The garrison of Kalyāni was disheartened and surrendered to the enemy.

But Kalyāni was not Burhān's objective. What he wanted was the possession of Sholāpur. His Hindu colleague agreed to continue the war only if Burhān helped the Hindus to recover the Rāichūr Doāb. Burhān agreed. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh was unable to defend either the Doāb or Sholāpur and both the districts succumbed to the enemy; the Doāb was once again occupied by the Hindus and the Nizāmshāhis made a triumphal entry into Sholāpur ²⁸ (1552).

It seemed as if Burhān contemplated the reduction of the 'Adilshāhī kingdom itself.²⁹ He planned what he considered to be the final campaign against Bijāpur. If it succeeded, he would triumph over his inveterate enemy Ibrāhīm, would oust him from his throne, drive him away from his kingdom and so victoriously raise the Nizāmshāhī standard on the citadel of Bijāpur.

This was not to be. Indeed it turned out to be the

²⁷ Ferishta II., 58-59, 232; Burhān (I.A., I., 5-8).

²⁸ Ferishta II., 59; Burhān, l.c. 7.

²⁹ Cf. Ferishta II., 234.

last expedition, but in a manner in which Burhān had never foreseen. He laid siege to Bijāpur; the bewildered Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh fled to the fortress of Panāla. Expectantly Burhān waited to pluck the last fruit of his ambition. But his frustration was great indeed, for when the 'Adilshāhī capital was within sight of surrender, he was smitten with a fatal illness and was compelled to return to his capital where he died³⁰ on Saturday, December 3, 1553.

Rāma Rāya and Ibrāhīm: Change in policy:- Husain, Burhān's son and successor had Deccani sympathies. The Pardesis in Ahmadnagar, under their leader Saif 'Ain-ul-Mulk, a Turk, had supported the claims of Husain's step-brother and rival 'Alī. On Husain's accession 'Ain-ul-Mulk fled to Bijāpur. For a time Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh forgot his prejudice against Pardesis and admitted 'Ain-ul-Mulk into his service and at his instance besieged Sholāpur. 'Ain-ul-Mulk, who was sent to check the advance of Husain on Sholāpur, was defeated. Ibrāhīm's distrust of Pardesis returned and he suspected 'Ain-ul-Mulk of treachery, and his subsequent harsh and uncompromising attitude drove the Pardesi into rebellion. He gained more than one victory over the royal troops and declared for prince 'Abdullāh who was still at Goa. Ibrāhīm was in a sad plight. His strength had been reduced by constant wars and he found

³⁰ Ferishta II., 234; Burhān, l.c. 28.

himself unable even to quell the rebellion of 'Ain-ul-Mulk. In this extremity he appealed to Rāma Rāya, who sent his brother Venkatādri to help him. 'Ain-ul-Mulk was defeated and sought safety in flight.³¹

Rāma Rāya's policy towards the 'Adilshāhī kingdom had now changed. Hitherto he had made unsuccessful attempts in alliance with Ahmadnagar to destroy the power of Bijāpur. The Hindu henceforward supported Bijāpur in its wars against Ahmadnagar. He believed that Ahmadnagar had become so powerful and Bijāpur so helpless that it might succumb to the stronger power any time. It was no part of his policy to allow Ahmadnagar to grow more powerful. The balance seemed too much against Bijāpur. So Rāma Rāya transferred his friendship from Ahmadnagar to Bijāpur. Thus though he shifted his allegiance the principle underlying it was still the same, namely the gradual weakening of the sultanates and finally their destruction. His policy towards the Muslim kingdoms was actuated not by friendship towards any particular state but by self-interest and self-aggrandizement. This is the keynote of the history of the next ten years. As we shall see, the policy did not succeed and ultimately brought ruin to its originator.

³¹ Ferishta II., 60-63, 236; B.S. 55-56; Burhān, I.c. 78. 'Ain-ul-Mulk fled to Ahmadnagar and begged to be readmitted into Nishāshāhī service. Husain pretended to forgive him and caused him to be assassinated while he was making his obeisance. Ferishta, II., 239-40.

Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh did not live long to see the results of Rāma Rāya's new policy. The strain of a war-weary life had told heavily on his health which was further undermined by his intemperate and debauched life. As a result he was afflicted with a complication of disorders. The illness inflamed a nature naturally fierce, so that Ibrāhīm became a terror to all about him. Many physicians unable to cure him were ordered to be trodden to death by elephants. This caused an exodus of the medical practitioners of the capital, and on his death-bed the king found himself without medical aid. This accelerated the end. In September 1558 he departed this life and was buried at Gogi near his father and grandfather.³²

The reign of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I. was the darkest period in Bijāpur's history. His difficulties were of his own making. Suspicious, cruel, fanatic, he had alienated almost all his nobility and tried to the utmost the loyalty even of so faithful a servant as Asad Khān. The fundamental differences that divided Burhān and Ibrāhīm caused continuous friction between the two, and Burhān's alliance with the Hindus nearly brought about the annihilation of Bijāpur. It was only the death of Burhān and the change in Rāma Rāya's policy that saved the 'Adilshāhī kingdom.

³² Ferishta II., 64; B.S. 67. Gogi is a village in Gulbarga district, Hyderābād State.

'Ali 'Adil Shāh and Rāna Rāya: Alliance against Ahmadnagar:-

'Ali 'Adil Shāh and Husain Nisām Shāh were as far apart as their fathers. 'Ali signalised his accession by reverting to Shiaism and favouring Pardesīs in his service.³³ Husain on his part was opposed to Pardesīs who were now in disfavour at Ahmadnagar. And so religious differences and racial preferences gave edge to an enmity which had separated the two kingdoms so long and which had been assiduously but imperceptibly fostered by Rāna Rāya in recent years.

At the very beginning of his reign 'Ali 'Adil Shāh showed a desire to continue his father's alliance with Vijayanagar. Old grudges against Ahmadnagar had to be paid off, old reverses to be avenged, Kalyāni and Sholāgur to be recaptured. Moreover Husain Nisām Shāh's attitude was threatening; he had formed an alliance with Golconda and Berar against Bijāpur.³⁴

Rāna Rāya had already changed his policy towards Bijāpur. He now agreed to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with 'Ali 'Adil Shāh³⁵ provided he first came to Vijayanagar in person.³⁶

³³ Ferishta II., 66; B.S. 77; F.A. 81a.

³⁴ Ferishta II., 67; B.S. 83-84; F.A. 81b-82b; Burhān (I.A., I. 101).

³⁵ Cf. دشمنان ترا براندازیم خاطر جمع دارد F.A. 84b.

³⁶ T.M. 43a. This shows that 'Ali's visit to Vijayanagar was not voluntary. This very important fact is not mentioned by Ferishta or the B.S. Rāfi-ul-dīn Shirāzī was a personal servant of 'Ali for many years and enjoyed his confidence. Hence the value of his evidence in the T.M.

62

This was indeed a hard and humiliating condition and was naturally distasteful to 'Alī 'Adil Shāh, an independent monarch of equal if not higher status than Rāma Rāya. For the time being he was helpless, an alliance with the Hindus was the only way out of an imminent crisis. But 'Alī never forgot the rancour caused by Rāma Rāya's haughtiness, a rancour which was made more acute by the subsequent behaviour of the Hindu.

Taking advantage of 'Alī's absence at Vijayanagar Husain, with his ally Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh, laid siege to the fortress of Gulbarga in the 'Adilshāhī dominion. Rāma Rāya instantly carried out his declared intention of helping Bijāpur. Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh was under obligations to Rāma Rāya, having found refuge in Vijayanagar after his unsuccessful rebellion during the reign of Jamshīd Qutb Shāh.³⁷ To Ibrāhīm Rāma Rāya sent an admonitory letter, asking him to refrain from hostilities against 'Alī 'Adil Shāh who was now a friend of the Hindus. Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh, afraid of incurring the displeasure of so powerful a neighbour as Rāma Rāya, deserted his ally and returned to Golconda. This made Husain Nizām Shāh's position precarious. Not only was his strength weakened by the loss of his ally, but his enemy 'Alī threatened to become more formidable by his alliance with the Hindus.

³⁷ T.M.Q.S. 77a-88b; Ferishta II., 333. Ibrāhīm came to the throne in 1550.

He had no choice but to raise the siege of Gulbarga and retire to Ahmadnagar.³⁸

The next three years (1559-1561) witnessed an almost continuous warfare between Bijāpur and Vijayanagar on one side and Ahmadnagar on the other, aided sometimes by Berar, sometimes by Golconda. This was the most critical period in Husain Nisām Shāh's reign. Rāma Rāya's star was in the ascendant and it was he who really benefitted by the enmity between Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur. He dictated terms not only to the vanquished Husain, but to Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh, and in the end, to his ally 'Alī 'Adil Shāh himself. In a word, during this period, he completely dominated the disturbed political situation in the Deccan. In 1561 Husain was forced to agree to a most humiliating treaty.³⁹ He sent envoys to Rāma Rāya asking for suspension of hostilities. It is significant that he approached Rāma Rāya and not 'Alī 'Adil Shāh, which shows how completely the Hindu had overshadowed the sultans of the Deccan. Rāma Rāya agreed to conclude peace on the following terms:-

1. Restoration of Kalyāni to 'Alī 'Adil Shāh. No mention was made of Sholāpur which apparently remained in Husain's possession. This was purposely done by Rāma Rāya to keep open the quarrels between Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur.

³⁸ Burhān (I.A., L.101-02); T.M.Q. 8.99a; Ferishta II., 68.

³⁹ Ferishta II., 244; T.M. 46a.

2. The execution of the valiant Jahāngīr Khān, the 'Imādshāhī general who, as an ally of Husain had been a cause of great concern to the allies.

3. Husain's personal submission before Rāma Rāya.

To all these three conditions Husain agreed. That he consented to put Jahāngīr Khān to death, shows how completely he had been demoralised by the formidable alliance against him. The submission of Kalyāni resulted in another war and the fulfilment of the third condition merely added to the already bitter feelings of Husain against the Hindus, and paved the way for a union among the sultans in the not too distant future.

Husain's next campaign against Bijāpur was the grossest military folly. His only ally was the unreliable Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh. As against this, 'Alī had the support of Vijayanagar. Moreover, Tufal Khān, the regent of Berar, with the shameless murder of Jahāngīr Khān still fresh in his mind, joined 'Alī and even persuaded 'Alī Barīd to do so. This formidable combination drove Husain to the northern fastnesses of his kingdom. Ahmadnagar at this juncture was very near extinction. But 'Alī 'Adil Shāh had, by this time, learnt the futility and danger of inviting the Hindus to fight against brother Muslims. He even began to doubt whether Rāma Rāya's help was disinterested or whether the Hindu had not ulterior motives of establishing his supremacy by helping the Deccan sultanates to fight each

other and weaken themselves. He put forward the approach of the monsoons as an excuse for the suspension of hostilities and the allies returned to their respective dominions⁴⁰ (June 1563).

'Alī 'Adil Shāh abandoned his advantage because he was both afraid of Rāma Rāya and disgusted at his attitude towards the Muslims in the recent campaigns. During these campaigns against Ahmadnagar, the Hindus had greatly insulted Islām. They had polluted the mosques, had insulted the Book, had dishonoured Muslim women. Nor had they shown proper respect towards the person of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh himself. The Muslim envoys had to endure similar humiliation. When they presented themselves before the Hindu, they were treated contemptuously.⁴¹ At first 'Alī 'Adil Shāh had disregarded these petty incidents, but they loomed large against the background of the general attitude of the Hindus towards Islām. 'Alī's cup of bitterness was full. Rāma Rāya's arrogance knew no bounds. But his pride was the prelude to his fall.

After reaching Vijayanagar, Rāma Rāya claimed from 'Alī 'Adil Shāh the districts of Itgīr and Bāgalkot as the price of his friendship and from Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh Kovilconda and Pāngal. The two sultans were not in a position to refuse this

⁴⁰ T.M.Q.S. 101b-103a; T.M. 61a-62b; F.A. 87a-b; B.S. 86-88; Ferishta II., 68, 245.

⁴¹ Ferishta II., 69; B.S. 90; T.M. 46a; Burhān (I.A., L.143); Sewell 193-94; A.D.V. 91-92; Marāthī Riyāsat, 305-06.

peremptory demand. At the same time it helped to bring them together and brought home to them the fact that the Hindu was the common enemy of the Islamic states of the Deccan. Rāma Rāya had already secured the Doāb. By the occupation of Itgir on one side and Kovilconda on the other, the natural boundaries, formed by the Krishna, between Bijāpur-Coloonda and Vijayanagar had been destroyed. To Rāma Rāya, therefore, the acquisition of these districts was merely the beginning of an encroachment on the territory of the Deccan sultanates which in the end were to succumb to the Hindu arms. But he was too rash and the Muhammadan monarchs had learnt their lesson. Rāma Rāya was trying to become the military dictator and the arbiter of the destinies of the Deccan sultanates. It was he who had asked Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh in 1558 to withdraw his alliance from Ahmadnagar; it was he who had dictated terms to Husain Nizām Shāh; it was he who had compelled even his ally 'Alī 'Adil Shāh to cede to him the strategic districts adjoining the Doāb. No more proofs of the sinister intentions of Rāma Rāya were necessary for the Deccan sultans. His reckless diplomacy and inconsiderate attitude towards Islām filled their minds with disgust. And out of this was born their hatred towards the empire of Vijayanagar, the source of Rāma Rāya's strength, the symbol of his arrogance. If the sultanates wanted to save themselves from the menace of the Hindu autocrat, their salvation lay in uniting together against him for destroying his

military strength and overthrowing the Hindu Empire. And this they proceeded to do.

The Muslim Confederacy: Battle of Talikota:- The idea of the Muslim confederacy originated at Ahmadnagar.⁴² Husain Nizām Shāh placed it before Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh of Golconda who approved of it and sent Mustafā Khān Ardastāni, one of his nobles, to Ahmadnagar to complete the negotiations. From Ahmadnagar Mustafā Khān went to Bijāpur for inducing 'Alī to join the league. Husain Nizām Shāh proposed a dual marriage alliance: his daughter Chānd Bibī was to be given in marriage to 'Alī and 'Alī's sister Hadiyya sultān was to be married to Husain's son Murtazā. Further, the fortress of Sholāpur, which had hitherto been a bone of contention, was to be handed over to Bijāpur as the marriage dowry of Chānd Bibī. These were not mere empty promises, false representations or futile negotiations. To allay 'Alī 'Adil Shāh's suspicions Husain even offered to send his children as hostages to Bijāpur.⁴³ But 'Alī did not need this show of elaborate earnestness to persuade him to join the league. He was utterly disgusted with his erstwhile ally Rāma Rāya and was apprehensive of the Hindu advance beyond the Doāb. He had found out Rāma Rāya for what he was - a professed friend of Bijāpur but the potential enemy

⁴² T.M. 62a; Burhān (I.A., L.143).

⁴³ T.M. 62b; T.M.Q.S. 109b-111a; F.A. 90a-92b; Ferihta II., 72.

of Islām. This anomalous position could no longer continue. To join the proposed alliance was to 'Alī not only a loyal duty, but an essential policy. 'Alī Barīd Shāh was also drawn into the alliance. The confederacy was complete.

It was 'Alī 'Adil Shāh who sent the ultimatum to the Hindu king for the surrender of the districts recently wrested by Vijayanagar from Bijāpur and Colconda. As was to be expected the arrogant Hindu turned down the demand, declared his intention of resisting it with the force of arms if necessary and drove the 'Adilshāhī envoy out of the Hindu capital.⁴⁴ The other resident ambassadors of the Deccan sultans also left in sympathy, thus bringing home to Rāma Rāya, in this instance at least, the solidarity of the Muhammadan monarchs.

The volume of mighty events was steadily reaching its climax. War was inevitable. Both sides knew it and were prepared for it. The allied armies had been already mobilised. They left Bijāpur on December 24, 1564 and encamped at Talikota⁴⁵ twenty-five miles north of the Krishna.

Rāma Rāya took measures for the defence of the Deccan by sending his brother Tirumala with a strong force to occupy the fords of the Krishna. Another division followed under a

⁴⁴ Ferishta II., 72; B.S. 95-96.

⁴⁵ T.H. 63a; T.M.Q.S. 111b; Burnān l.c. 144; Ferishta II., 72-73. For the numbers of the Hindu and Muhammadan armies see Ferishta II., 73, 250, 252; A.D.V. 200; Sewall, 201-02; C.H.I., III., 440.

second brother, Venkatādri, while Rāma Rāya himself brought up the rear with the main body of his army. The allies, on arriving at the river, found that their only course was to force the ford immediately before them and they resolved to draw their opponents out of their position by a feint. They accordingly marched by the river as if to attempt a passage at a different point, and were followed on the other side by the Hindus. On the third night they suddenly reversed and, gaining the now undefended ford, succeeded in carrying over their whole army.⁴⁶ This was a great triumph for the allies who proved that they were superior in military manoeuvres if not in numbers.

The morning of January 5, 1565 saw the two armies confronting each other on the since memorable battlefield of Talikota, about ten miles south of the Krishna, near Rāichūr. Hussein Nisām Shāh was in the centre of the allied armies, 'Alī 'Adil Shāh was to his right and Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh and 'Alī Barīd to the left. Hussein was faced by Rāma Rāya in the centre of the enemy ranks. 'Alī 'Adil Shāh found himself against Venkatādri, and the left wing of the allies confronted the Hindu contingent under Tirumala. The allied artillery was in the centre of the front line under the command of an able

⁴⁶ Ferishta II., 73; Burhān I.c. 144-45; Sewall, 199-200; T.H. 63a; B.S. 98-99.

Turkish gunner, Chalabi Rūmī Khān.⁴⁷ The Hindu front was protected by a large number of war elephants, as well as cannon.

The left wing of the Hindus under Venkatādri was the first to attack and 'Alī 'Adil Shāh who had to bear its brunt was forced to draw back under the vigorous impact. Tirumala too was successful in pushing back the left wing of the allied army.⁴⁸ But the artillery came to the rescue of the allies. Under its constant fire the Hindus could not come within an easy distance of the allied centre. This saved the centre and ultimately the allies. The artillery under the direction of Chalabi Rūmī Khān caused great havoc among the Hindu contingents commanded by Rāma Rāya. Taking advantage of this visible confusion, Kishvar Khān, one of the lieutenants under Husain Nisām Shāh, charged the enemy centre with his cavalry.⁴⁹ The destruction caused by Rūmī Khān's gunners was completed by the charge of Kishvar Khān's brigade.

Husain Nisām Shāh followed up this advantage with a general charge of his cavalry and completely routed the centre of the Hindu army. At this juncture Rāma Rāya himself was brought before Husain. The capture of the Hindu was fortuitous. One of the Nisāmshāhī war-elephants had strayed beyond his line and had come up with the litter which carried Rāma Rāya. His body-guard were panic-stricken and fled. The

⁴⁸ Burhān, l.c. 193; Ferishta II., 75.

⁴⁹ Ferishta II., 251.

⁴⁷ Ferishta II., 250-51; F.A. 95b-96b; Burhān, l.c. 145.

'māhut' recognised the Hindu king and ordered his elephant to pick him up. Seeing their leader gone, the remaining Hindu army broke up like a herd of stampeded cattle. Husain Nisām Shāh, after delivering one final address of pent-up hatred, ordered the Hindu's execution.⁵⁰

This was the end of the battle. It was also the end of Rāma Rāya's fatal foreign policy, which had spelt for its originator immediate triumph but ultimate disaster. At last, by their unity, the Deccan sultanates had vanquished their traditional enemy and won a well-deserved triumph, a triumph so consistently pursued but never realised by the Bahmanī kings.

After the fall of Vijayanagar the relations between Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar remained smooth for a time. 'Alī 'Adil Shāh was enabled to conquer some of the territories south of the Deccan,⁵¹ fragments of the Hindu Empire which had now been split up in small chieftainships. Muṭtasā Nisām Shāh who had succeeded Husain at Ahmadnagar subdued Berar and annexed it to his kingdom. But his move to vanquish Bidar also was strenuously opposed by 'Alī 'Adil Shāh,⁵² as it would certainly have made Ahmadnagar more powerful than Bijāpur and threatened the balance of power. This renewed the quarrels between Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar and the two kingdoms once again drifted apart.

⁵⁰ Forishta II., 251-52; 76; T.M. 64b.

⁵¹ Forishta II., 79-80; B.S. 124-26.

⁵² Forishta II., 88, 348; Burhān (I.A., LI., 67.)

CHAPTER IV.

RELATIONS WITH THE PORTUGUESE.

Factors determining the relations:- The relations between Bijāpur and Goa can best be described as being peaceful without being friendly. No doubt attempts were made more than once by the 'Adilshāhī sultans to dislodge the Portuguese from Goa. But all their efforts, with one solitary exception, were futile and hostilities usually ended with an agreement of peace between the neighbours, negotiations for which were always initiated by the Muhammadans. There were sound reasons why the kings of Bijāpur followed a policy of conciliation towards the Portuguese. Bijāpur was always at war with its neighbouring sultanates and the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar; and in their warfare cavalry formed an important unit of the army. It was, therefore, imperative for Bijāpur to maintain an efficient cavalry always ready for action. This necessitated a regular supply of horses which had to be imported from Arabia and Persia. And when the Portuguese came to India and became masters of the Arabian Sea, the Deccan sultanates and Vijayanagar vied with each other to obtain the friendship of

the Portuguese and to ensure for themselves a constant supply of horses to keep their cavalry in efficient fighting condition. Goa was the most important port in the Deccan, and once its masters, the Portuguese were strategically in a very strong position. The Muhammadans, though excellent traders, were weak fighters at sea and their attempt to drive the Portuguese out of Indian waters was frustrated. The sultans of Bijāpur recognised this weakness and strove to maintain the friendship of the Portuguese. The Portuguese on their part knew the weakness of Bijāpur and the other maritime powers of India and were ever ready to use it to the best advantage. Bijāpur's competitor for the friendship of the Portuguese was the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar. In fact it was one of its officials that first instigated Albuquerque to conquer Goa from Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh, hoping that in return the Portuguese would send all horses arriving at Goa to Vijayanagar. But Bijāpur, aware of the implications of the friendship between the Portuguese and the Hindus, chose to give up its claim to Goa rather than suffer a shortage of horses for its cavalry which, as Albuquerque so shrewdly observed, was "the principal spring of its defensive policy."¹

Moreover, when the Portuguese became masters of the Arabian Sea they imposed stringent restrictions on other

¹ Commentaries IV., 125.

traders. It was impossible for the Muhammadan ships, Indian or Arab, to navigate the Arabian Sea without permits from the Portuguese authorities. In issuing these permits, they prohibited the Muhammadan traders from carrying pepper, arms and other munitions of war,² and also arrogated to themselves the power of searching any ship suspected of being engaged in 'contraband' trade. Albuquerque even went to the extent of asking the sultan of Ormuz to show preference to the Portuguese ships over the Muhammadan.³ The trade in horses, therefore, could only be carried by the Portuguese or by the ships of a state which was friendly to them.⁴ After the loss of Goa, the port of Dabhol was left to Bijāpur, but it could not be used to import horses into the kingdom, if Bijāpur was at war with the Portuguese.⁵ The Portuguese had thus acquired a virtual monopoly of this most important trade and the sultans of Bijāpur had no choice at all but to seek their friendship.

There was another factor which influenced Bijāpur's policy towards the Portuguese. When Bijāpur was at peace with the Portuguese, the Muhammadans were allowed to ply their trade between the 'Adilshāhī ports and Persia and Arabia. Their ships brought Pardesi emigrants from overseas into the kingdom.

² Barbosa II., 227.

³ Biker I., 5a.

⁴ Cf. Linschoten I., 54.

⁵ Cf. Commentaries III., 40.

to join its armies and enhance its strength, as in the days of the Bahmanis. Hostility with the Portuguese meant not only complete stoppage in the supply of horses, but also a reduction in the number of Pardesi recruits in the 'Adilshāhī army. Peace with the Portuguese, if not their friendship, was, therefore, absolutely essential for Bijāpur.⁶

Description of the horse trade:- The Persian chronicles are completely silent about the trade in horses between Bijāpur and Persia and Arabia, but the European travellers from Marco Polo onwards give us interesting information about it. Apart from its military importance, this trade was extremely lucrative to the Portuguese and in controlling it they were serving a double purpose: they could dictate the relations between Bijāpur and Goa and could collect handsome revenue by way of customs duty on the horses that came into Goa to be carried into the Deccan sultanates and Vijayanagar.

It is difficult to determine accurately the number of horses that were annually brought to Goa. According to Barbosa the number varied between one to two thousand.⁷ It is certain, however, that almost all the horses required by Bijāpur passed through this port. The trade was a private one carried by Arab, Persian and sometimes Indian merchants. The horses were

⁶ Cf. "Gabayo desires your peace ... because in losing Dābhol he is altogether lost, for by no other way can horses come in, nor white men to reform his camp." Letters III., xli. 'White men' refers to the Pardesi Muhammadans coming into the Deccan.

⁷ Barbosa I., 94.

unloaded at Goa where dealers came from Bijāpur, Vijayanagar, Ahmadnagar and even Golconda to buy them⁸ and carry them to their respective kingdoms to be sold to the various cavalries.

The horses were carried in ships that came to India with other merchandise. A cover of hides was spread over the cargo when loaded and on the top of this were placed the horses.⁹ The number carried in each ship depended on its size. The Portuguese ships being bigger than the Muhammadan ships could accommodate a great number. The Portuguese ship in which Caesar Frederick travelled from Ormuz to Goa (1563) carried a cargo of eighty horses. However, not all the horses that embarked at Ormuz or Aden reached their destination. Nearly ten per cent or sometimes more of their number perished on the voyage. This fact no doubt influenced the price of horses sold at Goa.

The average price of a horse sold in Goa was in the neighbourhood of £150, but prices ranged from £100 to £200 per horse according to the breed and Arabian horses fetched more price than Persian. Sometimes a specially good horse fetched even a higher price.¹⁰ What was of importance to the Portuguese

⁸ Barbosa I., 178; Pyrard II., 67.

⁹ Marco Polo I., 117. cf. Sir Bartle Frere, governor of Bombay: "Till the last few years when steamers have begun to take all the best horses, the Arab horses bound for Bombay almost all came in the way Marco Polo describes." *ibid.* note 3.

¹⁰ All accounts are agreed on the high price of horses at Goa and give approximately the same figures. Marco Polo I., 83; Varthema, 126; Barbosa I. 65, 94, 178; Muniz, Sevell, 307; Caesar Frederick, Hakluyt II. 346; Linschoten I., 54; Pyrard II. 67; Mandelslo, 8

however, was the duty paid on these horses. They were allowed to be landed into Goa free of duty, but when they were being taken away by the dealers who bought them, the Portuguese authorities levied a duty of forty pagodas on each horse.¹¹ And when, after the fall of Vijayanagar, this trade showed a decline, the Portuguese sought to revive it by abolishing customs duty on the merchandise of those ships that also imported horses.¹²

Portuguese beginnings in India:- The concentration of the horse trade at Goa attracted to that port the rest of the trade, since the ships that brought horses also brought merchandise. This was what the Portuguese were aiming at; they had come to India to capture the trade of the Arabian Sea. The renaissance in Europe had equipped them to take advantage of the natural opportunities opened to them by the geographical position of Portugal on the Atlantic sea-board. In 1498 Vasco da Gama arrived at Calicut, having rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and the discovery of a sea-route to India was accomplished.

At first the Portuguese had merely sent out annual fleets to India in the hope that they would destroy the Muhammadan shipping and obtain for themselves the trade of the Arabian Sea. This was soon found impossible. The new Portuguese policy was, therefore, to build fortresses and to hold the strategic centres from which they could command the seas and control the

¹¹ Barbosa I., 178; Caesar Frederick, Hakluyt II., 346; Canto IV. vi. 6.

¹² William Barret, Hakluyt II., 410.

trade either at its source or at its destination, preferably at both. By 1505 the Portuguese, under Almeida, had built forts at Cochin and Cannanore and were thus able to get a hold over the trade of the Malabar coast. But Almeida's policy, conceived in caution, was not calculated to establish Portuguese supremacy in the Arabian Sea. He was content with holding the Malabar coast. As against this Albuquerque built up visions of Portuguese supremacy not only in the Arabian Sea but also in the spice islands of the Far East. He conquered Calicut and Goa, the two ports on the Malabar coast through which most of the trade passed. In the Persian Gulf he occupied Ormus and though he failed to fortify Aden, it did not materially affect his policy, for he had already occupied the island of Socotra which controlled the bottle-neck entrance to the Red Sea.

Almeida's activity had alarmed the Muhammadan powers surrounding the Arabian Sea. They combined and defeated the Portuguese fleet off Chaul. But Almeida struck an effective counterblow, shattered the confederacy in a naval battle off Diu and rehabilitated the prestige of the Portuguese. They were henceforward supreme in the Arabian Sea.

Portuguese conquest of Goa:- The sultān of Bijāpur had taken an active share in the Muhammadan alliance that had defeated the Portuguese fleet off Chaul.¹³ Moreover, the Portuguese suspected

¹³ Tuhfat, 91-92.

that he was trying to reconstruct the confederacy recently vanquished at Diu.¹⁴ The Portuguese could hardly expect better justification to declare hostilities against Bijāpur. Almeida made this clear. In 1508 on his way to Diu he halted at the 'Adilshāhī port of Dābbol, at this time second in importance only to Goa as a trade centre but negligible as a naval base. As a reprisal against Bijāpur's share in the Portuguese defeat at Chaul, Almeida decided to attack it. The Muhammadans were driven back and the Portuguese occupied the harbour (December 30, 1508). Almeida himself slept in the principal mosque of the town that night. Next morning the victors set the buildings of the town on fire and returned to their ships.¹⁵ Bijāpur's utter weakness to defend its coast became evident.

Albuquerque succeeded Almeida as the governor of the Portuguese possessions in the East. He at once launched the forward policy which he advocated and prepared for an expedition to the Red Sea. He was, however, persuaded by Timoja, a naval officer of Vijayanagar, to abandon the project and to turn his attention to the nearer port of Goa.¹⁶ Albuquerque did not require much persuasion; he had already marked Goa as a future Portuguese possession. Strategically the position of Goa had every possible advantage from a Portuguese standpoint. It offered the combination of a natural harbour and a natural fortress.

¹⁴ Barbosa I., 176-77.

¹⁵ Faria I., 142-44; Osorio I., 343-44; Barbosa I., 166.

¹⁶ Faria I., 162.

which would sooner or later be necessary at some place on the coast, if Albuquerque's policy of making India the principal region of the commercial activity of the Portuguese in the East was to succeed. Goa was more favourably situated than Calicut or Cochin so far as the trade of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf was concerned, and it was for this reason that Albuquerque desired to possess it. It was, at this time, the most important port on the Malabar coast, both on account of its trade and its situation. Its proximity to the Deccan sultanates and Vijayanagar gave it added importance as a commercial centre. Almeida's policy was to have a strong navy without a desire to hold the ports. Perhaps that is why when Dabhol had nearly surrendered to him in 1503, he did not establish a factory there nor demand any other territorial concessions. But Albuquerque's policy was different, he wanted not only a strong navy, but also the possession of the ports which commanded the trade of the East. The conquest of Goa, therefore, was an essential factor in Albuquerque's policy. He sailed from Cannanore to attack Goa early in 1510. It proved an easy prey. The fortress of Panjim which guards the harbour was carried by assault and the city surrendered on February 17, 1510.¹⁷

It redounds to the credit of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh that he decided to recover Goa. Undaunted by the proved superiority of

¹⁷ Ferishta II., 21; B.S. 22; Osorio II.4; Prestage, 41.

the Portuguese, in May of the same year he forced his way into the island of Goa. Fortune favoured him. His courage and determination won for him the admiration of the inhabitants of the port. Loyal to Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh, they rose in an insurrection against their new masters. Albuquerque was advised by his officers to withdraw to the ships. Once in the sea the Portuguese were safe. They set sail for Cannanore and Goa was recovered by Bijāpur.¹⁸ But this advantage was short lived. In October 1510 Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh died and this paved the way for Albuquerque's final conquest of Goa.

It will be remembered that Albuquerque's policy in the East depended for its success upon the holding of certain strategic posts - Ormuz to command the entrance to the Persian Gulf; Malacca to control the spice trade at its source and Goa which gave him the command of the Malabar waters. At the time of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh's death Albuquerque was in Cannanore re-organising his fleet for another attack on Goa. When he heard of the death of Yūsuf and also ascertained that almost all the garrison at Goa had gone to Bijāpur to attend the coronation ceremony of Ismā'il, he decided to strike, and set sail for Goa early in November. On the 25th of that month he stormed the harbour, gained an easy entrance into the city and became master of the place.¹⁹ Thus was Goa conquered by the Portuguese

¹⁸ Ferishta II., 21; B.S. 22; Faria I., 165-67; Tuhfat. 101.

¹⁹ T.D.I., 290; Ferishta II., 24; Letters III., viii.

and it remains in their possession to this day.

Peace with the Portuguese was essential even if it meant the loss of Goa. Albuquerque had definitely gained the upper hand and had also discovered the utter weakness of Bijāpur in naval warfare. He threatened to attack Dāhol and Saugameshwar, two of the 'Adilshāhī ports, if attempts were made to recapture Goa. There was also the danger of the Portuguese interfering with the supply of horses if hostilities continued. In fact Albuquerque was in communication with Vijayanagar on this topic. Kamāl Khān, the regent at Bijāpur had, therefore, no choice but to recognise the Portuguese occupation of Goa. On his part Albuquerque agreed to maintain peace and to allow horses to pass into the 'Adilshāhī kingdom as before.²⁰

Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I. and the Portuguese:- For twenty-five years relations between Bijāpur and Goa remained friendly. In 1545 prince 'Abdullāh, the brother of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I., made an unsuccessful attempt to usurp the 'Adilshāhī throne, and had to fly to Goa to escape the wrath of his brother. This ultimately brought Bijāpur and Goa into conflict. Ibrāhīm offered to cede to the Portuguese the districts of Salsette and Bardez, adjoining Goa, in return for the person of the rebel prince. Martin Affonso, the Portuguese governor, refused the request as it violated the standards of hospitality. He,

²⁰ Commentaries IV., 125-28; Letters II.xvii., IV.civ; Whiteway, 134-35; Ferishta II., 24; B.S. 27.

however, suggested that in return for the two districts he would send the prince to Malacca. But Affonso was deterred by his advisers from fulfilling even this condition as they considered 'Abdullāh a useful instrument to hold Ibrāhīm in check and to extort from him further benefits. The result was that the prince was carried from Goa to Cannanore and back to Goa.²¹ At the same time the Portuguese took possession of Salsette and Bardes.

Too late Ibrāhīm discovered that he had been outwitted by the Portuguese. In the meanwhile Martin Affonso had left for Portugal and his place was taken by Dom Joao de Castro. Ibrāhīm had to start negotiations over again. But the Portuguese attitude was firm and he failed to have his way. The utmost Dom Joao de Castro was prepared to do was to undertake to keep the prince in Goa and to prevent him from communicating with the sultān of Ahmadnagar or other powers hostile to Bijāpur. In return Ibrāhīm had to relinquish his claims to Salsette and Bardes. Ibrāhīm accepted these terms only to violate them when he found the Portuguese engaged on the Gujarāt coast. He led his army into the districts in dispute and occupied them.²²

When the news of the 'Adilshāhī incursion reached Dom Joao de Castro, he had concluded his campaign on the Gujarāt

²¹ Faria II., 87; Andrade, 28-29; Whiteway, 285-86.

²² Andrade, 30-31;²¹³ Faria II., 117-18; Danvers I., 475-77.

coast and was returning to Goa. He retaliated by surprising the Bijāpurī port of Dābhol, looted it and hastened towards Goa. He succeeded in driving the Bijāpurīs out of Salsette and Bardes in spite of their repeated attempts to hold the districts. In addition the Portuguese governor decided "to strike where the blow might be most felt" and dispatched a fleet to sack 'Adilshāhī ports, with the result that every port between Sripur and Goa was plundered and burnt.²³

These incidents once again bring clearly to our notice the utter weakness of Bijāpur - as also of the other Muhammadan powers of India - at sea. Only forty years before this the combined fleets of Egypt, Gujarāt and the Deccan had been unable to drive the Portuguese from Indian waters. On the other hand the newcomers had succeeded in obtaining a firm footing on the Indian coast by the conquest of Goa. Apart from the transient and solitary success of Yūsuf 'Adil shāh in recovering Goa for a time, all other efforts made by the kings of Bijāpur to oust these European intruders from their island possession had been unsuccessful. The Portuguese, too, knew their advantage well and made strategic use of it to retain the possession of Goa and the lands surrounding it. Whenever the 'Adilshāhī army threatened Goa, the Portuguese in their turn would retaliate by attacking the Bijāpurī possessions on the coast. In the present struggle when the troops of

²³ Andrada, 38-40, 213-14, 222-23; Faria II., 120-21; Danvers I., 479.

Bijāpur overran Salsette and Bardez, not only were they driven back, but the Portuguese further retorted by devastating Dābhol and other ports. Thus Bijāpur could not dictate terms to the Portuguese at Goa, who were fully aware of their superiority at sea and ever ready, if need be, to blockade the 'Adilshāhī ports. It was this fear that always prompted the kings of Bijāpur to placate the Portuguese. And in this campaign also we find that it was Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh who made the initial move for peace.

Apart from a desire to safeguard his coastline and maritime trade Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh had another reason for starting negotiations with the Portuguese. During 1546 and 1547 Dom Joao de Castro had concluded with Vijayanagar and Ahmadnagar separate treaties.²⁴ This forced on Ibrāhīm the necessity of concluding a similar agreement with the Portuguese. But Dom Joao de Castro did not live to see the success of his policy.²⁵ It was his successor Garcia de Sa who signed the treaty (August 22, 1548) by which Ibrāhīm finally resigned his claim to Salsette and Bardez.²⁶

These two districts adjoining Goa were the first and the only territorial acquisitions of the Portuguese on the mainland of India. Otherwise their ambition was limited to the possession of ports and the command of the coast. They could use their

²⁴ Biker II., 184-87, 188-91.

²⁵ He died on June 5, 1548. Whiteway, 320.

²⁶ Biker II., 192; Faria II., 132.

unopposed freedom on sea to approach the shores and enter the ports of India to establish their oceanic sovereignty of trade. But they made little effort to extend their conquests into the interior of the country. The Indian states with whom the Portuguese came into contact were far too strong on land for them to entertain any hopes of large conquest of territory. Moreover the Portuguese nation was too small to wage successful land warfare in India with a view to establishing a military empire. For impotent though the Indian states might have been on water, they were much too formidable on land to go to pieces under the attack of a handful of Portuguese.

Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar: Alliance against the Portuguese:- But the Portuguese occupation of Goa was a source of perpetual humiliation to the 'Adilshāhī kings. Repeated treaties and affirmations of mutual friendship did nothing to lessen its rancour. The battle of Talikota had brought home a new lesson to the Deccan sultanates, the advantage of concerted action. And this encouraged Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar to make one final effort to dislodge the Portuguese from the Deccan coast. So long as the Hindu empire of Vijayanagar threatened Bijāpur in the south, peace with the Portuguese was essential as they held control over the horse trade; for hostilities between Bijāpur and Goa meant a complete diversion of this trade in favour of the Hindus. But after the fall of Vijayanagar the strategic importance of Goa as the centre of this trade naturally declined.

Undoubtedly 'Alī 'Adil Shāh had this fact in mind. In 1570 he entered into negotiations with Murtazā Nizām Shāh of Ahmadnagar. The Zamorin of Calicut also was drawn into the alliance. It was decided that the confederates were to attack simultaneously the Portuguese possessions in their respective kingdoms.²⁷ This plan to divide Portuguese strength was both sound and attractive in theory, but it proved of very little effect when put into practice. The Portuguese successfully drove back both the sultans and the Zamorin and once again proved the superiority of their maritime strength.

In January 1570 the offensive against the Portuguese began. Murtazā Nizām Shāh advanced on Chaul and laid siege to the place.²⁸ The 'Adilshāhī attack on Goa was more difficult. Chaul was a solitary Portuguese outpost in the Nizāmshāhī kingdom, accessible by land, whereas Goa was separated from the mainland by the Goa creek and Bāchol river.

The Portuguese viceroy had already sent part of his garrison and fleet to the relief of Chaul. Numerically the Portuguese defence was no match for the Bījāpurīs. But they held the creek and the river and made a gallant stand against the 'Adilshāhī attack led by 'Alī in person.²⁹ For the better part of a year he invested the island in vain.

In the meanwhile a squadron of the Portuguese fleet had

²⁷ Faria II., 281; Danvers I., 551; Tuhfat, 162. Cf. Geddes, 26-27; Ferishta does not mention that Ahmadnagar and Bījāpur entered into a league. The campaigns against the Portuguese are chronicled separately in the history of each kingdom. Ferishta II. 79, 20

²⁸ Danvers I., 554; C.H.I., V., 20; Ferishta II., 262.

²⁹ Faria II., 282-83; Danvers I., 552.

returned from the Malabar coast after defeating the Zamorin.³⁰ This the viceroy sent against Dābhol. The Portuguese fleet sacked Dābhol and once again impressed on the 'Adilshāhī king the fact that the friendship of the Portuguese was essential for the safety of Bijāpur ports.

The siege of Chaul fizzled out after seven months.³¹ The Zamorin had already been defeated. Fresh Portuguese ships arrived from the Persian Gulf and Portugal.³² 'Alī 'Adil Shāh was forced to acknowledge his inability to reduce Goa and the hostilities were suspended. 'Alī 'Adil Shāh even sent his ambassadors into Goa to renew the treaty of friendship between Bijāpur and the Portuguese.³³

This was the most serious confederacy of the Deccan powers that had ever taken up arms against the Portuguese. But from the outset it was bound to failure. The Portuguese were undoubtedly superior at sea to all the confederates put together. And the sack of Dābhol, on more than one occasion, showed that any hostilities with the Portuguese were bound to lead to counter attacks on Deccan ports, and on the maritime trade of the Deccan kingdoms.

The union of Portugal with Spain and the subsequent decline

³⁰ Faria II., 288; Danvers I., 555.

³¹ Ferishta II., 262-63; Danvers I., 560-68.

³² Danvers I., 557; Faria II., 296.

³³ Biker II., 26; Faria II., 296; Ferishta II., 79.

of Portuguese supremacy in the Eastern seas has little bearing on 'Adilshāhī history. The trade of the Arabian Sea, once lost to Muhammadan shipping was never recovered by it. The decline of the Portuguese saw the rise of two other European powers, the Dutch and the English, who competed for the supremacy of the lucrative Eastern commerce. Portugal held fast to her coastal possessions in India, but slowly faded out of the picture of Deccan politics.

If the close of the sixteenth century was full of portents for the future of Portuguese supremacy on the Indian coast, it was equally ominous for the future of the Deccan sultanates. The Mughals had come into the Deccan. Their advent caused a flutter at Goa. The Portuguese were perhaps the first to apprehend the dangers of the Mughal invasion and accordingly, Mathias de Albuquerque, the viceroy of Goa, sent an embassy to Bijāpur, and to hasten an alliance, mentioned to Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. the evident danger to those kings who could not unite against the common enemy, the Mughals.³⁴ The Portuguese authorities

³⁴ J.B.B.R.A.S. I., 1925.

In a letter dated November 9, 1598 from Philip III. of Spain to the viceroy Dom Francisco de Gama we read: "How necessary is the alliance with the neighbouring kings, to defend us all against the Mughal." Evidently the Portuguese were afraid that the Mughals would succeed where the Deccan sultanates had failed and deprive them of their possessions. In another letter we read "yet since that king (the Mughal Emperor) is very powerful and sagacious, I recommend you to keep your eyes open on his designs and intentions, to prevent them with the necessary remedies." These letters are preserved in the archives at Goa.

were aware of the imperialistic designs of Akbar, against which the best preparation seemed a defensive alliance with the neighbouring kingdoms. Union alone was strength. But how little the Deccan sultanates succeeded in imbibing the old adage, history was ruthlessly to prove.

CHAPTER V.

COMING OF THE MUGHALS.

The Deccan Policy of the Mughals:- It was inevitable that when the Mughal Empire had extended its sway over the whole of northern India, it should turn its attention to the south. Even if the achievements of the earlier Hindu Empires were too distant in time to arouse ambition, the example of the Tughlugs was too fresh in the minds of the Mughal Emperors to stop their conquests on the banks of the Nerbada; and the moment they felt secure at home, they devoted themselves to the fulfilment of their Imperial ambition. Babar had no time to go beyond Delhi and its environs; his son Humayun was not by nature ambitious, while his very throne was none too secure. But with the accession of Akbar, the Mughals were firmly established on the throne of Delhi, and by the end of the sixteenth century Akbar had made himself the master of the whole of northern India. The Deccan alone remained a field for his ambition and a reward for his arms.

The political situation in the Deccan at this time was favourable for Akbar to further his imperialistic plans in the south. The Deccan powers continued to fight between themselves. Further, the Abyssinians at Ahmadnagar made a bid for power and suppressed all the Fardanis. They even

went to the extent of inviting the Mughals to support them. Akbar was waiting for such an opportunity, and he sent his son prince Murād to Ahmadnagar. In the meanwhile the Abyssinians, having repented for their foolishness, made common cause with Chānd Bibī who led the rival party. It was Chānd Bibī's valour that repulsed the Imperial troops. The Noble Queen's defence of the Nizāmshāhī capital is one of the most memorable incidents in Indian history. After this, the party strife at Ahmadnagar once again broke out with renewed bitterness and the Abyssinians basely murdered Chānd Bibī. The Nizāmshāhī capital was unable to resist the Mughal arms much longer and capitulated to Akbar in 1601.¹

The Mughal campaigns for the annexation of the Deccan thus began about the beginning of the seventeenth century. Berar had already been wrested from Ahmadnagar in 1596.² Gradually but definitely the boundary of the Empire was advancing southwards. The Nizāmshāhī kingdom came to an end in 1633. Bijāpur and Golconda were forced to make concession after concession of territories to satisfy the ever-growing Mughal demands. At last Aurangzib conquered Bijāpur and Golconda and the last two sultanates of the Deccan became provinces of the Mughal Empire.

What were the reasons behind the Deccan policy of the

¹ Akbarnāma III., 1157-59; Ferishta II., 323.

² Burhān (I.A., LII., 337-38); Ferishta II., 318.

Mughals? Imperialism was the most important. The Mughals aspired to surpass the achievements of all the Empire builders that had preceded them. In the history of India, the rulers at Delhi had always claimed the supreme sovereignty in the land, and it was to enforce this sovereignty that all their expeditions were devised and all their wars were fought. In the hands of the Mughals this instrument of sovereignty became a potent weapon. It was fashioned out of the Hindu idea of a Chakra-vartin and the Muslim theory of state. It is quite possible that the exploits of Asoka and Chandragupta had kindled an emulation in Akbar's mind to follow their example and become the supreme lord of all India. The conception behind the idea of becoming a Chakra-vartin was essentially imperial. It envisaged the obedience of all the rulers in the distant parts of India who accepted the sovereignty of the supreme lord and acknowledged themselves as his vassals.³ Moreover, both 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī and Muhammad Tughluq had extended their sway over the south and showed the Mughals the way to the Deccan.

Akbar was further inspired by another consideration in his efforts to incorporate the Deccan in his Empire. He considered it a moral duty to spread Mughal government all over the land, for to his mind Mughal government was synonymous with

³ Akbar as a Chakra-vartin: see, *Aryan Rule in India*, Chapter II

good government. The disturbed conditions of the Deccan convinced him that that country could have peace only if it became a part of the Mughal Empire. It is possible that this idea played its part in the subsequent attempts of the Mughals to conquer the Deccan sultanates.

In the case of Aurangzib another and a more powerful incentive to conquer the Deccan sultanates was the religious factor. Aurangzib was a staunch Sunni, while both the sultanates of the Deccan, Bijapur and Golconda, were Shias. Of these Golconda was practically governed by the Hindu ministers, Akanna and Madanna. And in the case of Bijapur, Aurangzib suspected that it secretly supported Shivaji in his fight against the Mughal Empire. Under such circumstances he considered it his duty to put an end to these Shia states as soon as he could. This would eventually facilitate the extinction of the Marathas, the expansion of the Empire, and so establish the glory of Islam.

Mughal imperialism was also influenced by Islamic political theory. In theory the Muslim state is a pure theocracy; its true sovereign is God and the human ruler is merely His agent on earth, called the Khalifah. He is the legitimate successor of the Prophet in command of the faithful and therefore entitled to the obedience of all the Muslims wherever they might live. The Mughal Emperors assumed the title of

Khalīfah and called their capital "dar-ul-Khilāfat",⁴ thus making it clear that they did in no way consider the Ottoman sultans their superiors. Implicitly, therefore, the Mughal Emperors arrogated to themselves the supreme political authority in India and never acknowledged as equal in status any independent monarch in the land. They studiously refrained from addressing the sultans of Bijāpur and Golconda as "shāhs" and invariably used the term "khān" in all their communications to them. But towards Bijāpur their attitude was less overbearing than towards Golconda. That they considered themselves the overlords of both these sultanates is made evident by their policy. In 1648 Shāh Jahān, with a great show of condescension, bestowed the title of "Shāh" on Muhammad 'Adil Shāh, thus making it clear that the 'Adil Shāh could use the style "Shāh" only with the permission of the Mughal Emperor. His subordinate position was further brought home to Muhammad 'Adil Shāh when Shāh Jahān reprimanded him for conferring the title "Khān Khānān" on his premier noble, a title which, Shāh Jahān contended, could be conferred only by the Emperor on his nobles.⁵ Golconda was in even a worse position. In 1636 it was declared as a vassal state of the Empire, was compelled to conform to the Sunni rites in reading the "khutba" and to

⁴ Arnold, 159; S.M.I., 310-11; C.C.I.M.C., III., 9, 16, 96; C.C.P.M. L., II., 2, 4, 7, 24, 159, 223.

⁵ B.S. 342-43, 346; Sarkar: Aurangzib I., 255-58.

pay him an annual tribute.⁶

The Mughal conception of sovereignty was threefold; it was universal, it was aggressive and above all it was military. The natural result of such a view of sovereignty was the expansion of the Mughal state. And since the Mughal Empire was the most powerful political unit in India of its time, it could back up its claim and enforce it on the lesser powers with the help of the Imperial army. Thus the whole of the country acknowledged the Mughal sway, only the Marāthās daring to resist.

Because of the military organization of their state, the Mughals had gathered round them a large army. This had to be kept continually occupied with new conquests. This is one of the reasons behind the Mughal attempts to conquer Central Asia. Towards the close of the sixteenth century, the country from Qandāhār to Bengal and from Kashmir to the Marbada acknowledged Akbar's authority. The existence of this mighty Empire was made possible and its security maintained by the large army which the Mughals had collected around them. This army could not be left idle without menacing the internal peace of the Empire. Moreover, it was much too expensive to maintain such a large ^{army} without keeping it employed on one kind of expedition or another. And the need to find a profitable employment for this army was undoubtedly at the bottom of

⁶ B.N., I., 11, 210-11.

the Deccan policy of the Mughals. By the time of Aurangzib the Mughals had become aware of the fact that geographical factors prevented the boundaries of their Empire from extending in the north. They then turned their attention to the independent kingdoms of the south. And it was inevitable that Bijāpur and Golconda being the weaker powers had to submit to the stronger.

Deccan sultanates and the Mughals: Early relations:- Bijāpur first came into contact with the Mughals during the reign of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I. About 1574 Akbar had sent an ambassador to Bijāpur who returned to Delhi accompanied by an 'Adilshāhī envoy with valuable presents from 'Alī 'Adil Shāh to Akbar.⁷ There was a further exchange of ambassadors between Bijāpur and Delhi during the reign of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh and at the time of his death in 1580 a Mughal ambassador was present in Bijāpur.⁸

'Alī was succeeded by his nephew Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. During his reign Bijāpur came in closer touch with the Mughals through the expansion of their Empire to the south. Party factions at Ahmadnagar were responsible in inviting the Mughals into the Deccan. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh tried his utmost to bring the Nizāmshāhī factions closer together. He sent Rafī-ud-dīn Shirāsi on a mission to Ahmadnagar to advise the factions to compose their differences. But Rafī-ud-dīn was

⁷ Badauni II., 257.

⁸ 'Ain I., 466; Akbarnāma III., 440-41; Ferishta II., 88-89; M.U.I. 181.

a Pardesi and the Abyssinians, who were the more powerful party at Ahmadnagar, suspected his intentions. Rafī-ud-dīn's advice fell on deaf ears, and in disappointment Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh recalled him to Bijāpur.⁹

The Mughals who had already taken Berar from Ahmadnagar as the price of peace, once again advanced towards the border of the Nizāmshāhī kingdom and occupied Pathrī and once again the Abyssinians made common cause with Chānd Bībī. The Noble Queen now requested help from Bijāpur and Golconda to repulse the unwarranted Mughal advance. The allied armies marched towards Berar and encamped near the town of Sonpet. Here a battle was fought (January 27, 1597) in which the imperialists were first beaten back, but in the end overpowered the Deccan troops.¹⁰ The allied armies returned to their respective dominions. The Mughal grandees quarrelled between themselves and the Mughal general Khān Khānān was recalled to Delhi.

The malady of Ahmadnagar, however, was beyond cure. Faction fights broke out again in the city. The Emperor Akbar grasped the opportunity and besieged the Nizāmshāhī capital in person. Chānd Bībī again rose to the occasion. But one of her Abyssinian enemies accused her of complicity with the invaders and she was murdered by one of the soldiers of the garrison who were completely panic-stricken. A few

⁹ T.M. 153b-156a.

¹⁰ Akbarnāma III., 1070-72; Ferishta II., 320-21; F.A. 234a-238b.



Bijāpur during the first quarter of the Seventeenth Century.

150 MILES

days later, the Mughal army succeeded in storming Ahmadnagar and occupying it.¹¹ Thus the Nizāmshāhī capital fell to the Mughals (April 1601).

Encouraged by his victory at Ahmadnagar, Akbar sent an ambassador to Bijāpur to demand a tribute from Ibrāhīm as a token of his submission and also to ask for the hand of his daughter in marriage to Akbar's son, prince Dāniyāl. Mīr Jamāl-ud-dīn Husain, Akbar's envoy, was profusely bribed by Ibrāhīm to keep the negotiations pending. At last the Emperor sent Asad Beg, another ambassador, to Bijāpur with orders to complete the negotiations without delay. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh had no alternative but to submit to the wish of the Emperor. Accordingly Asad Beg fetched the bride from her home and made her over to prince Dāniyāl who married her on the banks of the Godavari¹² (June 1604). But in spite of his professions of submission to the Mughal Emperor, Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh did not desist from extending a welcome to Malik 'Amber, the leader¹³ of the Abyssinian party at Ahmadnagar, who had fled to Bijāpur. It was indeed a wise policy on the part of Ibrāhīm to help 'Amber to restore the Nizāmshāhī dynasty. But their mutual distrust proved greater than their political wisdom and once again acted as a barrier between Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar. In spite of all his desire to co-operate with the Abyssinian,

¹¹ Akbarnāma III., 1157-59; Ferishta II., 323.

¹² B.S. 256-57; Ferishta I., 516; Akbarnāma III., 1239-40; Wāqī'a, 45a-b; T.M., 225b-227b.

¹³ F.A. 261b, 266b-267b.

Ibrāhīm could not overcome his prejudice against him, especially with the murder of his aunt Chānd Bibī still fresh in his mind. 'Amber on the other hand suspected Ibrahīm of plotting with the Mughals to annihilate him.

Rise of Malik 'Amber:- After the murder of Chānd Bibī and the sack of Ahmadnagar, the Nisāmshāhī kingdom was saved from extinction by the genius of Malik 'Amber. He remained faithful to the old dynasty, and rallying the remains of the army round him proclaimed a member of the royal family as Murtazā Nisām Shāh II. with Kharkī (Aurangābād) as his capital. He made common cause with his rivals and stemmed the tide of Mughal advance. He was also helped by Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh, and together they succeeded in not only driving the Mughals out of Ahmadnagar but also in defeating a formidable array of Mughal generals who were sent to the Deccan specially to subdue Malik 'Amber.¹⁴

Thus Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar were just learning to appreciate the lessons of unity, when Ibrāhīm became jealous of Malik 'Amber and viewed unfavourably the power the latter had acquired. He also disapproved of the way in which 'Amber was treating Murtazā Nisām Shāh.¹⁵ Perhaps he suspected that the

¹⁴ B.S. 264-72; F.A. 270b-271a; Iqbalnāma, 38-39, 65-66; Tuzuk I., 179-81, 220-21.

¹⁵ B.S. 270-71; Ferishta II., 327; Malik 'Amber, 44.

Abyssinian was planning to usurp the Nizāmshāhī crown. This only stirred up in Ibrāhīm his dormant prejudice against Malik 'Amber. He seems to have withdrawn his alliance with 'Amber and entered secretly into communication with Emperor Jahāngīr. In the meanwhile the Mughals had again come into the Deccan under prince Khurram (Shāh Jahān) and Khān Khānān, their general, and beaten back Malik 'Amber who had only Daulatābād and the surrounding districts left in his possession.¹⁶

Prince Khurram returned to Delhi and the Mughal officers, left in command of the Deccan, fell into mutual wrangles. Once again Malik 'Amber succeeded in winning over Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh to his side. Together they drove the Mughals into Berar. Malik 'Amber, following the Mughal troops, remained with the combined army for six months in that part of the country, and annexed several districts of Berar and Khāndesh.¹⁷ Matters were in a critical state for the Mughals when once again the vigorous prince Khurram was sent to punish 'Amber and to restore order in the Mughal possessions in the Deccan. The prince was remarkably successful against 'Amber, who, unable to make any resistance, fled as Khurram approached to reinforce the Mughal troops. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh does not seem to have supported Malik 'Amber with further reinforcements, as, at this time, disturbances near Adonī in the

¹⁶ B.S. 272; Tuzuk I., 234, 311-14, 368; Malik 'Amber, 68-73.

¹⁷ B.S. 273; Tuzuk II., 155-56, 188-89; Malik 'Amber, 70-72.

southern part of his kingdom, demanded his attention.¹⁸ The Abyssinian was driven from Berar to Kharkī which was invested, taken and destroyed. 'Amber now again had to submit and was compelled to cede territory to the extent of twenty-eight miles beyond the Mughal line and to pay an indemnity of fifty lacks of rupees.¹⁹

The rebellion of Shāh Jahān in 1623 gave Malik 'Amber one more opportunity of scoring a triumph over the Mughals, and he pushed on his boundaries to within a short distance of Ahmadnagar. Elated by this success, Malik 'Amber, who was already disgusted at the vacillating attitude of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh towards him, decided once for all to break up with Bijāpur and advanced into 'Adilshāhī territory.²⁰

The causes of the difference between Malik 'Amber and Bijāpur were many. 'Amber, an Abyssinian, was unpopular with the Pardesi officers of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh. They contended that he had become too powerful and therefore Bijāpur ought to join the Mughals and thus adjust the balance of power. There was behind this proposal more prejudice than statesmanship. But Malik 'Amber's aggressive attitude left no alternative for Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh but to listen to this advice. The Pardesis at Bijāpur also took advantage of the rumours that one of Ibrāhīm's wives was said to be in conspiracy with

¹⁸ B.S. 273.

¹⁹ Tuzuk II., 207-08; Malik 'Amber, 96-98.

²⁰ Iqbalnāma, 223; S.B., V.6; Beni Prasad, 369-70.

Malik 'Amber with intentions to depose the sultān and place her son Darvish on the throne.²¹ All these factors resulted in Ibrāhīm's making an offer of alliance to the Mughals. Prince Parvīs, who had been appointed to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, had already sent envoys to Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh suggesting such an alliance.²² At the same time Malik 'Amber also was straining every nerve to gain the friendship of the Mughals. But prince Parvīs recommended to the Emperor that between Malik 'Amber and Ibrāhīm, the choice should fall on the latter,²³ and thus Bijāpur and the Mughals entered into a kind of offensive and defensive alliance.

Soon after, Shāh Johān renewed his rebellious activities in Bengal and Bihar and prince Parvīs and Mahabat Khān, his second in command in the Deccan, were ordered to the east to deal with the rebel. This was Malik 'Amber's opportunity. He invaded the 'Adilshāhī kingdom, made a surprise attack on Bīdar, plundered it, advanced towards Bijāpur itself and laid siege to it. But soon Mulla Muhammad Lārī, the 'Adilshāhī general who had joined the Mughal camp with a Bijāpur contingent of 5,000 cavalry, arrived with Mughal reinforcements and compelled Malik 'Amber to retire. During the pursuit which followed, Malik 'Amber suddenly turned round and fell on the

²¹ P.D.V. 443.

²² F.A. 287a-b.

²³ Iqbalnāma, 223; Tuzuk. II, 288, 296.

allied forces at a place called Bhātūrī (भगतुरी in Marāthī), about eight miles south of Ahmadnagar. A battle was fought in which Muhammad Lārī lost his life and the combined Mughal and Bijāpur forces were utterly routed²⁴ (November 1624).

After the battle of Bhātūrī, Malik 'Amber once again invaded Bijāpur territories, laid siege to Sholāpur and occupied it. By this time prince Parvīs and Mahabat Khān returned to the Deccan and so Malik 'Amber withdrew from 'Adil-shāhī territories.²⁵

Thus the political affairs of the Deccan during the first quarter of the seventeenth century culminated in the battle of Bhātūrī. Time and again Malik 'Amber had tried to form an alliance between himself and Bijāpur on a permanent footing. But his attempts were defeated by the Pardesi party at Bijāpur led by Mulla Muhammad Lārī who always advocated a pro-Mughal policy. The prejudice of the Pardesis against the Abyssinian 'Amber - relic of past feuds between Deccanis and Pardesis that had played such a disastrous part in the break-up of the Bahmanī kingdom and in the fratricidal struggle between the Deccan sultanates in the sixteenth century - and their racial affinity towards the Mughal generals in the Deccan proved too strong and blinded them against the obvious

²⁴ Iqbalnāma, 234-37; F.A. 288b-291b; B.S. 274.

²⁵ F.A. 292a; Malik 'Amber 110; B.S. 274; Iqbalnāma, 237-38.

advantages of an alliance with Malik 'Amber. But the attitude of the Pardesis must also have been influenced by the fact that sooner or later the Mughals were bound to reduce the rest of the Ahmadnagar kingdom. It was, therefore, no use to incur their displeasure by supporting Malik 'Amber.

Thanks to the supine Deccan policy of Jahāngīr and Malik 'Amber's own abilities, he seemed fairly on his way to reinstate the fortunes of the Nizāmshāhī dynasty. But soon after his victory at Bhātūrī he died (May 14, 1626). He was held in great respect in the Deccan and he was the only person who could form a confederacy against the Mughals, who were never able to gain a firm foothold in that country as long as he lived. He was not only a military leader but also an administrator: he consolidated the fragments of the Nizāmshāhī kingdom and organised their administration closely on the Mughal model. He went near to restoring the power and strength of the Nizāmshāhī kingdom. With Malik Amber's death the last capable defender of Ahmadnagar, we may even say of the Deccan, passed away; after him no one could succeed in emphasising the fact that unity alone could enable the Deccan sultanates to repel the common enemy. Both Jahāngīr and the official historian of his reign pay eloquent tribute to the memory of this great Abyssinian. "Alike as a soldier, a general, a diplomat and an administrator, Malik 'Amber was unrivalled in greatness.

He controlled the unruly spirits of the Deccan and to the end of his life maintained his position and governed with ability. History has no parallel of a man of so humble antecedents rising to such eminence."²⁶

Bijāpur and the Mughals:- Malik 'Amber's death was followed in quick succession by that of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. (September 12, 1627) and Jahāngir (October 28, 1627). Muhammad 'Adil Shāh ascended the throne of Bijāpur and at Delhi Jahāngir was succeeded by Shāh Jahān who from the very beginning made it evident that, unlike his father, he was going to follow a strong forward policy in the Deccan.

At the accession of Muhammad there were in Bijāpur two parties. The first was led by Mustafā Khān, a son-in-law of Muhammad Lārī who was killed at Khātūrī. He advocated a policy of an alliance with the Mughals against the Nizāmshāhī kingdom. The second party was led by Khavās Khān, an Abyssinian, who was supported by the Marāthā general Murārī Pundit and his followers. They tried to dissuade Muhammad 'Adil Shāh from adopting a policy which in their opinion was detrimental to the safety of Bijāpur, as it would bring the Mughals to the very doorsteps of the 'Adilshāhī kingdom.

Murtazā Nizām Shāh's attitude, however, was not at all friendly towards Bijāpur, the recent alliance between Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh and the Mughals being still fresh in his mind.

²⁶ Iqbalnāma, 271-72.

Moreover, after the death of Malik 'Amber, Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh had recovered the fort of Kandhār which he had temporarily handed over to 'Amber in the first alliance.²⁷ He invaded the 'Adilshāhī kingdom and was met at Kadri Kannūr by an army led by Muhammad 'Adil Shāh himself, was defeated and pursued out of Bījāpur territory.²⁸

This unjustified aggression gave fresh encouragement to the pro-Mughal party in Bījāpur to further their policy. In the meanwhile Shāh Jahān had sent an envoy to Bījāpur, ostensibly to prevail on Muhammad 'Adil Shāh and Murtazā Nizām Shāh to compose their differences, but really to negotiate an alliance with Bījāpur against Ahmadnagar. It was agreed between the Mughal ambassador and the 'Adilshāhī government that the Nizāmshāhī kingdom should be divided between them - the Mughals to have the country north of the Bhima and Bījāpur that to the south. And in accordance with this agreement Randola Khān, an 'Adilshāhī officer was sent northwards to help the Mughals.²⁹

The Mughals first reduced Dhārūr. As an evidence of the good faith of the Mughals, Randola Khān requested that it should be handed over to Bījāpur. This was refused.³⁰ The Mughals were accused of having broken faith. This put

²⁷ B.N., I., 382; B.S. 264.

²⁸ Guldashta 9a-11b; B.S. 285.

²⁹ B.N., I., 256; M.N. 10; B.S. 291-92.

³⁰ B.N., I., 399-46; B.S. 293.

an end to Mustafā Khān's pro-Mughal policy at Bijāpur and Khavās Khān, his rival, who advocated a policy of an alliance with the Nizām Shāh, came into power. For a time his policy succeeded. But Fath Khān, who had succeeded to his father Malik 'Amber's position at Murtazā's court, soon abolished all further hopes of its continuance. It is believed that he poisoned Murtazā Nizām Shāh to death and set his seven year old son Husain on the throne. He also saw that the fall of the Nisāmshāhī kingdom was only a matter of days and offered his submission to Shāh Jahān.³¹

The Mughal Emperor had now decided to put an end to the Nisāmshāhī kingdom altogether and to reduce Bijāpur also if possible. He decided to attack Bijāpur first. But his general Asaf Khān conducted the campaign in an inefficient manner. The tactics of the 'Adilshāhīs compelled him to raise the siege of Bijāpur and to abandon his campaign.³²

Shāh Jahān, learning of the failure of Asaf Khān, sent another general, Mahābat Khān, to subdue Fath Khān and march against Bijāpur. Mahābat Khān first directed his attention to Daulatābād. Fath Khān who, as we have seen, had made an offer of alliance with the Mughals, wrote to Mahābat Khān expressing his willingness to enrol himself in Imperial service and to hand over the fort to the Mughal general. Khavās Khān, the Bijāpur minister, made a feeble attempt to induce

³¹ B.N., I., 402, 497; B.S. 290; M.N. 13.

³² B.S., 294; M.N. 11-12; F.A. 323a-b; B.N., I., 411-16.

Fath Khān to put up a defence. But the Abyssinian had already made up his mind to surrender to the Mughals. On June 17, 1633 he came out of Daulatābād and handed over the fort to Mahābat Khān.³³ And so ended the Nizāmshāhī kingdom.

Thus the fort of Daulatābād fell into the possession of the Mughals and became the capital of the Mughal possessions in the Deccan. Daulatābād had a strategic importance of its own; it now served the Mughals as a base for future operations against Bījāpur and Golconda. With the fall of Ahmadnagar the Deccan kingdoms lost their first outpost; and with the fall of Daulatābād another and a more important one. By 1636 the Nizāmshāhī kingdom was completely wiped out and the Mughals extended their borders right up to those of Bījāpur and Golconda.

The subsidiary alliance of 1636:- Fresh reinforcements now arrived from Delhi and Mahābat Khān marched against Bījāpur and laid siege to Paranda. The 'Adilshāhī garrison defended the fort with great courage and determination. Two other factors which went against the Mughals were the dissensions in the Imperial camp and the operations of Shahājī, father of Shivājī and a prominent figure in the Nizāmshāhī kingdom, which greatly hindered the progress of the Mughals. After the fall of Daulatābād Shahājī had placed a child of the Nizāmshāhī royal family on the throne at Pongad with the title

³³ B.N., I., 496-528; B.S. 295-300; F.A. 324a-326b; Guldasta, 26a-29b.

of Murtazā Nizām Shāh and had succeeded in attracting to his side not only the sympathy of Khavās Khān of Bījāpur, but also the support of many of the Nizāmshāhī nobles who still remained loyal to the old dynasty. And while Mahābat Khān was trying to reduce Parenda, Shahājī spread havoc in the recent conquests of the Mughals. Mahābat Khān saw no hopes of success under these circumstances and raised the siege of Parenda and returned to Burhānpur³⁴ (May 1634). By his failure he incurred the displeasure of Shāh Jahān and died of a broken heart soon after.

Khavās Khān still hoped to resuscitate the Nizāmshāhī kingdom and helped Shahājī with men and money. This was too much for Shāh Jahān. He demanded immediate withdrawal of Bījāpur's support to Shahājī, and, when this was refused by Khavās Khān, ordered Khān Jahān, his general in the Deccan, to invade Bījāpur.³⁵

Thus Khavās Khān's obstinate but ineffective attempts to piece together the fragments of the Nizāmshāhī kingdom only brought the wrath of Shāh Jahān on Bījāpur and strengthened the cause of Khavās Khān's rivals. Anticipating that his unpopularity at the court would lead to his downfall, Khavās Khān contemplated treachery. He actually sent word to Shāh Jahān that the Bījāpur court was divided in itself and if the Mughals would attack the capital, he would undertake to secure them

³⁴ B.H., I. 11. 39-46; M.H. 14-15; F.A. 328a-330b, 346b; Guldasht
³⁵ B.H., I., 11., 125-26, 144; F.A. 331b. 31a-34b.

them an entrance within its walls. When his treachery became known he was put to death. The pro-Mughal party at Bijāpur triumphed and Mustafā Khān their leader, who had been kept in confinement by Khavās Khān, assumed the control of the administration.³⁶

The Mughals in the meanwhile were marching against Bijāpur. They had overrun the districts of Kalyāni and Bīdar and had defeated a Bijāpur force near the latter place. With the ascendancy of Mustafā Khān, however, affairs began to change, and the Bijāpur government assumed a distinctly conciliatory attitude towards the Mughals and agreed to abandon their anti-Mughal policy. Shāh Jahān at first refused to come to terms, but was ultimately prevailed on by the 'Adilshāhī envoys to conclude peace.³⁷

The terms of the treaty seem to have been drawn up by Shāh Jahān himself. Bijāpur was to recognise Mughal sovereignty, to pay to the Mughal Emperor a tribute of two million rupees and to maintain peace with Golconda which was now under imperial protection. Further, Shāh Jahān defined the boundaries of Bijāpur and assigned part of the Nizāmshāhī territory to the 'Adil Shāh. By this arrangement Bijāpur gained the whole of Nizāmshāhī Konkan and the 'parganāh' of Chākan; Parenda and

³⁶ F.A. 332b-344a; Guldashta 40a-41b;^{49b}/M.N. 15-17; B.S. 307-13.

³⁷ B.N., I.11.154,162-63; F.A. 347a-349a.

Sholāpur beyond the Sīna and the district of Wāngī between the Bhīma and Sīna rivers and the district of Bhālki on the Mānjra river to the north-east of Kalyāni. Finally each side undertook not to seduce the officers of the other; and Muhammad 'Adil Shāh agreed to co-operate with the Mughals in reducing Shahājī to submission, if he did not surrender Junnar and Trimbak to the imperial officers.³⁸

The terms of peace were favourable to Bijāpur, but the humiliation was great. They were dictated by the Mughal Emperor, who on May 6, 1636, sent to Muhammad 'Adil Shāh a 'firmān' laying down the terms. He also sent a copy of the 'firmān' engraved on a gold plate. Muhammad 'Adil Shāh agreed to the conditions and, in the presence of the Mughal ambassador, swore on the Quran to observe them³⁹ (May 21, 1636).

This peace lasted for twenty years during which period Muhammad 'Adil Shāh pursued his long-cherished policy of conquering the Hindu principalities of the south, and brought great prosperity to his kingdom. But this period also saw the rise of the Marāthā power which, after the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh, proved a formidably disruptive force in the kingdom of Bijāpur and facilitated the task of Aurangzīb.

³⁸ B.N., I.11.167-74; F.A. 349a-351b. Shahājī abandoned his predatory activities and entered the service of Bijāpur.

³⁹ B.N., I.11.174-76.

CHAPTER VI.

RISE OF THE MARĀTHĀ POWER.

The Marāthā resurgence:- Next to the Mughals the Marāthās became a great source of danger to the kingdom of Bijāpur. At the time of Shivājī's death in 1680 the Marāthā kingdom established by him occupied the whole of 'Adilshāhī Konkan up to Kārvār. Its eastern boundaries included Bāglāna in the north, passed through the middle of present-day Nāsik and Poona districts and comprised the whole of Satāra and much of the Kolhāpur province. Shivājī's acquisitions in the south extended over almost all the 'Adilshāhī possessions from Koppal on the northern side of the Tungabhadra to Vellore and Jinji. Though Shivājī acquired some territory from the Mughal Empire, in the main his kingdom was carved out of the decaying sultanate of Bijāpur.

The remarkable success of Shivājī over Bijāpur and the much more formidable Mughal Empire excites our curiosity and compels our admiration. That a young man of barely twenty should dare to contest the 'Adilshāhī power when it was at the height of its strength and glory cannot merely be dismissed as pillage. For out of these early exploits came into existence the Marāthā kingdom which, in a later

century, was to dominate the history of India. Out of these early adventures and the constant exhortations of his mother, came to Shivāji the conviction that he had a mission to fulfil - to liberate his people the Marāthās from what was considered the Muslim oppression. No doubt Shivāji got support from the Marāthās at large who considered that under Muhammad 'Adil Shāh their religion and their culture were in danger. Till now no 'Adilshāhī sultān had played with the religious susceptibilities of the Marāthās: they were looked upon as the pillars of the kingdom. And so the 'Adilshāhī kings had followed a policy of conciliating the Marāthās much on the same line as Akbar's policy towards the Rajputs. This policy succeeded and along with the Pardesis, the Marāthās formed the real support of the 'Adilshāhī state. But the religious policy of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh and his general intolerance and suspicion of the Hindus offended the Marāthās and alienated their sympathies.¹ At this psychological moment came Shivāji on the scene. Many young men, conscious of a spirit of awakening in the land, gathered round him and acknowledged him their leader. His daring exploits won the hearts of many more who joined him and the sympathies of others who still remained in the service of Bijāpur. Moreover, the advent of the Mughals in the Deccan, the extinction of Ahmadnagar and Shāh Jahān's attitude towards Bijāpur and Golconda foretold the future of

¹ See Chapter IX., section 2.

the Deccan sultanates: sooner or later they were going to be absorbed in the Mughal Empire. Nor were the internal conditions in Bijāpur any more hopeful. The quarrels at the Bijāpur court after the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh plunged the kingdom into disorder. No better opportunity could have been offered to the Marāthās to reinstate the glory of Hindu rule in the Deccan.

Never in their history were the Marāthā people more united than at the time of Shivājī. There was born in the Mahārāshtra of that time a new spirit, a common feeling of interest, patriotism. And Shivājī with his insight into the nascent forces of Marāthā nationality, attracted towards himself all that was hopeful and vigorous without distinction of class or caste or creed.

The Marāthās were and are by nature an independent people. The basis of their character is activity, courage, self-respect, self-reliance and love of equality. Geographical factors succeeded in bringing out these characteristics in them which were further fostered by social forces in the land. The structure of the Marāthā society is essentially democratic in spite of the limitations of the caste-system which is looked upon more as a division of labour among the various classes of the Marāthā society than as a barrier separating class from class.²

² Sarkar: Shivājī, 3-9; Kolhāpur, D.G. 70; Ratnāgiri, D.G. 123; Poona, D.G. 285, 288. Cf. Edward Thompson: "They are a people of spare and muscular physical carriage, the result of both choice and stern natural conditions; they bear themselves like free men and women, which indeed they are." A Letter from India, 59.

To the poet-saints of Mahārāshtra is due the credit of demolishing the social and religious barriers and bringing the Marāthā people closer together. The movement dates back to the days of Dnyāndeva (d.1296). He was the herald of a Puritan enthusiasm and religious revival in the land. Dnyāndeva, his three brothers and sister were outcaste Brāhmins. By single-minded devotion to God he convinced the orthodox element that caste counted as nothing in the eyes of God and that all earthly disabilities could be overcome by love and worship.³ Thus Dnyāndeva started pulling down religious and social barriers and in the hands of his numerous successors this became a luminous idea. Men were no longer great because of birth, in the eyes of God all were one. "Never ask a man's caste when he has in his heart the faith in God and love of man. God wants in his children love and devotion and does not care for his caste."⁴ This rational explanation of society, this firm faith in the equality of all men of all classes, this noble teaching sprung from the hearts of poet-saints alike from among the Brāhmins and Sudras spread like

³ For the story of Dnyāndeva, see C.A.Kincaid: Tales of The Saints of Pandharpur, 6-12. The story of Dnyāndeva and other poet-saints of Mahārāshtra are household knowledge among the Marāthī-speaking people and are embodied in a book by the Marāthī poet Mahipatī in his "Lives and teaching of the Saints" (भक्तिवेजय). Mr. Kincaid's book is a translation of some of Mahipatī's work.

⁴ Chokkāmela quoted by Ranade: Rise of the Marāthā Power, 154. Cf. Patwardhan: Wilson Philological Lectures IV.

wildfire throughout the country.

This was the Bhakti movement. Its centre was Pandharpur. Here men of all castes and social positions gathered for common worship of Vithoba, supposed to be the tenth incarnation of the Hindu deity Vishnu. Dayādeva started the worship of Vithoba as the deity of the people who knew no difference of caste and creed among its devotees. Thus Pandharpur came to attract pious men of all castes. The great saints of Pandharpur were Chokhamela, a Mahar (an untouchable or Harijan of the present day!), Savata Hālī of the gardener caste, Rākā and Gerā Kumbhārs or potters, Rohidās a Chambhār or leather worker, Narharī, a goldsmith, Nāmadeva, a tailor; and as if this was not a sufficiently cosmopolitan collection, there were two Mussalman devotees Shaikh Muhammad and Latīf, a weaver. These names are dear to Mahārāshtra to this day. The preaching of these saints was directed to one aim only, that all men can gain salvation by giving up their false ideas of orthodoxy and worshipping god Vithoba with a single devotion. Men made pilgrimages to Pandharpur and Alandi which has the shrine of Dayānadeva and there discussed the teachings of the poet-saints. These appealed to their reason because of their directness and simplicity, and, when they returned to their respective villages, they disseminated these rational teachings among their fellows. And so the Bhakti cult or Bhāgavat

Dharma, as it is otherwise known, grew in strength. It reached its climax with the greatest Marāthā saint Tukarām (1608-1649) who shook to the very foundation Brāhmin orthodoxy and the false pride in caste. According to him caste was only an accident and no man could gain salvation only because of his caste. What really appealed to Vithoba was not Sanskrit learning or ritualistic Brahmanism, but single-minded devotion.⁵

The reformation gave to Mahārāshtra a new religion, simpler, more rational and more appealing to the common people than the scholastic dogmas of Sanskrit Pundits; it also gave to the country a new literature in a language which the people could understand. And the Marāthās found themselves bound together by common tradition, common language, common literature, common religion, common race. This was responsible for the new political upheaval; the Marāthās aspired to become a nation. And this Shivāji made them.

The geographical features of Mahārāshtra made Shivāji's task easy. Throughout the country is hilly, so that the Marāthās could attack one fort, take recourse to the hills and avoid a pitched battle. It should also be remembered that they were already hardened in the rigorous school of mountain warfare since the days of the Bahmanis. They had developed

⁵ Cf. Tukarām: कर्णा (भैमाने कोण क्षाले पावन | ऐसे द्या संजोने मजपाशीं ॥
ऐसे कैसे रे सोनके | शिवतां होतसे ओनके ॥

and


His work has been discussed in Chapter XI.

a mode of fighting all their own, the guerilla warfare, and had become past masters in it. So that in their own country they could fight any army, even the Mughals were unable to suppress them.

Shivāji started his political activities during the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh when the kingdom of Bijāpur had reached the zenith of its splendour. But the last ten years of Muhammad's reign saw also the beginning of its decline and the disorder that followed his death gave Shivāji his best opportunity. Though he carved his kingdom mainly at the expense of Bijāpur, he also helped it in its hour of need. Whenever the existence of the 'Adilshāhī kingdom was threatened by the Mughals, Shivāji helped Bijāpur. Still it cannot be said that Shivāji worked for the security of Bijāpur without ulterior motives. The government of Bijāpur, in its turn, was forced to acknowledge the independence of Shivāji, as his friendship was of the utmost value to them when Aurangzib was making repeated attempts to conquer Bijāpur. If Shivāji had gone over to the Mughals the fall of Bijāpur would certainly have been accomplished earlier. In spite of his occasional professions of alliance with the Mughals, Shivāji was convinced that it was in his interests to keep the sultanates of Bijāpur and Golconda going. He knew that no sooner were these two kingdoms reduced than the brunt of Mughal advance in the

south would fall on the Marāthās. In fact this was what happened after the fall of the two sultanates. But the Mughal ^{showed} Empire, signs of decline after the death of Aurangzib, and like the phoenix the Marāthā kingdom rose out of its own ashes.

Early activities of Shivāji:- Shivāji had spent his boyhood with his mother Jijābāi at Poona, the headquarters of Shahājī's 'jāgirs', listening to religious poems, meditating military exploits and exploring the hills and valleys at the base of the Sahyādri, the Sunset Land or 'nāvals' as they are known. In this formative period of his life, his mother was continually exhorting him to take on himself the task of throwing off the Muslim yoke and of establishing once again a Hindu kingdom in the Deccan. Thus on the threshold of youth Shivaji had to make the choice of a career. He had two alternatives before him: the traditional one of entering 'Adilshāhī service at Bijāpur where, as the son of Shahājī, he was sure of an honourable position and an assured future; and the other, less conventional and more arduous, to follow the precepts of his mother and to try to re-establish the glory of Hindu rule in the Mahārāshtra. The second alternative was ^{the} more romantic and more adventurous of the two. It was also full of uncertainty - success would have been difficult and failure probable - for the new Hindu state was to be built up in defiance of Bijāpur



Bijapur in 1656.

and the advancing tide of Mughal imperialism.

At last Jijābāi's teaching prevailed. Shivāji spent the next three years (1645-48) in enlisting the sympathies of Marāthā officers of Bijāpur in the 'māvals'. In the meanwhile he had surprised the Bijāpur fortress of Tornā, twenty-five miles to the south-west of Poona, and after the death of Dādāji Kondadev, his tutor and Shahājī's agent at Poona, had assumed control of his father's 'jāgirs'. Next he won over the Marāthā commandant of Chākan by persuasion and acquired the fort of Kondāna (better known by its later appellation Sinhagad) by bribing the Bijāpur officer stationed there.⁶

Shivāji's task was made easy by ^{the} pre-occupation of the Bijāpur government in the south and the illness of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh. After the subsidiary alliance with the Mughals in 1636, Bijāpur found unlimited opportunities for expansion in the south. Muhammad 'Adil Shāh had directed annual expeditions to subdue the small principalities in the south, with the result that by 1648, after the conquest of Jinji, Bijāpur had become the overlord of almost all of them. The boundaries of the kingdom thus extended from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal⁷ and in extent it became second only to the Mughal Empire. Tributes from the subdued Hindu chieftains poured

⁶ Sabhāsād 7-8; Sarkar: Shivāji 34-35; Rājwade IV.267; Grant Duff I., 101-07.

⁷ For the southern campaigns of Bijāpur, see B.S. 317-28, 347-48; M.N. 24-49; Mission III., 42-46; F.A. 375b-383b; Guldasht 75a-81a, 149b-180b; Vestiges of Old Madras I., 43-44, 76.

into the treasury and more than compensated for the monetary loss incurred by the payment of an indemnity to the Mughals in 1636.

But the hour of Bijāpur's success was full of portents of the future. In 1646 Muhammad 'Adil Shāh fell ill never to recover the full vigour which had characterised his administration so far. How the strength of the government in Indian politics depended on the powerful personality of the king is once again amply proved in this instance. No sooner did Muhammad 'Adil Shāh's illness become serious than the administration of the kingdom became lax.⁸ In the south Shahājī contemplated treachery. He had distinguished himself as a general in the southern campaigns. But now on the one hand he was entreating 'Abdullāh Qutb Shāh to enroll him in his service at Golconda,⁹ and on the other was negotiating with the Hindu chieftains, now tributaries of Bijāpur, to support him if he made an attempt to found yet another independent Hindu kingdom in the south.¹⁰ Even Mustafā Khān, the Bijāpur commander-in-chief in the south was for a time toying with the idea of setting himself up as an independent princeling in the territories he had conquered for his sultān.¹¹

⁸ Cf. E.F.I. (1651-54), 104. B.S. 329-30.

⁹ Marāsilāt 29b.

¹⁰ R.C. 84-87; S.B. xi.3.7.

¹¹ B.S. 327.

When Shahājī's disloyal activities were known in Bījāpur, he was ordered to be put under arrest by Muhammad 'Adil Shāh. Accordingly Mustafā Khān arrested Shahājī (July 25, 1648) and sent him to Bījāpur. His father's arrest placed Shivājī in a terrible dilemma. He appealed to Prince Murād, Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, to intervene on his father's behalf. But Shahājī himself had powerful friends at Bījāpur in Randola Khān and Sharza Khān, two prominent 'amīrs' at the 'Adilshāhī court who pleaded Shahājī's cause with the sultān. They also prevailed on Shivājī to return the fort of Kondana to Bījāpur. So Randola Khān's influence and Shivājī's apparent submission secured the release of Shahājī who was once again appointed to his former position to administer the new conquests in the south.¹²

Shivājī's submission was only temporary. His father's arrest had a salutary effect on his activities for some time, but his determination to set up his independence could not be checked for long. Soon after Shahājī's release he became active and in 1650 deprived the 'Adilshāhī kingdom of one of its important forts, Purandar, eighteen miles to the south-east of Poona. Nilkanth Nāyak, its commander, died about this time and his three sons began to quarrel over their father's estates. The younger two appealed to Shivājī who offered to arbitrate

¹² Jedhé; Sarkar: Shivājī, 35-38; Grant Duff I., 113-14; H.M.P., I., 143-44.

in the dispute. He was admitted into the fort on the occasion of the Divālī celebrations (November 1650). Instead of settling the dispute Shivājī imprisoned the brothers and occupied the fort.¹³

Shivājī's next step was to open negotiations with Krishnarāo Moré of Jāvlī, better known by the family title of Chandrarāo. He wanted to persuade this powerful Bijāpur chief to make common cause with him. Chandrarāo disregarded Shivājī's offer; he looked upon Shivājī as a rebel from Bijāpur and would not agree to his proposals. But Shivājī was out to found a kingdom by fair means if possible, by foul means if not. Persuasion was wasted on Chandrarāo, the only other alternative was to put him out of the way. Shivājī sent two envoys to him, Rāgho Ballāl, a Brāhmin, and Sambhājī Kāvji, a Marāthā and he frankly told the former that unless Chandrarāo was killed a Marāthā kingdom was not possible.¹⁴ Rāgho Ballāl and Sambhājī Kāvji had two interviews with Chandrarāo. In spite of all their persuasions Chandrarāo's loyalty to Bijāpur remained unshaken. So during the second interview, when they found Chandrarāo and his brother unguarded and unaware of treachery, they set upon their victims and stabbed them to death. In the confusion that followed, both Rāgho Ballāl and Sambhājī

¹³ *Sabhasad* 9; *Chitnis* 39; *Sarker*: Shivājī 39-40.

¹⁴ "नंदुराव मोरे मंडल भारतावेराहेत राज्य साधत नाही. "

Kāvji effected their escape and returned to Shivaji who was prepared to follow up his agents' crime. Immediately he advanced on Jāvlī and occupied the town. The whole province of Jāvlī now passed into Shivāji's possession¹⁵ (January 1656). The fort of Rāigad which was in the Jāvlī principality became later the capital of Shivāji.

The acquisition of Jāvlī gave Shivāji the vast wealth which the Morés had accumulated for generations. It also gave him much more territory from which to recruit the hardy Marāthā fighters, the Mavlés. Shivāji's dominion thus gained in extent and strength. He had now become the master of the whole of the north-eastern corner of the 'Adilshāhī kingdom excepting the Konkan and had secured the protection of his conquests by a strong chain of hill forts. Thus the disintegration of Bijāpur had already begun.

Shivāji and Bijāpur: 1657-1665:- Muḥammad 'Adil Shāh died on November 4, 1656 and immediately afterwards Aurangzib succeeded in persuading Shāh Jahān to sanction an invasion of Bijāpur. By September 1657, however, Aurangzib had to patch up a hasty treaty with Bijāpur and hurry northwards.¹⁶ Bijāpur though left in peace by the Mughals was rent by party factions. This was Shivāji's best opportunity. In October

¹⁵ Sabhāsad, 9-11; H.M.P., I., 147-51; Bakhar of the Morés of Jāvlī, Itihās Samgraha, I. Nos. 5 and 10; Jedhe; Sarkar: Shivāji
¹⁶ Bijāpur's relations with the Mughals after 1636 are dealt with in the next chapter.

1657 he occupied the province of Kalyān. Mulla Muhammad its governor had gone to Bijāpur, during the illness of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh, to watch his interests in the shifting party politics in the capital, and the administration of the Kalyān province was in disorder.¹⁷ That Shivāji was able to occupy Kalyān without any opposition shows how weak the authority of Bijāpur had become.

But soon afterwards the court of Bijāpur composed its differences and made clear its intentions that its first task was the punishment of Shivāji. 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II., Muhammad's successor, being a young man of nineteen years, the administration was in the hands of the queen mother Barī Sāhibā, a masterful lady. She invited the grandees of the court to undertake an expedition to chastise Shivāji, and in response Afzal Khān, one of the prominent Bijāpur nobles, offered his services. He had considerable experience of warfare in hilly territory gained in his expeditions against the Hindu chieftains of Canara. He was the governor of Wāi near Satāra and knew well the country around Jāvlī. His services were gladly accepted.¹⁸

Shivāji too was not unprepared, and his military strength was not despicable. Bijāpur had been crippled by the late

¹⁷ B.S. 369; Sabhāsad 9; Jedhé; A.N. 576; Peshvā Daftar XXI., 23-24; Sarkar: Shivāji 55-57.

¹⁸ T.A.A. 98-99; B.S. 370; M.N. 26; 'Alīnāma 28a; Sabhāsad 13; Jedhé.

war with the Mughals; moreover, a part of its army was occupied in the Carnātak. Afzal Khān had with him 10,000 horse and foot, while Shivājī's strength according to popular reports was 60,000 'mavle' infantry. If it had been possible for Afzal Khān to force an encounter with Shivājī he had some hopes of success. But the Marāthā was safely ensconced in the fastnesses of Jāvlī beyond easy reach of Afzal Khān's cavalry. Indeed Afzal Khān was instructed by Barī Sāhibā to gain his end - which evidently seems to have been the capture of Shivājī dead or alive - by pretending friendship with Shivājī.¹⁹

Afzal Khān sent alluring messages to Shivājī promising him all kinds of favours at the Bījāpur court. But the Marāthā was not deceived by these professions of friendship. He decided on his own line of action, ordered all his men to assemble ready at hand and then received the envoy of Afzal Khān. After prolonged negotiations it was agreed that Afzal Khān was to meet Shivājī outside Pratāpgad, the fort near Jāvlī where Shivājī had retired at the approach of the Bījāpur general. On November 10, 1659 the meeting took place which was to end so tragically for Afzal Khān. During the preliminary salutations the general caught hold of Shivājī and struck at him with a dagger. The lithe Marāthā struggled free of Afzal Khān's grasp, struck at him with the tiger-claws (गायत्रि), tore open his bowels, and before his victim

¹⁹ E.F.I. (1655-60) 250; T.A.A. 100,102; Sarkar: Shivājī 59-61; Sabhāsad 13-14.

could recover from this shock, drove his dagger (*बिचला*) in his side. The wounded Afzal Khān was decapitated by Shivājī's attendant Sambhājī Kāvji.²⁰ After this the leaderless Bījāpur army was routed in no time.

Shivājī followed up this daring exploit by capturing the fort of Panāla (November 28, 1659) and some other strongholds on the crest of the Western Ghats. He next burst into the Konkan and occupied Dābhol and many other port towns.²¹ His task was made easy by the half-hearted manner in which Rustam Zamān the Bījāpur general performed his duty; indeed he was friendly towards the Marāṭhā.²² His ill-success resulted in his recall, and another general Siddī Johār, an Abyssinian, was appointed to conduct operations against Shivājī. Siddī Johār succeeded in driving Shivājī into the fort of Panāla which was closely invested. By June 1660 Shivājī saw that his position was hopeless. By his wiles he won over the treacherous Johār to connive at his escape from the fort. So one night (July 13) under cover of darkness he slipped out of the fort and made for Vishālgad his stronghold in the vicinity. He was closely pursued by Fazl Khān, the son of Afzal Khān and an officer under Johār. But thanks to the devotion of his rear-guard, who held the pass of Pāvankhind leading to Vishālgad,

²⁰ Sabhāsad 14-24; Jedhé; Sarkar: Shivājī 62-68.

²¹ Sabhāsad 26-27; Jedhé; T.A.A. 104-05; E.F.I. (1655-60) 251, 354.

²² Cf. "hee (Shivājī) and Rustam Jemah being close friends." E.F.I. (1655-60) 354, also 364. Fryer II., 63; Sarkar: Shivājī 227-28.

Shivāji was able to reach his destination in safety. Annoyed at Shivāji's escape 'Alī 'Adil Shāh himself marched towards Panāla, which in the meanwhile had been handed over to Siddī Johār. The Abyssinian was relieved of the fort and it was occupied by 'Alī's men.²³

Further danger to Bījāpur from Shivāji was soon removed by the great campaign the Mughal Emperor directed against him, which ultimately resulted in Shivāji's submission to the Mughals. In 1663 Shaista Khān was sent against Shivāji, but his generalship proving ineffective, his place was taken by Rāja Jai Singh early in 1665. Jai Singh decided to strike at the strategic centre of Shivāji's dominions and towards the end of March laid siege to Purandar, one of Shivāji's most important strongholds. The siege was steadily pressed. In addition the flying columns of Mughal cavalry raided the surrounding country. Shivāji found himself unable to withstand the grim determination of Jai Singh and early in June came to terms. In a personal interview with Jai Singh (June 11, 1665) he agreed to surrender to the Mughals twenty-three of his forts with the districts round them yielding an annual revenue of four lakhs of pagodas. He also undertook to co-operate in the projected Mughal campaign against Bījāpur. The most mischievous condition of the treaty was that whereby Shivāji was to be allowed to annex Bījāpur territory in the Konkan and

²³ B.S. 371-77; T.A.A. 106-115; 'Alīnāma 29a-32a; Jedhé; E.F.I. (1655-60) 372.

uplands yielding in all a revenue of nine lakhs of pagodas a year; and these conquests were to be recognised by the issue of an imperial 'firmān'.²⁴ Thus the treaty of Purandar did not presage too well for Bijāpur; by it Shivāji became an apt instrument to carry out Jai Singh's ruthless policy towards Bijāpur.

Bijāpur and Shivāji: 1673-1680:- The condition of the kingdom after the death of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II. (1672) became utterly chaotic. With a boy king on the throne - Sikandar who succeeded 'Alī was only four years of age - party faction in Bijāpur flared up with a fierceness which spread quickly all over the kingdom. The southern dependencies were seething with rebellion and insubordination. In the north the sword of Damocles of a Mughal invasion hung over Bijāpur. Shivāji had succeeded in completely establishing his independence and consolidating his dominions and was ever watchful for an opportunity to profit by the growing weakness of the 'Adilshāhī kingdom. The anarchy which prevailed at this time in Bijāpur threw open to Shivāji the doors to the south. In 1673 he launched a campaign against Bijāpur and within five years conquered almost all its southern dependencies. A short-lived truce was patched up between Shivāji and Bijāpur during this period (1676) when the 'Adilshāhī kingdom was threatened

²⁴ A.N. 868,904-07; Sabhāsad 38-39, 42-45; B.S. 402-04; Bhimsen 28a-b; Sarkar: Shivāji 105-29.

by a Mughal invasion;²⁵ but the internecine strife in Bijāpur, which constantly shifted the administration from one party to another, soon put end to it.

On the accession of Sikandar, Khavās Khān, a Deccani, became regent and usurped all power to himself which he had agreed to share with other ministers. This made the regent unpopular in the capital. Shivājī was quick to see his chance; he knew when it was wise to stop and when it was opportune to strike. He recalled his envoy Bābājī Nāik from Bijāpur and started his offensive by the capture of Panāla (March 6, 1673). An attack on Parli, a fort six miles south-west of Satāra was also successful (April 1, 1673) and in June one of Shivājī's officers occupied Satāra.²⁶ At the same time taking advantage of the disorder in the uplands of Carnātak, a Marāthā contingent had fallen on Hubli, a rich market town and sacked it. Even the English factory there suffered considerable loss.²⁷

A few feeble attempts were made from Bijāpur to stop these daring incursions of Shivājī. But party fights still absorbed all the energies of the court. This emboldened Shivājī to further annexations. In April 1675 he besieged Phonda on the Goa frontier. The commandant most gallantly defended the fort, but, as no help came from Bijāpur, had to surrender it to

²⁵ Sarkar: Shivājī 225.

²⁶ Jedhé; B.S. 440-41; P.P. 3-4.

²⁷ F.R. Surat, CVI., 100, 145-46; Orme, CXIV. 11., 32, CXIV., 68; O.C., XXIV., 3800; F.R. Bombay I., 47-48.

Shivāji in the end. Shivāji had now an open road southwards. He marched along the coast, extorted ransom from the Bijāpur governor of Sunda in the pepper country, plundered Kārwār. ^{occupied} He/ and fortified several fortresses in this region and by the end of May the Canara country comprising Ankola, Kārwār and Kādra had passed from Bijāpur into Shivāji's hands.²⁸ The Konkan ports of Dābhol and Rājāpur were already lost to Bijāpur. The loss of the pepper country and of the port of Kārwār struck a further blow at 'Adilshāhī trade and the economic position of the Bijāpur kingdom. Moreover with the loss of the coast-line was ~~lost~~ ^{lost} to Bijāpur [^] what little chance it had of recruiting Pardesi soldiers in its sadly depleted army and importing horses for its cavalry.²⁹

Shivāji's plans were much more ambitious than merely the conquest of the country round Kārwār. He was planning an expedition to subdue the jarring fragments of the Bijāpur dependencies in the south. Goleonda at this time was completely under the authority of the two well-known Hindu brothers Akanna and Madanna and in them Shivāji found willing supporters for his southern campaign. The Mughals were busy in the north of the Empire and their general in the Deccan against Bijāpur. The time was in all respects propitious for Shivāji's undertaking.

The southern possessions of Bijāpur at this time comprised

²⁸ Sabhāśad 70; B.S. 445; F.R. Surat LXXVIII., 37, 46, 49, 61; Fryer II., 25.

²⁹ Cf. Fryer II., 58.

northern and eastern Mysore and the Madras plains from Jinjī to Tanjore. The Mysore territory or the uplands of Bijāpur Carnātak was divided partly between petty Hindu chieftains who paid tribute to Bijāpur and partly between 'Adilshāhī nobles. The Madras plains were governed by three powerful Bijāpur chieftains. First was the province of Jinjī under Nasīr Muhammad Khān, a Deccani. Next to it were the fiefs of Sher Khān Lodī, an Afghān, with his headquarters at Vali-gandapuram (in the Trichanapoly district). Further south were the 'jāgirs' of Vyankojī, half-brother of Shivājī who had conquered them recently for his master the 'Adilshāh. Of these, the first two, belonging as they did to rival parties at the capital, were ever bent on fighting against each other and annexing one another's territories.³⁰ The central authority of Bijāpur being completely impotent to control these two, they went on fighting each other and in the end succumbed to Shivājī.

Shivājī's success in the south was phenomenal; he swept everything before him like a whirlwind. Nasīr Khān handed over Jinjī to Shivājī in May 1677. The Abyssinian commander of Vellore refused to follow Nasīr's craven example, but had to surrender the fort after a vigorous Marāthā siege lasting over a year (July 22, 1678). Sher Khān, too, was completely reduced to submission; he ceded his 'jāgirs' to Shivājī and

³⁰ Vestiges of Old Madras I., 315-16, 336; Memoirs of François Martin, M.R. XXIV., 149-50.

retired to the court of one of the Hindu nāyaks. Shivāji also annexed Vyankoji's 'jāgirs' north of the Kolerun river.³¹

After this marvellous success, Shivāji left the Madras plains and entered Mysore and the northern districts of Bijāpur Carnātak portions of which he conquered. He marched northwards by Sera, Gadag, Bankāpur and returned to his stronghold of Panāla in the first week of April 1678.³²

While Shivāji was engaged in the south, the Bijāpur kingdom was harried by the Mughals and soon after his arrival at Panāla he was requested by Siddi Masaud, who was then regent at Bijāpur, to help him to save Bijāpur from the Mughals. Dangerous as an enemy, Shivāji on this occasion proved unsafe as an ally. This encouraged the Mughal general Dilir Khān to renewed efforts against Bijāpur. But once again Masaud prevailed on Shivāji to put his whole heart into the defence of the capital. This time Shivāji was sincere; he ravaged adjacent Mughal possessions, routed the reinforcements on their way to join Dilir, cut off the general's lines of communications and so harassed the Mughal forces that in despair Aurangzib ordered Dilir Khān to retire from Bijāpur³³ (January 1680).

Though Shivāji's efforts had succeeded in compelling the Mughals to raise the siege of Bijāpur, he had suffered severely

³¹ Memoirs of Francois Martin, M.R. XXXV., 150-51; Vestiges of Old Madras I., 357, 463; Sabhāsad 89-91; Jedhé.

³² Sabhāsad 91; Grant Duff I., 217-18; Jedhé.

³³ B.S. 493-507; Sabhāsad 92; Jedhé; Bhimsen 82b-83a; Sarker: Aurangzib IV., 182-92.

in some of the skirmishes against their forces. After December 1679 his health began to decline and he retired to his capital Rāigd. Here on the noon of Sunday, April 4, 1680 he passed away.³⁴ With the death of Shivāji, Aurangzib's strongest adversary in the Deccan disappeared; the Emperor was now free to concentrate his attention on Bijāpur and Golconda.

Shivāji is one of the greatest figures in Indian history. His greatness lay in his character, his practical ability which overcame difficult obstacles, his personal magnetism which evoked loyalty among his followers and drew to himself the best elements in Marāthā manhood. His greatness also lay in his administrative capacity and above all in his military genius which adopted for the Marāthās a method of warfare suited to their racial character and geographical surroundings. It must be recognised that Shivāji was born at a time when his versatile genius could find maximum scope for expansion. There was the renaissance in Mahārāshtra, the sure signs of decay in the Deccan sultanates, the inevitable expansion of the Mughal Empire in the Deccan which aimed at the extinction of these sultanates. This was the most opportune time for the liberation of the Marāthā people. Shivāji came at a time when Mahārāshtra most needed him, welded the scattered Marāthā people into a nation and gave them a sense of solidarity which binds them together to this day. "No other Hindu has

³⁴ Sarkar: Shivāji 335-39; Sabhāsad 101-04; Jedhé.

shown such constructive genius in modern times. He has proved by his example that the Hindu race can build a nation, found a State, defeat enemies; they can conduct their own defence; they can protect and promote literature and art, commerce and industry; they can maintain navies and ocean-trading fleets of their own, and conduct naval battles on equal terms with foreigners. He taught the modern Hindus to rise to the full stature of their growth."³⁵

³⁵ Sarkar: Shivaji, 405-06. For a full estimation of Shivaji's character and the nature of Marāthā polity founded by him see *ibid* Chapter XVI.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FALL OF BIJĀPUR.

Causes of Bijāpur's weakness:- The characteristic feature of the Deccan sultanates during the sixteenth century is the state of chronic warfare in which they were engaged. Various factors separated the sultanates; political ambition and religious and racial differences were the most important among them. All attempts to bridge the gulf between them, particularly between Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar, proved not only futile but widened the breach. This made the task of the Mughals easy. When they first came into the Deccan, towards the close of the sixteenth century, the two protagonists, Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar, had utterly exhausted themselves, and, even in the face of such an immediate threat to their existence as the might of the Mughals, failed to unite for their defence. But even if they had, their strength had been sapped and their morale undermined to such an extent that the Mughals would not have found it difficult to brush away their opposition. This was what actually happened in the solitary instance when the three sultanates, Bijāpur, Ahmadnagar and Golconda,

made an effort to present a united front to the advancing Mughal armies. They were defeated at Sonpet, and the success of the Mughal arms in the Deccan remained only a question of time.

Besides the struggle between the various sultanates another cause of their weakness was the internecine struggle between the various parties into which the Deccan courts were divided; and at every stage of 'Adilshāhī history we are faced with party strife, mutual jealousies and recriminations. Petty cabals and jejune party politics engaged the energies of the 'Amirs'. The aim of each party was to bring about the downfall of its rivals. So that the nobility had no time for constructive statesmanship and the reform of the administration. Moreover, this atmosphere of selfishness and spite supplied constant fuel to the ignoble scuffle of the rival parties. And during the latter days of the kingdom these differences, more than once, resulted in one party making an appeal to the Mughals for intervention, followed by treachery and defection.

The mutual antagonism between the parties was the legacy of the Bahmanis. Party strife between Deccanis and Pardesis was responsible for the disintegration of the Bahmani kingdom and ultimately the destruction of the states that arose on its ruins. And in no sultanate was this danger more pronounced

and more potent than in Bijāpur.

One of the factors responsible for the chronic state of civil war between rival parties was the tender age at which the 'Adilshāhī kings ascended the throne. On the accession of a boy king one of the parties would seize the reins of government. This was the signal for its rivals to begin plotting and to invite outside interference. This was so particularly during the minority of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. and Sikandar the last of the 'Adilshāhs. This fact also throws ^{an} interesting sidelight on the life of the 'Adilshāhī kings. Most of them died in the prime of life, leaving their young heirs to succeed them. In fact, of all the nine kings of the 'Adilshāhī dynasty, only Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh its founder and Ibrāhīm II. (1580-1627) had long lives, the one died when he was seventy-five and the other when he was about sixty; all the others scarcely lived long enough to see their heirs grow up to manhood. This seems to have been due to two factors: the demands of a strenuous life, about half of which was spent on the battlefield, and excessive indulgence in drink attended by its twin curse debauchery. So that most of the 'Adilshāhī kings died in their thirties. Their successors were too young and inexperienced to attend to the government which fell into the hands of unscrupulous regents who used their position to inflict disabilities on their rivals. Thus the administration suffered and

each period of regency bred fresh quarrels between rival factions.

During the reign of the first four sultans the alternations of Deccani and Pardesi ascendancy coincided with the religious beliefs of the king. With a Sunni king the Deccanis came into power and with a Shia king the Pardesis. Ismā'il reversed the Sunni practices followed by Kamal Khān during his regency. Similarly Ibrāhīm I. suppressed Shia forms of worship soon after he came to the throne. These changes of state religion, accompanied as they were with changes of office in almost every department at court, were a fertile source of disaffection as well as of party intrigue.

During the first half of the seventeenth century party animosities had softened down to a certain extent, but they flared up once again after the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh. Particularly after the death of his son and successor 'Alī II. in 1672 serious trouble arose in Bijāpur. The capital witnessed constant fighting between Deccanis and Afghans who were now the predominant element in the Pardesi party. During the regency of Khavās Khān, a Deccani, the Afghans surrendered themselves to the Mughals and during the Afghan régime the Deccanis followed this enlightened example. Treachery, desertion and defection were the order of the day. The cold-blooded defections of the nobles were the signal for a general 'sauve qui peut'.

144

Constant wars, payments of tribute to the Mughals and other payments to Shivājī to secure his friendship had completely drained the 'Adilshāhī treasury. The annual tributes from the Hindu chieftains of the south that used to flow into the royal treasury at Bijāpur had ceased after Shivājī's conquests in the south. The kingdom was hard pressed financially. At such a time Aurangzīb loosened his purse-strings to induce Bijāpur nobles and their followers to join Mughal service and succeeded in seducing a large number.

The reasons for the absence of loyalty in the 'Adilshāhī army and these wholesale desertions are not far to seek. The connection between the state and its defenders was purely commercial. The adventurer brought his horse, his weapons, his strength and his experience into the market. Whether the sultān of Bijāpur or Ahmadnagar or Golconda or the Mughals struck the bargain was to him a matter of perfect indifference. He was for the highest wages and the longest term. The natural consequences of such an attitude of the soldiers towards their master was that so long as they were well paid they remained loyal to him. But the soldiers loved not the kingdom they professed to defend nor hated whom they fought. Perhaps they were often bound by closer ties to their enemies than to the master whom they served. Termination of war meant to them loss of pillage and perhaps loss of employment. And when the

army of Bījāpur found that they could get neither good wages nor security of employment, they turned to the Mughals who promised them both and the 'Adilshāhī army dwindled away to a few thousand men, ill-paid and ill-disciplined. Nor was it possible to recruit Pardesi soldiers from overseas. First of all the state could no longer offer attractive terms to such recruits, and secondly, with the loss of the Konkan coast and the total eclipse of 'Adilshāhī trade, not many Pardesis came to the Deccan. This abolished all hopes of Bījāpur ever being able to rejuvenate its military strength.

An even more important factor which crippled the power of Bījāpur was the rise of the Marāthā power. The existence of the Bījāpur kingdom depended even more on the loyal support of the Marāthās than on that of the Pardesis. After Shivājī started on his plan of founding a Marāthā state, most of the Marāthās naturally joined him to the detriment of Bījāpur. Perhaps if Muhammad 'Adil Shāh had not indulged in his unwise and untimely policy of suppression of the Hindus - a policy never adopted by any of his predecessors - the Marāthās could still have been kept as loyal subjects of the kingdom. Whether they would have defended it with as much enthusiasm as they did their own is a matter of historical speculation.

But the most potent source of Bījāpur's weakness lay in its administrative system. If all the governors of the

140

kingdom posted in the different provinces had gone to the help of the central power - as in duty they were bound to do - the kingdom could have defended itself better against the Mughals. This, however, was not possible, for military revolt was the undoing of the 'Adilshāhī sultanate. It was the 'jāgīrdārī' system that encouraged this disease. The administrative lethargy and political unwisdom of the 'Adilshāhī kings made a reform of this pernicious system difficult. Muhammad 'Adil Shāh's attempt to reorganise the administration¹ scarcely went to the heart of the problem. The result was that this pernicious system hurried the kingdom to its inevitable doom. When Shivājī had gone into the south, he had to encounter the Bijāpurī governors of Jinjī and Vellore who had become practically independent. Venkojī at Tanjore had arrogated to himself royal dignity. Near or home Siddī Masaud, governor of Adonī, had almost seceded from Bijāpur (1683), and the uplands of Canara that had not been subdued by Shivājī were divided between petty autonomous chieftains.² This happened because of the lack of a strong central

¹ See next chapter, section 7.

² Dr. Fryer, describing the condition of the kingdom of Bijāpur during the reign of Sikandar the last 'Adilshāh, says: "So miserable is the state where the other members grow too powerful for the head. . . where the king's munificence to the grandees has instated in them in absolute authority over their provinces, that they are potent enough to engage one another, and countermand the king's demands unless suitable to their humours." Fryer II., 46-47.

government at Bijāpur, a defect inherent in the administrative system adopted by the Deccan sultanates.

Bijāpur in 1656:- Ever since 1636 the kingdom of Bijāpur was on friendly terms with the Mughals. Muhammad 'Adil Shāh had utilised this period of peace in extending the boundaries of his kingdom southwards, a policy which greatly added to its wealth. But prince Aurangzib the governor of Mughal Deccan was bent on subduing both Bijāpur and Golconda and was only waiting for a suitable pretext. In 1653 he had been appointed to the command of the Mughal provinces in the Deccan. He had lately been twice repulsed in attempts to capture Qandahār and desirous of retrieving his military reputation, he resolved on the overthrow of Bijāpur and Golconda.

Muhammad 'Adil Shāh died on November 4, 1656, and his young son 'Alī, aged nineteen, succeeded him. His legacy indeed was not a happy one. At this time the Bijāpur kingdom had to deal with a fourfold situation and young 'Alī was scarcely the person to shoulder such heavy responsibilities. Aurangzib declared that 'Alī was not a legitimate son of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh and as such had no right to the throne of Bijāpur.³ Aurangzib had

³ The question of 'Alī's legitimacy has been examined by Prof. Sarkar (Aurangzib I., 258-60) and he comes to the conclusion that 'Alī was probably the son of a slave girl in the harem by Muhammad 'Adil Shāh. According to Islamic law, therefore, 'Alī was perfectly legitimate and Aurangzib's later attitude bears out the conclusion that his doubts about 'Alī's legitimacy were only an excuse for the invasion of Bijāpur. In 1679 we find him asking for the hand of Pādshāh Bibī, the sister of Sikandar and the daughter of 'Alī, in marriage for his son prince Asam

already invaded Golconda and had completely humbled it and had also induced the famous Qutbshāhī minister Mīr Jumla to enter his service.⁴ Aurangzīb had already put forward the plea that Bijāpur ought to be annexed as there was no lineal descendant of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh to ascend the 'Adilshāhī throne. He played on the vanity of Shāh Jahān as the sole authority to nominate a ruler for Bijāpur. The result was that on November 26, 1656 Shāh Jahān sanctioned the invasion and gave Aurangzīb a free hand in carrying out his policy. Mīr Jumla was sent from Delhi at the head of an army to help Aurangzīb in the proposed expedition.⁵

The outlook in the other directions also was scarcely propitious. Soon after his father's release, Shivāji had renewed his activities with doubled vigour and was striking blow after blow at 'Adilshāhī sovereignty. He had occupied the fort of Purandar and by his treacherous acquisition of Jāvli had obtained possession of the most strategic territory in the Māvals, and was now contemplating the conquest of the

3 (continued from previous page)

(B.S. 487-89; M.A. 190, 210). Surely, if 'Alī came of obscure parentage the Mughal Emperor would never have dreamt of such an alliance. In this respect it is also significant that the 'Alangīrnāma (A.N. 576) unequivocally states that 'Alī was the son (پسر) of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh.

⁴ Sarkar: Aurangzīb I., 189-216; 'Amal-i-Sālih, 227a-232a; Bernier 21-22.

⁵ K.K., I., 754; Tārīkh-i-Shāhjahānī, 195b; M.U., I., 300; Mulakḥḥas 453a; 'Amal-i-Sālih, 232a; Bernier, 23.

Bijāpur province of Kalyān.

In addition to this troubled outlook in the north created by the threatening attitude of Aurangzib and the defiant exploits of Shivaji, the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh was followed by disorder in the Carnātak possessions. It is difficult not to see Aurangzib's hand in this. He had never viewed with favour the 'Adilshāhī conquest of this rich tract. And even while Bijāpur and Golconda were subduing the south, Aurangzib was dispatching reports about it to the Mughal Emperor at Delhi, insinuating that they had not sought the sanction of the Emperor in undertaking their southern campaign.⁶

Nor was this all. There was treachery in the capital itself. By systematic bribery Aurangzib had won over many Bijāpur officers. Even Khān Muhammad, the prime minister of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh seems to have been bought over by Aurangzib.⁷ This created dissensions at court, as there were some nobles at Bijāpur, loyal to the 'Adilshāhī throne, who suspected the premier's pre-Mughal inclinations and wanted to drive him out of office and power.

Aurangzib's campaigns against Bijāpur:- Aurangzib, having obtained the sanction of Shāh Jahān, began his campaign against Bijāpur early in 1657. Mir Jumla had joined him at Aurangābād on January 18. Entering the 'Adilshāhī territory the Mughal

⁶ 'Adāb-i-'Alamgirī, 33b-34b, 43b-44b.

⁷ 'Adāb-i-'Alamgirī 100a, 101a, 106a; 'Amal-i-Sālih 241b; B.S. 366-68.

army first besieged Bidar which surrendered to them after a siege of twenty-seven days⁸ (March 29, 1657).

Aurangzib was pleased with his achievement and carried on his march with added vigour. He pushed on towards Kalyani and laid siege to the fort. But the Mughals suffered heavy losses. A Bijapur force arrived at Gulbarga; it was beaten back, and, having again encamped near Aurangzib's camp at Kalyani, it was once again repulsed, but only after it had done considerable harm to the besiegers. At last Kalyani too fell (July 21, 1657). With its fall were lost to Bijapur two of the strongest forts on its northern frontier. One thing emerges clear out of this - the Mughals always conquered the outposts first and then the territory around them. This happened in Ahmadnagar; the same was now taking place in Bijapur.

The Mughal army next marched towards Bijapur.⁹ Khān Muhammad, the 'vazir', was sent from Bijapur to prevent the Mughals from advancing towards the capital. But he had already been won over by Aurangzib. Instead of doing his duty, he connived at the advance of the Mughal army. And on one occasion when the enemy was in a strategically unsound position, he even refused to attack them, in spite of the repeated insistence of his junior officers.¹⁰ This neglect of duty was reported to

⁸ 'Anāl-i-Sālih 237a-b; B.S. 365; Khimśen 8a.

⁹ K.K., I., 756, II., 3-4; Tārīkh-i-Shāhjahānī 1556; Zafarnāma 35b.

¹⁰ B.S. 366-68.

Bijāpur and resulted in the murder of the treacherous minister.

In the meanwhile Aurangzib with his army advanced to Bijāpur and laid siege to it. 'Alī 'Adil Shāh sued for peace in the most humble manner and ^{was} willing to agree to any terms. But Aurangzib was inexorable and resolved on the complete overthrow of Bijāpur. At this juncture the scene changed in a sudden and unexpected manner. Orders now came from Shāh Jahān to stop war. Dārā, his eldest son, was opposed to the idea of Aurangzib's campaign and prevailed upon his father to recall Aurangzib. Close on the heels of Shāh Jahān's order came the news of his illness (September 1657). Both reached Aurangzib as he was engaged in the siege of Bijāpur. This led him to conclude a hasty peace with the Bijāpur government before starting for Delhi. Bijāpur agreed to pay $1\frac{1}{2}$ crore of rupees as indemnity, besides allowing the Mughals to keep possession of Bīdar and Kalyāni. Bijāpur also had to cede Parenda, Wāngi Mahal and the Nizāmshāhī Konkan (given to Bijāpur by the treaty of 1636). Shāh Jahān ratified the treaty¹¹ and Bijāpur was once more left in peace.

The treaty curtailed the power of Bijāpur to a considerable extent. The northern defences of the kingdom were now in the possession of the Mughals. Shivājī was becoming stronger; his father Shahājī had become practically independent in the south. Siddī Mohār the Abyssinian governor of Adoni and Karnul beyond

¹¹ Tārīkh-i-Shāhjahānī 155b, 195b-196a; 'Amal-i-Sālih 240a-b, 245a; Zafarnāma 35b; R.K., I., 756-57. II., 3-5; A.N. 83-84.

the Hāichūr Doāb had risen in rebellion. In the uplands of Canara the petty Hindu chieftains defied the authority of Bijāpur. In this way within a year after Muhammad 'Adil Shāh's death the weakness of the Bijāpur kingdom became apparent.

Last years of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh:- The storm of the Mughal invasion having blown over, the kingdom of Bijāpur during the next few years showed great vigour under 'Alī 'Adil Shāh. The sultān showed remarkable ability for administration and succeeded in restoring order in the kingdom. Often he took the field in person. First of all he directed his attention to Siddī Johār and the recalcitrant Hindu nāyaks of Canara and reduced them to submission.¹² Next he marched against Shivājī and curbed his growing power. And he succeeded in reviving the strength of Bijāpur to such an extent that when the Mughal general Jai Singh invaded the kingdom in 1664 he had to retire from Bijāpur utterly discomfited.¹³

But the revival of Bijāpur was forced and short-lived. The strength of the kingdom had been continuously undermined, and though 'Alī succeeded for a time in restoring order, he had neither the experience nor the resources to continue to preserve it, let alone to recover its lost territories. 'Alī 'Adil Shāh seems to have been aware of the futility of his

¹² B.S. 385; Mission III., 50-53; Grant Duff I., 145-46; R.C., 100.

¹³ A.N. 988, 992-96; K.K., II., 194-98; B.S. 406-28; T.A.A. 211-12.

task. After the retreat of Jai Singh, he adopted a defeatist attitude and instead of devoting himself to reconstruction, "gave himself up to the pleasures of the harem and the wine cup for the rest of his life."¹⁴ He entrusted the administration of the kingdom to 'Abdul Muhammad, his prime minister, who governed with great ability and avoided conflict with Shivāji and the Mughals.

In the middle of 1672 'Alī 'Adil Shāh had an attack of paralysis which confined him to bed. Despairing of recovery, he suggested to 'Abdul Muhammad that prince Sikandar should be crowned king during his own life-time and that the minister should act as regent. 'Abdul Muhammad did not favour the idea. He further declined to undertake the responsibility of conducting the government after the death of 'Alī. He suggested that when Sikandar would be placed on the throne, Khavās Khān, the Abyssinian leader of the Deccani party, should be the regent and the government of the kingdom itself should be divided between the four principal nobles: 'Abdul Muhammad himself to be in charge of the north-eastern part of the kingdom to oppose the Mughals; Bahlol Khān, his chief follower, on the west to check Shivāji; Musaffar Khān, another of his followers, to be the governor of the southern territories and the regent Khavās Khān to be in charge of the capital and the surrounding districts.¹⁵

'Abdul Muhammad had proposed this arrangement with a view

¹⁴ Sarkar: Aurangzib IV., 157.

¹⁵ B.S. 436.

to maintain the balance between his party, the Afghans, and the Deccanis. It looked good on paper but was responsible for the internecine quarrels which soon broke out even while 'Alī 'Adil Shāh was on his sick bed. He lingered as a paralytic invalid for about six months during which time affairs of state went from bad to worse. He died on November 24, 1672.¹⁶ After his death everything was in confusion. The end was not far off.

Party strife in Bijāpur: the progress of Mughal arms:- 'Alī 'Adil Shāh was succeeded by his son Sikandar aged only four. His unhappy reign was characterised by civil war in Bijāpur which paralysed the administration of the central government, encouraged the provincial governors to assume independence for all practical purposes, facilitated the audacious conquests of Shivāji thus destroying what little strength Bijāpur still possessed, and invited the Mughals who so relentlessly aimed at the extinction of the kingdom.

Soon after 'Alī's death Khavās Khān usurped all power to himself, refusing to abide by the arrangement agreed to during the life time of 'Alī. 'Abdul Muhammad, the leader of the Afghans, left the capital in disgust and retired to his 'jāgīr'. His follower 'Abdul Karīm Bahlol Khān thirsted for revenge against the Abyssinian regent. The pay of the army had fallen in arrears and Bahlol Khān demanded that he and his Afghans should be paid in full at once. But the

¹⁶ B. S. 437.

treasury was empty and Khavās Khān found himself in a difficult position. At last he appealed to the Mughal general Bahādur Khān to help him to punish the Afghans, and on October 19, 1675 an agreement between the two was signed at Pandharpur by which Bahādur Khān was to help Khavās to suppress the Afghans at Bijāpur and the regent in return was to support the Mughal general against Shivājī.¹⁷

Khavās Khān's plan to subdue his rivals was the cause of his downfall. Bahlol Khān captured him by a ruse (November 11, 1675), imprisoned him in the fort of Bankāpur and himself assumed the office of regent.¹⁸

Bahlol Khān's regency was not a blessing. On becoming regent, he gave his kinsmen the best 'jāgīrs' from which the Deccanis were dismissed, many of whom went over to the Mughals. Shaikh Minhāj, one of the leaders of the discontented Deccanis, fatally stabbed Khizar Khān Pannī, the right-hand man of Bahlol Khān. The regent took blood for blood by putting Khavās Khān to death (January 18, 1676). Thus civil war openly broke out in the kingdom,¹⁹ whilst Shivājī on one side and the Mughals on the other threatened its annihilation.

Bahlol Khān drew on himself the wrath of Khavās Khān's friend, Bahādur Khān, the Mughal general, who renewed his campaign against Bijāpur. The Deccanis refused to support Bahlol Khān against the invaders, with the result that the Mughal

¹⁷ B.S. 439-45; M.U., I., 491; Rhinson 69b.

¹⁸ B.S. 446; Rhinson 70a; M.U., I., 491.

¹⁹ B.S. 447-50; Fryer II.53; F.R. Surat LXXXIX., 37.

general occupied Naldurg and effected an entrance into Gulbarga by bribery (July-August 1677). The campaign ended with the recall of Bahādur Khān by Aurangzīb.²⁰ The command of the Deccan army devolved on Dilir Khān who was an Afghan and in sympathy with the party of Bahlol Khān at Bijāpur.

On December 23, 1677 Bahlol Khān died and Siddī Masaud the leader of the Deccani party became regent. He showed a keen desire to repair the decaying kingdom. He made an effort to negotiate a loan of six lakhs of 'huns' from Golconda to pay the arrears of the Afghan soldiery. This proving unsuccessful, he next entered into an agreement with Dilir Khān to support him against Shivāji in return for a subsidy of thirty thousand 'huns'. But this amount with what little there was in the royal treasury was insufficient to meet the demands of the Afghans and the disorder in the capital continued.²¹ Dilir Khān was evidently unwilling to give active support to Masaud to suppress the disturbances created by the Afghans. Siddī Masaud was at last driven to seek the aid of Shivāji. In a pathetic message the harassed regent requested the Marāthā to help Bijāpur in its hour of need.²²

At first Shivāji intended to occupy Bijāpur on his own and to this end bribed Sharza Khān, Masaud's second-in-command. The discovery of this plot by the regent led to renewed

²⁰ Rhinnsen, 75a-76b; B.S. 451-52; M.A. 160; M.U., I., 492.

²¹ B.S. 453-61; Rhinnsen, 77b-79a.

²² See 137 ante.


bloodshed in Bijāpur between Sharza Khān's men and Masaud's followers. At last Sharza deserted to the Mughal camp. Dilīr Khān, the Mughal general, also succeeded in seducing many 'Adilshāhī officers and soldiers, with the result that only three or four thousand starving men were left with Masaud.²³ Nothing could be more pathetic than the straits to which the 'Adilshāhī kingdom was reduced at this time. All the immense wealth that was in Bijāpur had gone in satisfying the demands of Aurangzīb and Shivājī and in the civil strife that raged in the kingdom. In the end, there was no money to pay even the army, which being essentially mercenary, sought service with a master who paid them - the Mughals.

Nothing was left for Masaud but abject submission to the Mughals. Aurangzīb demanded that Sikandar's sister, Pādshāh Bibī, should be sent to the Mughal camp to be married to the Emperor's son, prince Azam. Brought up in the Shia tradition, such an alliance was utterly distasteful to the princess. But she was prevailed on by the regent to agree to it as this was the only measure that could save the kingdom. The princess was the idol of the capital. On July 1, 1679 she left Bijāpur amidst the tears and wailings of the citizens²⁴ to spend the rest of her life in a Sunni household.

But the Mughals were not content with taking away the 'Adilshāhī princess. Dilīr Khān now insisted that Masaud

²³ B.S. 472-86; Storia II., 140-41.

²⁴ B.S. 487-89; Rhinssen 82a-b; Sarkar: Aurangzīb IV., 181-82.



Bijapur in 1680.

should retire from the regency and hand it over to Hakim Shams-ud-din, a nominee of the Emperor. He also demanded that a Mughal army should garrison the capital and the Bijāpur army should be sent after Shivāji.²⁵ To agree to these terms was to end the independence of Bijāpur. Masaud rejected them and once again called upon Shivāji to save Bijāpur. Dilir Khān, seized with a mad frenzy, marched towards Bijāpur desolating the country through which he passed. It was the Marāthā help, the dissensions in the Mughal camp and Dilir's inefficient conduct of the campaign that saved Bijāpur this time. Aurang-zib recalled Dilir while he was engaged in the siege of the 'Adilshāhī capital and that general started his march northwards in the beginning of February 1680.²⁶

Thus within eight years after the death of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II., the kingdom had gone to ruin by civil war and treachery from within and the activities of two powerful enemies from without. It needed not a prophet to say what the end would be. The extent of the kingdom had been much curtailed and it was deprived of almost all its fertile and wealthy territories. Chronic wars had utterly destroyed trade and industry and checked the initiative of the peasantry with the result that financial ruin stared the kingdom in the face. Shivāji had become master of the Konkan strip and had created for himself a kingdom between the Bhīma and the Krishna; the

²⁵ B.S. 489-91.

²⁶ B.S. 491-507; Bhimsen, 82b-83a; Sabhāsad, 92.

Mughals had advanced beyond Kalyāni and Bīdar and occupied Naldurg and Gulbarga. Carnātak had been conquered by Shivāji, and some parts of it had become independent. Loss of territory, administrative breakdown and economic ruin had weakened and impoverished the kingdom which now reflected only a shadow of its former splendour.

The Last Mughal offensive: Fall of Bījāpur:- After the death of Shivāji, Aurangzib was intent on reducing the Marāthās. But Shivāji's son Sambhāji, secretly aided by Bījāpur, defied the Mughals. The Emperor attempted to detach Bījāpur from the audacious Sambhāji, but his requests fell on deaf ears. Prince Azam, his son, endeavoured to coerce Bījāpur for a time, but soon the 'Adilshāhī kingdom was left in peace.²⁷ For four years Bījāpur was free from the Mughals.

The internal condition of Bījāpur was now rotten to the core and Siddī Masaud was completely disillusioned about improving it. No doubt he had succeeded in inducing Sharza Khān to rejoin Bījāpur service, but the outlook on the whole was gloomy. "With all his efforts he failed to reform the government or restore order in the administration. No man from peasant to chieftain ate his bread with peace of mind for a single day; none from king to beggar slept in happiness for a single night." Despairing of mending the fortunes of the 'Adilshāhī dynasty, Siddī Masaud begged permission of Sikandar

²⁷ B.S., 515-22.

'Adil Shāh to retire to his 'jāgīr', where he hoped to create for himself an independent principality. On the pretext of visiting Adonī, the seat of his 'jāgīr', he left Bijāpur on November 21, 1683,²⁸ leaving the distracted kingdom to its fate.

Aurangzīb was at war with the Marāthās. He called upon Sikandar to help the Imperial army and asked him to expel Sharza Khān from Bijāpur. The young king sent a spirited reply asking the Mughals to stop their encroachments on his kingdom, to return to him the tribute and territory extorted from Bijāpur in the past and refused to banish Sharza Khān.²⁹

Aurangzīb had come into the Deccan determined to conquer it. Sikandar's reply meant the renewal of hostilities against Bijāpur. The Mughal generals were ordered to march into 'Adilshāhī territory. Samphājī threw in his lot with Bijāpur and a Marāthā contingent was welcomed by Sikandar near the capital. Also assurance of help came from Golconda.³⁰ On April 1, 1685, the Mughals encamped around the 'Adilshāhī capital and the siege of Bijāpur began. At the sign of a general attack on the kingdom, the spirit of chivalry had been roused, and help came into the capital from all parts of the kingdom.³¹

At first the Bijāpuris succeeded in cutting off the communications of the besiegers, and so harassed the Imperial army that they appealed to Aurangzīb, who was at Sholāpur, for aid.

²⁸ B.S., 514-15; 522-25.

²⁹ B.S., 530-34.

³⁰ H.A., 261-64; Bhimśen, 94b-95a; B.S., 535-36; Jedhé.

³¹ B.S. 536; Jedhé.

The Emperor, therefore, directed Firūs Jang, one of his officers, to proceed from Ahmadnagar with ample provisions to the help of the besiegers. In the meanwhile a contingent under prince Mu'azzam Shāh 'Alam, the Emperor's eldest son, after raising the siege of Golconda, had also converged on Bijāpur.³²

By June 1686 the siege had dragged on well nigh for fifteen months. At last Aurangzīb decided to lead it in person. He left Sholāpur on June 14 and arrived at Rasūlpur, a suburb of the 'Adilshāhī capital, on July 3.³³ The complexion of the siege now completely changed. The end was never in doubt, it remained only a question of time.

The moat round Bijāpur was the last defence of the besieged and the despair of the besiegers. It was very difficult to hold it in face of constant firing from the bastions. The Emperor at last decided to fill it up with earth. At first he offered four annas, then a rupee and finally one gold coin, for one basket of earth thrown into the moat. But earth was not the only material used. Dead cattle, horses and men were hurled into the moat and many an unfortunate labourer who had earned a few gold coins was thrown alive into the ditch and robbed of his money by his brother workmen. By sheer dint of exertion the moat was at last filled up.³⁴ The garrison fought with the courage of despair, waiting for the inevitable end. Their

³² M.A., 265-66; K.K., II., 319-21.

³³ Rhinsoen, 101b; B.S., 539.

³⁴ B.S., 539-40; H.F., 148-49; Sarkar: Aurangzīb IV., 386-87.

numbers had shrunk to a mere handful and even these were in great distress through want of supplies.³⁵ Sikandar 'Adil Shāh and Sharza Khān came to the conclusion that 'Adilshāhī monarchy could no longer be defended against the Mughal Emperor's grim determination. From the very beginning it was evident to them that this was going to be a fight to a finish, with the chances of victory overwhelmingly in favour of the Mughals.

On September 9, 1686 'Adilshāhī envoys deputed by Sharza Khān waited on Firūz Jang in the Imperial camp. They were presented to Aurangzib and communicated to him the decision of Sikandar 'Adil Shāh. This was the moment of the Emperor's triumph; he had been striving for thirty years to conquer Bījāpur and now his ambition was at last to be fulfilled. On September 13, 1686 Sikandar came out of the capital, and was received in Aurangzib's camp as Sikandar 'Adil Khān. He handed over the keys of the fort and his royal insignia to the Mughal Emperor³⁶ and Bījāpur ceased to be an independent kingdom.

³⁵ K.K., II., 322; Bhimsen, 102b.

³⁶ B.S., 540-41; K.K., II., 322; M.A., 279. Sikandar 'Adilshāh died in captivity (April 3, 1700).

CHAPTER VIII.

A SKETCH OF 'ĀDILSHĀHĪ ADMINISTRATION.

The King, the Court and ministers:- The king was the supreme power in the state; he was the ruler, judge, administrator, military leader, sometimes even preacher and leader of public worship. His duties were as all embracing as his authority.¹ The king was the shadow of God on earth (شادى خدا). But only Muhammad 'Adil Shāh seems to have claimed this distinction² which was jealously guarded by the Mughal Emperors as their special prerogative. In practice the king's sovereignty was limited by his feudal nobility. Though in theory the king was all powerful, he was never in a position to break the power of the aristocracy that had been created by the 'Ādilshāhī administrative system so faithfully modelled on that of the Bahmanīs.³ So long as the king had personality and administrative capacity he held his nobles in check; but no sooner

¹ This is the Islamic conception of kingship. Arnold 27,72. Cf. B.S. 348. The king as leader of public worship, see also Burhān (I.A.,XXVIII.,236).

² Farāmīn-us-Salātīn, 214.

³ Cf. Ferishta I.,536; C.H.I., III.,376-77.

did his authority become weak and the control of the central power lax than they defied the sovereignty of the king. The perpetual struggle between the nobles and the king over the question of sovereignty is the keynote of the history of the Deccan sultanates. This was the direct result of their administrative system. It was responsible for the break-up of the Bahmanī kingdom and the same factor weakened the strength of Bijāpur in the later years of the 'Adilshāhī dynasty.

The external symbols of the king's sovereignty were the throne, the 'chutr' or the royal umbrella, the royal standard, the right of issuing gold coins, the striking of the royal 'naubat' or drum five times a day and the reading of the 'khutba' in the name of the sovereign. The Deccan sultanates copied these Bahmanī institutions when they became independent. But, except the sultān of Golconda, none of them arrogated to themselves the right of issuing gold coins or the striking of the naubat five times a day⁴ during the sixteenth century. Gold coins were first minted in Bijāpur during the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh (1627-56).

From early morning till night the king's time was fully occupied. The early hours of the morning were spent in the company of learned men and poets. Also during this period the king received reports from various messengers from different

⁴ Ferishta I., 537. Cf. Colloquies 74.

parts of the kingdom. The king maintained an army of these reporters (*جاسوس*) many of whom were Brāhmins. They were under the direct supervision of the prime minister, but had unhindered access to the king. Their duties were to report to the capital all the day to day happenings in the different parts of the kingdom and to carry letters from the officers in these parts to the capital and vice versa.⁵

The king studied the reports brought by the messengers in preparation for the open 'Darbār' which occupied the next three hours. On every day of the week, excepting Friday, the king held 'Darbār', the full assembly of the court. No one was allowed to sit in his presence while the 'Darbār' was in progress; the nobility had to stand on the right and left of the throne according to their rank and order of precedence. The 'Darbār' served the purpose of a council of state and was useful in ascertaining the trend of opinion among the officers of the kingdom. The assembly of the 'Darbār' lasted till the time for the noon prayers.⁶ At the 'Darbār' any individual had the right of free access to the king and could lay complaints before him. So that those persons who were dissatisfied with the decisions or orders of the officials, could try to get their grievances redressed by laying them before the sovereign who was the final court of appeal.⁷

⁵ B.S. 131,357; T.M. 93a. Cf. Tavernier I.233-34.

⁶ Ferishta I.536; B.S. 357.

⁷ B.S. 357. Cf. Ferishta I.533.

Also by this practice the king came in direct touch with his subjects. Thus the royal routine was designed to serve various ends. It flattered the vanity of the king. It combined work with pleasure. The pomp at the 'Darbār' served to impress foreigners and natives alike, while some of the practices went to assure the subjects that the sultān had their welfare at heart and would see justice done to them.

The discussion of vital matters of state did not take place in the open 'Darbār'. It was reserved for other times and select advisers. After the 'Darbār' was over the king rested for two hours and spent the remainder of the day discussing the problems of government with his ministers.⁸

Though theoretically the king's authority was unlimited, in practice he took the advice of his ministers in deciding questions of state policy. The chief duty of these ministers was, of course, implicit obedience to the king's wishes. They were responsible to him in the smallest matters and held office during his pleasure. Thus for instance when Mustafa Khān Ardastānī came into disfavour with 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I., he was deprived of his office as Wakil and Amīr-i-Jumla, transferred to the governorship of the newly conquered province of Carnātak and his office was conferred on Afzal Khān Shīrāsī.⁹

⁸ B.S. 357.

⁹ Ferishta II. 85.

The number of 'Adilshāhī ministers was never fixed, nor were their duties clearly defined. There was thus, in modern phraseology, a complete absence of well-marked division of labour and specialization in departmental work. The same person could assume responsibility for two ministerial departments, holding, in addition, a military office to which he, along with the other state officials, inevitably belonged.

The principal minister was known as Vakil-us-sultanat.¹⁰ His authority was second only to the king's. All 'firmāns' issued by the king bore his seal in the bottom left-hand corner.¹¹ He advised the king on all matters of foreign policy and internal administration. But when the king took active interest in the affairs of state, the Vakil had no initiative in any matter whatever. If, however, the king was a minor, the Vakil was usually appointed the regent of the kingdom and his powers were unlimited; he could dismiss any officers from service, confiscate any estates as he liked and declare war on a neighbouring kingdom at his own will.¹² Sometimes the king would give himself up to pleasure and entrust the whole management of the state to his minister. In this case also the powers of the Vakil-us-sultanat were unlimited.¹³

¹⁰ Ferishta II., 24, 52, 80, 85, 105.

¹¹ B.I.S.M., II.i-iv, 57-60, 76-78; S.P.S.S., I.2.

¹² Ferishta II. 24, 99. Cf. B.S. 437.

¹³ Ferishta II. 83. Cf. I. 644.

Next to the Vakīl-us-Sultanat was the Amīr-i-Jumla or the Minister of Finance. As the name implies the duties of this minister mainly consisted of supervising the finances of the kingdom; he may be called, in modern terminology, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He was in charge of the annual payments made by the various 'jāgīrdārs' into the royal treasury, also the revenues received from the crown lands and the tributes from the tributary princes. But very often this office was amalgamated with that of the Vakīl and conferred on one person. Ibrāhīm I.'s minister Asad Khān was both Vakīl and Amīr-i-Jumla. So were Mustafa Khān Ardastānī and Afzal Khān Shīrānī, the ministers of 'Alī 'Adīl Shāh I. And during the reign of Ibrāhīm II. his two successive ministers Ikhlas Khān and Dilāvar Khān also occupied similar positions.¹⁴ In Golconda we have the case of Mīr Jumla the all-powerful Qutb-shāhī minister.

The Amīr-i-Jumla was assisted by a subordinate officer called Musta'fī-ul-Mulk. This assistant was usually a Hindu and he had under him an army of Hindu clerks.¹⁵ The work of keeping accounts and the management of the revenues of the kingdom was thus left exclusively in the hands of the Hindus.

The office of Pēshvā does not seem to have been a permanent institution at the 'Adilshāhī court. During the Bahmanī

¹⁴ Ferishta II.52,80,85,99,105; B.I.S.M., XI.11.6.

¹⁵ Ferishta II.99; T.M. 93a; B.S. 131,349.

dynasty the Peshvā was one of the ministers of the kingdom.¹⁶ Under the Nizāmshāhs at Ahmadnagar he became the chief minister and appears to have enjoyed the same status as the Vakil-us-Sultanat did in Bijāpur.¹⁷ In fact the Nizāmshāhī influence can be traced in this office, because a minister called Peshvā was appointed at the 'Adilshāhī court first at the instance of Chānd Bībī, herself a Nizāmshāhī princess. During the minority of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II., when Ikhlas Khān was both Vakil and Amīr-i-Jumla, he conferred the office of Peshvā on Afzal Khān at the request of Chānd Bībī.¹⁸ This seems to be the only instance when the office of Peshvā existed at Bijāpur.

Another office which existed under the Bahmanī kings but does not appear to have been continued in the 'Adilshāhī kingdom was the office of the Vazīr. The Vazīr at the Bahmanī court was evidently an officer subordinate to the Vakil.¹⁹ And indeed in the seventeenth century, when the office of the Vazīr existed at the 'Adilshāhī court, it no longer carried the Bahmanī connotation. The Vazīr was then what the Vakil had been earlier, the chief minister of the kingdom. In some of the 'firmāns' issued by Dilāvar Khān during the minority of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II., he calls himself Vazīr. Muhammad 'Adil Shāh also styled his chief minister Vazīr.²⁰ Similarly during

¹⁶ Ferishta I. 576, 581.

¹⁷ Cf. Ferishta II. 198.

¹⁸ Ferishta II. 99.

¹⁹ Ferishta I. 636, 663.

²⁰ S.P.S.S., I. 2; B. S. 348.

the minority of Sikandar 'Adil Shāh, Khavās Khān was the Vazīr and had complete authority in the kingdom, and all the 'amīrs' of the Bījāpur court considered it their duty to obey him.²¹

Diplomatic relations:- Diplomatic relations between the Deccan sultanates and between Bījāpur and Vijayanagar and Goa were maintained by means of ambassadors at the various courts. Thus Bījāpur was always represented at Ahmadnagar, Golconda, Vijayanagar and Goa and other Deccan powers by 'Adilshāhī ambassadors and these states in their turn had similar officers at Bījāpur.²² The duties of these officials can hardly be compared with those of their prototypes in a modern state. Their main duty seems to have been to keep in close touch with political developments of the respective courts where they were placed and to keep their royal master at Bījāpur informed about them. Withdrawal of ambassadors signified declaration of hostilities. In 1564 the ambassadors of the Deccan sultanates, after presenting Rāma Rāya with the ultimatum of their masters, withdrew from Vijayanagar²³ and soon after the Muslim confederacy declared war on the Hindu Empire.

Besides resident ambassadors, special envoys were employed on special occasions to conduct negotiations between

²¹ عبدالمعبر مظفر خان پغتو فرستاد که خواص خان وزیر حکمت است ... والوال
هرج خواص خان خواهد کرد ماوشنا تابع ابرو حکم او بود

²² Cf. Pyrard II. 27.

²³ B.S. 95-96; Ferishta II. 72. B.S. 437.

the Deccan states. The most conspicuous example is of Mustafa Khān Ardastānī of Golconda, who later entered the service of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I., acting as envoy extraordinary to conduct the delicate negotiations which led to the Muslim confederacy.²⁴ Many times Brāhmin officials were preferred as envoys and were freely employed by all the Deccan sultanates.²⁵

Bījāpur maintained diplomatic relations with Persia by sending occasional embassies to the Safavī court, a practice reciprocated by the Persian kings.²⁶ These exchanges of envoys, however, had no political significance; they seem to have been purely a matter of diplomatic courtesy. Bījāpur, as the first state in India to become Shia about the same time as Persia under the Safavis, was naturally drawn towards the latter and the exchange of envoys was intended to show the approval of the step both of them had taken. Only once was an embassy from the Deccan sent to Persia with political motives. This was in 1548 when Burhān Nisām Shāh I. of Ahmadnagar, an enthusiastic Shia, demanded help from Shāh Tahmāsp Safavī to crush the Sunni Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I. of Bījāpur.²⁷

The Deccan sultanates also used to send occasional embassies to the Mughal court at Delhi with messages of good will towards the Mughal dynasty. After Babar became master of Delhi in 1526,

²⁴ Ferishta II.72; Burhān (I.A.,L.143); T.M.Q.S. 109b-111a; T.M. 62b.

²⁵ Ferishta II.39,57; Colloquies 292; Linschoten I.247.

²⁶ B.S. 35; Burhān (I.A.XXVIII.320); Ferishta II.33.

²⁷ Burhān (I.A.,XLIX.199). No help came from Persia.

embassies from Bijāpur, Ahmadnagar and Golconda waited on him with congratulatory messages from the Deccan sultans.²⁸ Also at the time of the accession of a new Emperor on the throne of Delhi, Bijāpur, in common with other Deccan sultanates, used to send missions to the Imperial capital with gifts and messages of felicitations.²⁹

Among the Deccan sultanates themselves the practice of sending special envoys to offer congratulations to a king about to ascend the throne, was always observed. A breach of this custom was tantamount to declaration of hostility. On the accession of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I., in 1557, embassies came from all the neighbouring states to congratulate 'Alī. But no such mission came from Husain Nisām Shāh.³⁰ The reason for his silence became soon clear when he declared war on Bijāpur. Similarly, with the arrival of every new Portuguese viceroy at Goa, the Deccan sultanates used to send special representatives to welcome him.³¹

The Deccan sultanates also resorted to another method to maintain diplomatic relations between themselves. This was mutual matrimonial alliances. The sultanates hoped to establish friendly relations by this means as they were often

²⁸ Ferishta I.729.

²⁹ Cf. Tuzuk I.110; De Laet, 172. F.A. 315a.

³⁰ Ferishta II.67. F.A. 315a.

³¹ Linschoten I.220.

at war and always at variance. But these alliances more often than not resulted in aggravating the malady they were expected to cure. The marriage of Mariyam, Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh's sister to Burhān Nizām Shāh I. in 1524, instead of bringing Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur closer together, sowed the seeds of bitter hatred between the two.³² And the double matrimonial alliance of 1564, though it temporarily succeeded, never really healed the breach for, after the overthrow of Vijayanagar, Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar remained as estranged as ever.

Provincial Administration:- Provincial administration of the kingdom followed the Bahmanī system with such modifications as were found necessary. 'Alā-ud-dīn, the founder of the Bahmanī dynasty, had divided his kingdom into four divisions, each of which was entrusted to an officer. During the reign of his son Muhammad these divisions were named 'tarafs' and the officers in charge of them 'tarafdārs'.³³ These provincial governors were supreme in their respective divisions and naturally they tended to become powerful. But during the early days of the Bahmanīs, they were held in check by the strong personality of the king himself, who, every year, spent some time in touring the various divisions and in supervising the administration of his officers.

³² Ferishta II.201; B.S. 35-37.

³³ Ferishta I.532-33,536.

Moreover, the 'tarafdārs' could be and were indeed transferred from one province to another.³⁴ Mahmūd Gāvān, the famous Bahmanī minister, pursued this policy and thus prevented the principal officers from acquiring vested interests in one particular 'taraf'. He also subdivided each 'taraf' into two, so that the kingdom was divided into eight divisions.³⁵ This reform too was directed to control the power of the 'tarafdārs'. But it failed to cure the evils inherent in the system, evils which were further accentuated by civil war. This ultimately resulted in the disruption of the kingdom and the establishment of the five sultanates.

Usually one and sometimes even two of these 'tarafdārs' were also ministers at the Bahmanī court. Mahmūd Gāvān was Vakīl-us-Sultanat to Humayūn Shāh (1458-61) and also the 'tarafdār' of the Bijāpur division. Similarly during the succeeding reign, Khwāja Jahān who was Vakīl to Nizām Shāh Bahmanī (1461-63) was also the governor of Telangana. And Mahmūd Gāvān who was made both Amīr-i-Jumla and Vazīr-i-Kull was retained in charge of Bijāpur.³⁶ Each of the 'tarafdārs' was ipso facto a military officer and held the rank of a commander of 2,000 horse.³⁷ They enjoyed almost autocratic power. "They collected the revenue, raised and commanded the

³⁴ Ferishta I.562,565.

³⁵ Ferishta I.689-90.

³⁶ Ferishta I.655,663. Cf. also 576.

³⁷ Ferishta I.616.

army, and made all appointments both civil and military in their respective divisions."³⁸ But over all, the king's authority was supreme and he could direct any detail of administration as he wished. But this prerogative was rarely used by the king. Two 'Adilshāhī sultans, 'Alī and Muhammad, exercised it in an attempt to reform their administration. The question of foreign policy in all its aspects was dealt with exclusively by the central government.

Under the 'Adilshāhī sultanate the old designations 'taraf' and 'tarafdār' fell into disuse and the term 'jāgīr' and 'jāgīrdār' came into use. The old conception behind the 'tarafdārī' system also seems to have vanished. Under this system the Bahmanī kingdom was divided into a definite number of divisions; this, however, was not the case with Bījāpur. When Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh declared his independence he had to create a new oligarchy. But in his life-time he bestowed provincial governorship only on 'Ain-ul-Mulk of Goa. The rest of the kingdom appears to have remained as crown lands. When Dastūr Dīnār's 'jāgīrs' came into Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh's possession they were not bestowed on a 'jāgīrdār' but were kept by Yūsuf under his direct control and its officers were appointed by

³⁸ C.H.I., III.383. Cf. B.S. 512. For the duties of a provincial governor in an Islamic state see Margoliouth, 98-99: "Normally it was the business of the governor to collect the revenue.... and after spending what was requisite on the province and drawing his own stipend, to forward the surplus to the capital."

him. This arrangement continued till the end of the 'Adilshāhī dynasty.³⁹ In course of time the crown lands came to be divided among the 'amīrs' of the Bījāpur court. For administrative purposes, therefore, the kingdom was divided into two groups, the 'jāgīrs' and the crown lands (زمین سلطانی). After the fall of the Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar, the 'Adilshāhī kingdom acquired new territories in the south, which in the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh extended up to Vellore and Jinji on the Coromandel coast. These new acquisitions were either bestowed on 'Adilshāhī officers or left in the possession of their original Hindu chieftains who became vassals of Bījāpur. So that after 1565 the kingdom consisted of three different provincial systems. First came the provinces given as 'jāgīrs' to various officers of the kingdom. Then there were the crown lands administered directly by bureaucracy responsible to the king and the minister-in-charge appointed by the king, usually the Amīr-i-Jumla.⁴⁰ And last of all were the tributary states, paying an annual tribute to their overlord the king of Bījāpur, and supplying him with men and provisions in case of war.⁴¹

The kings of Bījāpur never interfered in the internal administration of their vassal Hindu chieftains, but we have no data at all as to how these chieftains administered their respective territories. The rest of the kingdom was divided

³⁹ Ferishta II.17; B.I.S.M., XII.111.31. Cf. Farāmīn-us-Salātīn, 210.

⁴⁰ Cf. B.I.S.M., XII.111.31; Ferishta I.690.

⁴¹ Cf. M.N. 38-39; B.S. 347-48.

into administrative units called 'parganas'. In the Carnātak they were usually known as 'sannats' and in the Konkan as 'tapas'⁴² which seems to be a Marāthī corruption of the old Bahmanī term 'taraf'. These units were either bestowed as 'jāgirs' on the nobles of the kingdom or were administered directly by officers appointed by the king. But in either case the administrative machinery of these provinces was the same. Sometimes one noble had more than one 'pargana' as his 'jāgīr' and these were perhaps not in the same part of the kingdom. An officer in charge of a province was not necessarily given a 'jāgīr' in that province, sometimes his 'jāgīr' lay in another part of the kingdom altogether. Thus, for instance, while Shahājī was in charge of the southern conquered territories, his 'jāgīr' was in the north at Poona. This, however, made little difference, for usually the 'amirs' were in the capital and their 'jāgirs' were administered by an agent. We know that Shahājī's agent in his Poona 'jāgirs' was Dādājī Kondadev. Similarly when Afzal Khān was in charge of the 'pargana' of Wāī, he left it in charge of an agent and himself remained in the capital. Asad Khān, the chief minister of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I., had always been away from⁴³ his 'jāgirs', either in the capital or on military expeditions.

⁴² Farāmīn-us-Salūtīn 207; B.I.S.M., XII.111.17,32; S.P.S.S., I. 17,26.

⁴³ S.P.S.S., I.120-21,136; Ferishta II.51,52.

In theory the tenure of the 'jāgīrdār' depended on the will of the sultan. A 'jāgīrdār' could be deprived of his office altogether or could be transferred to another division.⁴⁴ But this prerogative seems to have been rarely used by the 'Adilshāhī kings and during the seventeenth century can be said to have lapsed altogether. Still a 'jāgīr' was never hereditary and it was only in special circumstances that exceptions were made. The 'pargana' of Mudhol was conferred as a 'jāgīr' in perpetuity on the Ghorpadé family, for their services to the state, by 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II.,⁴⁵ and it belongs to the Ghorpadé family to this day.

A 'jāgīrdār' had three main duties to perform. He was the executive head of the districts under his jurisdiction; he was also the highest judicial authority in them,⁴⁶ and finally, he was responsible for maintaining a fixed quota of cavalry and perhaps infantry of which he was the commander.

In fact a 'jāgīr' was bestowed on a noble to enable him to maintain a certain number of cavalry. The king maintained only a part of the army of the state. The rest was recruited by the various nobles. This privilege to keep an army was known as 'mansab' and it was an essential concomitant of a 'jāgīr'. Under the Bahmanīs, each 'tarafdār' was a commander

⁴⁴ Cf. Ferishta II.19,24-25.

⁴⁵ 'Alī 'Adil Shāh's 'firmān'. Bakrishna I.129.

⁴⁶ S.P.S.S., I.136,179-80.

of 2,000, the Amīr-ul-āmra of 1,500, the Vakīl-us-sultanat of 1,200 and the rest of the nobility had troops varying from 1,000 to 100.⁴⁷ The same system of giving 'mansabs' was also prevalent in the 'Adilshāhī kingdom.⁴⁸ But it underwent considerable modifications. During the seventeenth century a rank of 5,000 among the higher nobility seems to have been common. Shahājī Bhonsla was given the rank of a commander of 5,000 and Mālojī Ghorpadē of Mudhol of 2,000.⁴⁹ These figures refer to cavalry only. How infantry was recruited and maintained is nowhere mentioned.

Thus a 'mansābdār' was automatically a 'jāgīrdār'. From the income of the 'jāgīr' were paid the expenses of the army and of the administration of the 'pargana' and a fixed amount seems to have been paid annually into the royal treasury. This practice resulted in many abuses and led to the oppression of the peasantry. Even when a 'pargana' was bestowed on an officer, revenues from certain items were specially reserved by the king. In the reign of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II. we have more than one instance of the 'jāgīrdār' paying to the king revenues derived from 'bhēt' and tobacco.⁵⁰ The 'bhēt' was the tribute paid by the subjects and petty chieftains

⁴⁷ Ferishta I.616.

⁴⁸ Ferishta II.26.

⁴⁹ Balkrishna I.105. Cf. Fryer II.56-57.

⁵⁰ B.I.S.M., XI.1.47-48; XII.111.32.

to the king, or his local representative, on certain occasions, and naturally a provincial officer had no claim to it. The reserving of the revenue on tobacco is very interesting, as it shows that this was even then a lucrative crop. If the revenue derived from it were to be left to the 'jāgīrdār' it would perhaps have meant the forced cultivation of more and more tobacco to the discouragement of other crops.

Each 'pargana' had usually four officers. In the absence of the 'jāgīrdār' his agent was the head of the administration of the 'pargana'. Dadāji Kondadev, the agent of Shahājī in his Poona estates, was known as subhédār.⁵¹ But there was no definite term by which these deputies were known. In revenue matters the agent was helped by two officers, one responsible for the collection of the revenue and the other for accounts. And the fourth officer was the Qāzī who was generally appointed by the sultān. He was the judicial officer for the division,⁵² though the work of dispensing justice was also done by the 'jāgīrdār'. He also seems to have been responsible for the supervision and maintenance of the Muslim religious endowments in his jurisdiction.

So far as the crown lands were concerned, the head of the administration of the 'pargana' was known as Subhédār.⁵³ In

⁵¹ Rajwādē IV.52.

⁵² Rajwādē IV.52. Cf. B.S. 350; S.P.S.S., I.20.

⁵³ Rajwādē VIII. No.37; B.I.S.M., III.65,68-69.

some state documents he is also referred to as Sarhavāldār.⁵⁴ This officer was in charge of the entire administration of the division and was in fact known as the king's deputy or agent⁵⁵ (نائب منیب). He was also the head of the garrison stationed in the division for the preservation of order.⁵⁶

The subdivision of the 'pargana' was known as 'māmāla' or 'tāluka' or 'karyat'. It was in charge of an officer called the Havāldār.⁵⁷

Agrarian system:- There is no first-hand evidence to show the nature of the agrarian system in Bijāpur and we have consequently no information as to what share of the produce was claimed by the king. The demands of the state on the peasant was undoubtedly heavy both in Vijayanagar and in the Mughal Empire. And though no direct evidence exists that the same was true of the Deccan sultanates, we have no other alternative but to assume that the same conditions prevailed under the sultanate rule in the Deccan.⁵⁸ Sabhāssad in describing the revenue administration of Shivājī gives the distinct impression that under sultanate rule land revenue was farmed

⁵⁴ B.I.S.M., XII.111.31.

⁵⁵ B.I.S.M., XI.11.5.

⁵⁶ B.I.S.M., XIII.111.31.

⁵⁷ Farāmīn-us-Salātīn 221, 224; B.I.S.M., XIII.111.21.

⁵⁸ Cf. I.D.A. 98-99.

out to the local officials.⁵⁹ The British officers who completed the surveys of the districts which formerly comprised the kingdom of Bijāpur are agreed that revenue farming of some kind existed in them under Muhammadan rule. Major Jervis and Baden-Powell are both agreed that the Khotī system of land tenure in the Konkan, essentially a system based on revenue farming, can be traced to Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh.⁶⁰

The very administrative system of the sultanates encouraged farming of revenue. Provinces of the kingdom were made over to the grandees for the upkeep of their quota of the army. They collected the land revenue, and other taxes if any, in their respective divisions, and they were expected to pay a certain fixed amount to the royal treasury. So long as this amount was paid, the officials of the treasury were not concerned how the taxes were collected. There was no direct supervision of this branch of administration, a state of things bound to lead to the oppression of the peasant. That the grandee was expected to collect all the taxes is made abundantly clear in the 'firmāns' issued by 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II. to Vyankoji.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Sabhāsad 32-33.

⁶⁰ Satāra, D.G. 335; Ratnāgiri, D.G., 213; Jervis 75-76, 83; L.S.B.I. III.288. Cf. The Agrarian System of Moslem India, 188.

⁶¹ B.I.S.M., XI.1.47-48; XII.111.32.

Most of the kingdom was divided among nobles; but even in the case of crown lands it seems that the officers that were entrusted with the collection of revenue had to pay into the state treasury a fixed amount annually collected from the territories under their jurisdiction.⁶²

The chief function of the administration was the collection of revenue. And in this the officer of the 'pargana' was helped by two other colleagues: the *Dēshmukh* and the *Dēsāī*.⁶³ The *Dēshmukh* was entrusted with the task of supervising the collection of revenue, while the *Dēsāī* was responsible for keeping the accounts. Sometimes the *Dēshmukh* and the *Subhédār* were referred to in the state documents by only one general term, namely *Huddédārs* or *Adhikāris* or *Amaldārs* or sometimes as '*Amils*'.⁶⁴ An attempt was made from the capital to keep a certain amount of supervision on these officers and to safeguard the interests of the peasant. For this reason the *Dēsāī* had to submit his accounts to the minister-in-charge at *Bījāpur*.⁶⁵ But the system of collecting revenue was altogether pernicious and the officers often harassed the peasants for private gain. In case complaints were carried to the capital redress was possible,⁶⁶ but such complaints were rarely made

⁶² S.P.S.S., I.65; *Farāmīn-us-Salātīn* 220; *Rajwādē* IV.24-25.

⁶³ *Farāmīn-us-Salātīn*, 212, 213, 224; B.I.S.M., II.1-iv.59; *Pōshvā Daftār* XXXI.5.

⁶⁴ B.I.S.M., II.1-iv.76, XII.111.18-20; *Farāmīn-us-Salātīn*, 212-13.

⁶⁵ B.I.S.M., XII.111.31; S.P.S.S. I.65, II.709.

⁶⁶ B.I.S.M., XII.111.27-28.

as the peasant was afraid of retaliation by the local officers.

The revenue officers of the 'tāluka' were known by the same names by which the 'pargana' revenue officers were known, namely *Deshmuk* and *Désāī*, but this *Désāī* was generally referred to as *Kārkūn* in state documents.⁶⁷

Village Organisation:- The village was the last unit of administration in the kingdom. From ancient times, whatever the central government in India, village administration was never interfered with; and under 'Adilshāhī' rule in the Deccan the villages were left as much to themselves as those under Mughal rule in other parts of the country.

The village officials were three in number: the *Pātil* or headman of the village, the *Kulkarnī* or the accountant and the village watchman. All these offices were hereditary.⁶⁸ The first duty of the village headman was the collection of revenues which were to be handed over to the provincial authority. He was also in charge of the police arrangements of the village, but the actual duty of watch and ward was entrusted to a watchman usually a person of the lower class. In case of war it was of course the duty of the state to protect the villages. How far the 'Adilshāhī' state succeeded in performing it is another matter. The *Kulkarnī* was the village accountant and responsible for all the details of the revenue, agricultural holdings and other property in the village.⁶⁹ But by far the most important

⁶⁷ B.I.S.M., III.1.15, 62.

⁶⁸ S.P.S.S., I.11; L.S.B.I., I.312.

⁶⁹ Grant Duff I.33-35; A.S.M. 506-07.

village official was the Pātil. Apart from his revenue and defence duties, he was also responsible for the settlement of the village disputes with the help of the village 'panchāyat'.⁷⁰ And lastly he was the leader of the village in all matters and the most influential person in it. If any co-operative work was to be undertaken in the village he took the leading part; if any state officials came to inspect the village he attended on them; if the village had to be represented at any place for any occasion he represented it. In short the Pātil was the spokesman of the village and though responsible to the government, he was always a man of the people.

The village headman and accountant were remunerated by means of 'inām' lands granted to them. The 'inām' or rent-free land and the office going with it was known as 'watan' in the case of the headman and 'mirās' in the case of the accountant.⁷¹ Though both the terms were first employed by the Muhammadan rulers, the practice implied by them was of ancient origin.⁷² From the dispute that was existing between Narsū Jagdalé of Masūr and Bapājī Mussalman of Karād about the 'watan' of headmanship of Masur, during the reign of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II., it is clear that the 'watan' of the village headman was regarded as an institution of great antiquity.⁷³ Apart from the 'inām' land these two officials

⁷⁰ B.I.S.M. (Proceedings of the Third Conference), 51; Grant-Duff I.33.

⁷¹ Grant-Duff I.39; S.P.S.S., I.11, 37.

⁷² Grant-Duff I.35; Cf. I.V.C. 15.

⁷³ Rajwādē IV.22.

claimed some minor taxes in the shape of an annual supply of shoes, oil, vegetables, cloth, etc. from the various members of the village community.⁷⁴

The village was essentially agricultural as all Indian villages have always been. Besides agriculture the other occupations of the village are those that are subsidiary to it. A farmer got his implements from the smith and carpenter; he was in need of the axe blade, the ploughshare, the plough and the cart, and the smith and the carpenter were thus essential for him. Apart from the agricultural needs he also had others in common with the rest of the villagers. There was the village barber, shoe-maker, potter, washerman. All these and similar other artisans have been existing in the village from times immemorial to serve the needs of the community.

The peculiarity of the village occupations was that they were just what were required to make the village community self-contained and self-sufficient, and so every village ^{had} as many professions as were required to serve the needs of its mainly agricultural population. Besides the Pātil the village establishment usually consisted of twelve artisans necessary for the life of the village community.⁷⁵ These are known

⁷⁴ A.S.M. 218-28,514-16.

⁷⁵ Grant-Duff I.29; A.S.M. 235; Cf. I.V.C. 16-17.

in the Maharāshtra as the 'balutédārs' and the institution is known as 'bārā baluté' (बारवाडुते). The twelve professions were represented by the Mahar who was the village watchman, the carpenter, the smith, the shoe-maker, the washerman, the potter, the barber, the astrologer and priest, the accountant, the Mang to do the menial work and generally help the village watchman, the Gurav or the person in charge of the temple of the village deity and the goldsmith. This was the usual composition of the professions of the village, but the number varied according to the size and needs of a village. Sometimes two small villages situated near each other would share their artisans, in other cases if a village had any Muslim endowments and some Muslim population, there used to be also a Muhammedan 'balutédār' who looked after the mosque and the spiritual life of the Muslim population.⁷⁶

We have already seen how the village accountant was remunerated. In remunerating the holders of these professions necessary for the village, the 'baluta' or grain share system was followed; and it is this system that gave the village servants the name 'balutédār'. The institution of 'balutas' or the payment of village servants by an annual charge against the crops is one of the characteristic features of a Deccan village. "The actual payment consists of a fixed amount of grain and fodder on the crops cultivated for grain and fodder.

⁷⁶ Grant-Duff I.30 f.n.; Village Communities in Western India, 96.

On the other crops it is nominally a similar charge commuted for a quantity of grain and fodder to cover what is supposed to be the due amount."⁷⁷

The 'baluta' dues were to be paid by every farmer to each 'balutédār' and so naturally none was admitted within that category whose services were not indispensable practical-^{to}ly every member of the community. Thus brick-layers, well-diggers and similar other professions were not included among the 'balutédārs', the reason being that their services were not required by all the villagers every now and then.

Justice and Police:- We have already seen that the policing of the village was left to the villagers themselves. In the case of important towns an official called Kotvāl was in charge of the police arrangements. In the capital itself the chief of police was known by the same title, Kotvāl. He was responsible for the safety of the citizens and their property and for maintaining peace and order in the capital. ⁷⁸ And it was his duty to trace robberies and punish miscreants.

In the village the administration of justice rested in the village council, or the village 'panchāyat', an institution of great antiquity. Failing to arrive at a mutual understanding the parties to a dispute in the village used to refer the matter to the Pātil. He used to try his best to arrive at an amicable settlement, failing which he would refer

⁷⁷ Land Labour in a Deccan Village II.122. For remuneration to the village priest see S.P.S.S., I.72.

⁷⁸ B.S. 353-54. Cf. T.M. 93b; B.S. 131.

Or sometimes betel nuts were used with a slight variation in the same method. These practices were heathenish and contrary to Muhammadan law as well as reason.⁸³ It was confined to the Hindus only and if one of the two litigants was a Muhammadan and had agreed to trial by this method, he could go back on this decision and appeal to a proper legal authority. But the decisions of the 'panchāyats' based on documentary evidence were binding on all litigants alike.

An appeal could be laid before the local officers or in the last resort before the king who was the fountain head of justice. But the officers usually preferred that disputes should be settled by a court of the people. We have two instances in which disputes were referred to Benaras and Paithan to be decided by the Pundits there. It must be noted that neither Paithan nor Benaras were in Bijāpur kingdom, but these two places were the centre of Hindu learning and disputes were referred to Pundits there for arbitration. Thus we have the instance of 'Abdul 'Alī, the 'Adilshāhī officer at Athani referring a religious dispute to the Brāhmins at Benaras.⁸⁴ In this connection the case of Harsoji Jagdalé of Masūr⁸⁵ (in Satara district) is also very important and illuminating and shows the pro-Hindu tendencies of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. In the reign of this sultān there was a dispute between Harsoji

⁸³ Cf. Ferishta I.162.

⁸⁴ S.P.S.S., I.156,168.

⁸⁵ Rajwādé XV.22-28.

Jagdalé and one Bapāji Mussalman of Karād regarding the Pātil 'watan' of Masūr. The case was first decided by the 'panchāyat' of Masūr which decreed in favour of Jagdalé. Being dissatisfied with this decision, the defendant Bapāji Mussalman appealed to his own 'panchāyat' at Karād which, however, confirmed the original decision. Bapāji then went direct to Bijāpur and complained to the sultan that the 'panchāyats' of Masūr and Karād were partial to Jagdalé being his co-religionists, and, therefore, their decision should be set aside. But even this allegation of miscarriage of justice could not induce Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh to order a retrial of the case before him. What he did was to order a retrial by the Pundits at Paithan remarking that it was a well-known place and that cases were often referred there for decision and that partiality or corruption was never suspected there.⁸⁶ The case was accordingly transferred to Paithan where the council of the Pundits after examining the evidence confirmed the original decision and Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh accepted this decision and enforced it.

However, it was not always that such appeals were referred to Benares or Paithan. Very often they were decided by the 'jāgīrdār' of the 'pargana' concerned or his officers.⁸⁷ Besides these officers there were Qazis in every 'pargana' and important town who administered the Quaranic law.⁸⁸ But they

⁸⁶ "प्रातिष्ठान थोर जगा आहें. निवाडे होणाहेत. न्यायनीति काही होते."

⁸⁷ S.P.S.S., I.4,14,18,161-62. Cf. Relations, 57.

⁸⁸ B.S. 350; Rajwādē IV.52.

seem to have served the need of the Muslim population and there is no evidence to show that Muhammadan law was applied to Hindu cases or even cases where one party was a Hindu and one a Muhammadan. Above all was, of course, the king who was the final law-giver and the highest source of justice in the kingdom. It is doubtful whether cases from different parts of the kingdom were referred to him often, but there was at the royal court a machinery for enquiring into such disputes and decisions were forwarded to the local officer concerned under the seal of the king.⁸⁹ In the case of European merchants the king seems to have been the only source of justice. We have the instance of the English factors in the kingdom who could not get redress for their complaints as the king (Muhammad 'Adil Shāh) was ill.⁹⁰

Reforms of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh:- It was Muhammad 'Adil Shāh who first became conscious of the evils of the administrative system that had been handed down since the days of the Bahmanis. Possibly the superiority of the Mughal administration brought home to him the shortcomings in his own. Afzal Khān Shīrāzī, the prime minister of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I., made an attempt to introduce departmentalization in the administration of the kingdom,⁹¹ but his reforms evidently fell into disuse during the minority of Ibrāhīm II. It was, however, Muhammad

⁸⁹ B.S. 349; S.P.S.S., I.45.

⁹⁰ E.F.I. (1651-54) 104.

⁹¹ T.M. 93a-b; B.S. 131.

'Adil Shāh who undertook the task of overhauling the entire administrative machinery. But its evils were far too deep-rooted to be remedied by a mere stroke of pen.

Muhammad 'Adil Shāh's first step was to bring all the forts in the kingdom under the direct supervision and responsibility of the king. Hitherto the forts of the kingdom were included in the 'jāgīr' in which they were situated and they were garrisoned and administered by the 'jāgīrdār' concerned. The dangers behind this system were evident. Muhammad 'Adil Shāh directed that the officers of the forts were to be directly responsible to him. These officers were to be three in number: the 'killadār' or the commander of the fort, one assistant and a personal agent of the king to report important matters to his master at Bijāpur. Even these officers were not to remain in charge of a fort for more than three years, after which period they were to be transferred to another fort.⁹²

Another way in which Muhammad 'Adil Shāh sought to limit the power of his nobles was by occasional inspection of the army maintained by them for the service of the king. Every 'jāgīrdār' was compelled to keep a roll of his army. This was inspected from time to time by inspectors appointed by the king. These officers checked whether the actual number of soldiers maintained by the 'amir' amounted to that entered

in the roll. Thus 'jāgirdārs' could not misappropriate revenues from their 'jāgirs' for their personal gain.⁹³

All the state servants in the capital and learned men who received royal patronage were paid monthly salaries. A register was kept in which the names of all such individuals were entered. And if any of these neglected their duties or in any way showed that they were unfit for royal patronage, they were either fined or were dismissed from their position. The king's children and other members of the royal family were given a fixed monthly allowance.⁹⁴

Municipal regulations for the supervision of the markets in the capital were introduced and public health regulations to keep the streets of the capital clean were framed.⁹⁵ Whether these extended to the towns in the kingdom is not evident. Regulations were made to make the weights and measures in the kingdom uniform.⁹⁶

The most impolitic reform of Muḥammad 'Adil Shāh was the imposition of the 'jaziya' on his Hindu subjects, though women and children, blind and infirm persons, old men and mendicants were exempted from this odious tax.⁹⁷ Its introduction alienated Marāṭhā loyalty and threw the younger Marāṭhās into the arms of Shivāji who had revolted from Bijāpur.

⁹³ B.S. 356.

⁹⁴ B.S. 356-57.

⁹⁵ B.S. 354.

⁹⁶ B.S. 350.

⁹⁷ B.S. 355.

This reform and the general intolerance of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh towards his Hindu subjects, during the later years of his reign, struck a deadly blow at the solidarity of the kingdom. Indeed this was not a reform but a retrograde step.

'Adilshāhī coinage:- To Muhammad 'Adilshāhī also belongs the credit of being the first 'Adilshāhī king to issue gold coins from the royal mint at Bījāpur. For a time after the extinction of the Bahmanī dynasty gold coins continued to be struck in the name of the Bahmanī kings,⁹⁸ but the practice soon lapsed. The Bahmanī gold coin was known as the 'hūn' and weighed about 170 grains.⁹⁹ After the extinction of the Bahmanī dynasty the sultanates of the Deccan did not mint gold coins for a long time and in Bījāpur gold coins of a date earlier than the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh have not been found. Indeed, writing his history in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Ferishta himself says that Bījāpur minted no gold coins but the "gold coins of the Kafirs are used in the Muslim kingdoms."¹⁰⁰

Though gold coins were not minted in Bījāpur before the time of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh, the Hindu gold coins 'pratāpe' or 'pagodas', as they are better known, were in circulation and met the currency needs of the kingdom and were known by the Bahmanī name 'hūns'. These gold coins were issued not only from Vijayanagar, but from Ikkerī also and perhaps from the capitals of other Hindu 'nāyaks' of Canara.¹⁰¹ At Goa

⁹⁸ C.C.I.M.C., II.204-05.

¹⁰⁰ Ferishta I.538.

⁹⁹ C.C.I.M.C., II.198,199-205.

¹⁰¹ S.C.C.I.M.C., I.91-93.

Portuguese gold coins were accepted by the Deccan merchants but the Portuguese silver coins were not.¹⁰²

When Muhammad 'Adil Shāh minted his gold coin, he called it by the familiar name 'hūn'. It was an adaptation of the Hindu 'pagoda' and did not conform in weight to the Bahmani 'hūn' but to the Hindu coin. Like the 'pagoda' the average weight of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh's 'hūn' was 52 grains and its size approximately 4 inch and it possessed the same fineness as the Hindu coin.¹⁰³ The value of the 'pagoda' or 'hūn' in terms of English money (shillings) varied with the silver price of gold. About 1565 Caesar Frederick put it at six shillings and eight pence. Methwold in 1630 quotes it as between seven shillings and seven shillings and sixpence. But the price increased somewhat as the century went on, evidently due to a rise in the silver price of gold; so that about 1659 it was a little less than eight shillings and Bowrey and Fryer agree in putting it at eight shillings in the last quarter of the century.¹⁰⁴

The silver coins were a kind of curious wire money called the 'lārīs'. The 'lārī' was a Persian silver coin originally current in the province of Lār at the head of the Persian Gulf. It was originally brought to India by the Persian merchants

¹⁰² Linschoten I.243.

¹⁰³ S.C.C.I.M.C., I.91; J.A.S.B., N.S. (XXXIV.1925), 44.

¹⁰⁴ Caesar Frederick, Hakluyt II.346; Relations 93; E.F.I. (1655-60), 242; Bowrey, 114; Fryer II.132. Cf. Tavernier II.70.

and proved acceptable to the people of the Konkan with whom they dealt and it was adopted by the kings of Bijāpur. The 'lārī' consisted of very good and fine silver without any alloy.¹⁰⁵ It was probably with a view to meeting the demand for this strange coast money that the sultans of Bijāpur caused 'lārīs' to be struck in their own names. That these 'Adilshāhī 'lārīs' were at any time current over the whole extent of the 'Adilshāhī dominion is very doubtful. In fact the English merchants found the absence of a silver currency in the interior of the kingdom a serious inconvenience and Revington, the English factor, wanted to start a mint at Rājāpur to meet this need. He suggested to Rustam Zamān, the 'Adilshāhī governor of Rājāpur that the English should be allowed to mint a coin equivalent to the Mughal 'rupee'.¹⁰⁶

The 'lārī' consisted of a piece of thick silver wire, something more than three inches in length, doubled on its middle and slightly flattened to receive an impression. The average weight of a 'lārī' was about 72 grains, but the length differed; if one 'lārī' was shorter than another it was also thicker and their weight was equal.¹⁰⁷ Mandelalo gives the value of one 'pagoda' equal to 10 'lārīs' of Dābhol

¹⁰⁵ Linschoten I.242; Pyrard II.68,239; Mandelalo 75.

¹⁰⁶ E.F.I. (1655-60) 243-44. Nothing came out of this suggestion, but finally a mint was opened at Bombay in 1672 to strike silver coins. Ibid. 246.

¹⁰⁷ I.A.S.B. (1910), 686-89.

and about thirty-five years later Fryer gives it at $10\frac{1}{2}$ at Rājāpur.¹⁰⁸ It seems that there was another silver coin in circulation inland called the 'tanga' and it is noticed by Pyrard, Mandelslo and Fryer. In value it was a little more than a 'lārī'.¹⁰⁹ This coin, however, seems to have had a very restricted circulation and was quite inadequate to meet the demands of the people, particularly the merchants.

Bijāpur copper currency consisted for the most part of coins of three denominations, weighing respectively about 60, 120 and 180 grains.¹¹⁰ This money was popularly known as 'budgruks', though Fryer mentions a copper coin 48 of which went to a 'pagoda'; this was known as 'jittal' at Rājāpur and 'rue' at Rāybāg.¹¹¹ The most interesting feature of the copper coins of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. is the inscription on them which calls the Sultān الملك (protector of the weak).¹¹² This is a pure Sanskrit phrase and shows Hindu influence on Ibrāhīm.

Besides these coins, shell money (cowries) was in extensive use for small everyday transactions in the villages and in addition small bitter almonds were also used for ^a similar purpose.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Mandelslo 75; Fryer II.129.

¹⁰⁹ Pyrard I.232; Mandelslo 75; Fryer II.129. Cf. Burhān (I.A. XXVIII.186,187); J.A.S.B. (1909), 309-13.

¹¹⁰ J.A.S.B. (1910), 681-86.

¹¹¹ Fryer II.129.

¹¹² J.A.S.B., N.S. (1922), 37-38. ¹¹³ Tavernier I.23-24.

The curious thing about 'Adilshāhī coins is that they do not give the name of the mint at which they were struck. This may be because there was only one mint in the kingdom and because private individuals were allowed to mint coins on the payment of license fees. They were allowed to strike only silver and copper coins and had to conform in shape, size and weight to the standard coins.¹¹⁴ The royal mint was situated at Bijāpur and was placed under the charge of a mint-master.¹¹⁵ Muhammad 'Adil Shāh decreed that important towns in his kingdom were to have their own mints which were to be under the supervision of the mint officers in the capital.¹¹⁶ It is impossible to name the towns which possessed mints, as the Bijāpur coins are silent on this point. The English factors found a mint at Bankāpur (1659) which minted gold coins known as the 'sagar Pagoda'.¹¹⁷ And a goldsmith at Dābhol was given permission to mint silver and copper coins.¹¹⁸ Hājāpur seems to have possessed a mint of its own. But besides these no mention of any other mint in the kingdom is found.

Weights were the same as they are to-day. The 'sér' was the standard unit of weight and forty of it went to a 'man'.

¹¹⁴ S.P.S.S. I.131; B.S. 350.

¹¹⁵ T.M., 152a.

¹¹⁶ B.S. 350, 353.

¹¹⁷ E.F.I. (1655-60), 243.

¹¹⁸ S.P.S.S., I., 131.

The highest weight was the 'khandi' of twenty 'mans'.¹¹⁹

The 'khandi' was known to the Portuguese as 'bahar' and was
equivalent to four quintals of Portuguese weight.¹²⁰ The
unit of measure was the 'gaz' equal to $28\frac{4}{5}$ inches, so that
five of it were equal to four yards.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Mandelslo 74; Fryer II.129.

¹²⁰ Barbosa II.232; Mandelslo 74.

¹²¹ Fryer II.129.

CHAPTER IX.

SOCIAL LIFE.

The Country and People:- The kingdom consisted of two main regions divided by the Sahyādrī mountains. Along the coast was the narrow strip of land known as the Konkan and beyond the 'ghāts', that is, the Sahyādrī range, lay the main plateau. To the south the boundaries of the kingdom were extended after the battle of Talikota, but in other directions they remained the same during the sixteenth century as at the death of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh. The seventeenth century saw considerable changes in the extent of the kingdom. Bīdar was annexed by Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh in 1619, half of the Nizāmshāhī kingdom was ceded to Bijāpur by the subsidiary alliance with the Mughals in 1636. By the same alliance the kingdom was left in peace to carry out a policy of expansion in the south, a policy followed by successive sultans but advocated most vigorously by Muhammad 'Adil Shāh. So that under him the kingdom achieved its greatest expanse, its frontiers touching the Arabian Sea on one side and the Bay of Bengal on the other, and it became second only to the Mughal Empire in extent.¹ But this glory was short lived; within twenty years after Muhammad 'Adil Shāh's death it had lost not only the Deccan coast but almost all of its southern

¹ See map facing 144 ante.

possessions also and considerable territories in the north. However, during most of the two hundred years of its existence the kingdom extended between the Mānjara and Tungabhadra and from the sea-board to Gulbarga, in other words roughly between latitudes 14 and 18 North and longitudes 73 and 77 East.

The country seems to have been thickly populated judging from the narratives of European travellers. The accounts of the travellers give an impression of density² and Tavernier's description of the diamond mines conveys the suggestion that there was no dearth of labourers to work them.³ It is, however, impossible to determine the population of the kingdom, not only because its boundaries kept fluctuating, particularly during the seventeenth century, but also because of complete absence of data on the topic.

The centre of the life of the kingdom was of course the capital, Bījāpur. It was one of the finest and richest cities in India in those days. Even Akbar's ambassador, Asad Beg, who visited it in the beginning of the seventeenth century, was struck by its grandeur and prosperity;⁴ this implies that it compared favourably with the Imperial cities of Agra and Delhi. Other towns of importance were connected with industry and trade, the ports on the coast and the marts inland. Goa

² I.P.C., Nikitin, 12; Barbosa I., 166, 178.

³ Tavernier II., 44, 46. Cf. Philosophical Transactions, XII. 916.

⁴ Wāqī'a, 54a-b.

was one of the most important emporiums of trade in India in the sixteenth century, but was lost to Bijāpur soon after the kingdom was founded. Other 'Adilshāhī ports were Dābhol, Vengurla, Hājāpur and, for some time, Chaul and Kārwār on the Malabar coast and, after the conquest of the south, Porto Novo and Negapatam on the Coromandel. The inland mart towns were Rāybāg, Hublī, Belgaum and Athanī. Provincial towns do not seem to have been of importance except in a political sense. Both Bīdar and Gulbarga, the two Bahmanī capitals, had dwindled to the position of seats of provincial governments. Frontier outposts and forts were places of military importance. The last unit of the kingdom was the village.

The inhabitants were almost entirely Hindus and a majority of these were Marāthās.⁵ The southern fringe of the kingdom was Canarese-speaking and so were most of the later acquisitions south of the Tungabhadra. Even to-day the Hindu population of this region is in the neighbourhood of ninety per cent. More than two centuries of Islām do not seem to have affected the religious life of the people. The Muslim population consisted partly of those who originally came into the Deccan and settled there, and partly of the Pardesi immigrants who came in search of a career. Practically all the Muhammadans derived their livelihood from the state. They were usually town dwellers and agriculture, the main occupation of the

⁵ The two terms have been used synonymously in this chapter.

people, was entirely in the hands of the Hindus. Hardly any of these sought a career outside their country and those who did, went either as palanquin bearers, a profession for which they were highly esteemed in northern India, or as itinerant acrobats⁶ (जैतान्त्री). Trade and industry absorbed a certain number of the population but the majority depended for their livelihood on the land.

Position of the Hindus:- The Marāthās were to the 'Adilshāhī sultanate what the Rajputs were to the Mughal Empire. Their loyal support was essential for the existence of the kingdom. The 'Adilshāhs recognised this vital fact. Even before the Mughal Empire was founded in the north, we find Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh of Bijāpur marrying a Marāthā lady.⁷ In later years a similar policy was followed with great success by Akbar. But the credit for appreciating its potentialities goes to Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh. This one step endeared him to the Marāthās who willingly co-operated with Yūsuf and his successors in the government of the state. Another reason for the Marāthā support of the 'Adilshāhī kingdom is to be sought in the Hindu conception of kingship and the fatalism of the Hindu mind. Once the Muhammadans gained the sovereignty of the Deccan, the Hindus accepted their rule as an ordained fact. And once they accepted the Muhammadan rule, they looked upon the sultān in the light of their conception of a king, which was that a king

⁶ 'Ain I., 254; Peter Mundy, 255. Of course this state of things changed after the rise of the Marāthās under Shivājī.

⁷ Ferishta II., 22.

was ruler by divine decree.⁸ When Shivāji shattered this belief the Marāthās could relinquish their support of the sultanate with a clear conscience.

The Marāthās had always occupied an honourable position in the state since the days of the Bahmanis. Many Marāthā families rose to power and influence under 'Adilshāhī rule, chief amongst whom was Shahāji Bhonsla, the father of Shivāji. He entered the service of Bijāpur under Muhammad 'Adil Shāh and rose to a great eminence as a general and as an administrator. Much of the credit of the 'Adilshāhī conquests in the south after 1636 is due to Shahāji in recognition of which he was appointed to the charge of them. The Nimbālkars of Phaltan and the Ghorpadés of Mudhol had similarly distinguished themselves in 'Adilshāhī service. Māloji Nimbālkar loyally supported 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I. at the battle of Talikota.⁹ In fact Bābājīsāheb Nāik, the founder of the Nimbālkar family threw in his lot with Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh when he declared his independence. Yūsuf rewarded Bābājīsāheb by granting him the 'jāgīr' of Phaltan¹⁰ which belongs to the Nimbālkar family to this day. Similarly the chieftainship of Mudhol is still in the Ghorpadé family. Both the present day Marāthā states of Jath and Sāvāntvādī in the Bombay Presidency trace their origin to 'Adilshāhī days.

Another distinguished Marāthā family in the service of Bijāpur

⁸ ना विष्णुः पृथ्वीपतेः।

⁹ Itihās Sangraha II. ix., 24-31.

¹⁰ Marāthā Sardārs, 31.

was the Mores of Jāvlī, so mercilessly extirpated by Shivājī in 1656. Besides these there were various other families, Shirke, Mohite, Māne, Ghātge and Mahādik - still living and honoured in the Deccan - who obtained place and power at the 'Adilshāhī court.¹¹

It is clear, therefore, that the Marāthās had equal opportunities to distinguish themselves as military leaders with the Muhammadan nobility. Another branch of state service was exclusively in the hands of the Hindus, the revenue and accounts department. The Hindus, particularly the Brāhmins, were adept at figures and all state accounts were kept by them. Brāhmins had been in charge of the accounts since the days of the Bahmanīs and this practice was continued by the 'Adilshāhī sultans of Bijāpur and also other Deccan sultanates.¹² Just as accounts were exclusively in the hands of the Brāhmins, the collection of revenue was entrusted to Marāthā officers. All the revenue officers in the various parts of the kingdom were thus usually Hindus. But Brāhmins also occupied other positions in the state. Garcia de Orta noticed that they were employed by the kings of the Deccan as "treasurers, writers, collectors of rent and ambassadors."¹³ Particularly were they

¹¹ Marāthā Sardārs, 39-63; Grant Duff I., 68-71. For accounts of some other Hindu families which rose to eminence under 'Adilshāhī rule see Rājwade XX.

¹² Ferishta I., 527, II., 5, 49, 85, 99. B.S. 349.

¹³ Colloquies, 292. Also Linschoten I., 247.

employed as envoys and occasionally even as ministers.¹⁴ The Hindus thus possessed considerable administrative power and some political influence in the Deccan sultanates. They also occupied high positions in the civic life of the capital. Asad Beg, the Mughal ambassador, found that the headmen of the various artisan guilds were Hindus.

Government of the state, therefore, was not entirely in the hands of the Muhammadans; the Hindus had ^a considerable share in it. This made it impossible for the Muhammadan powers to retain their bigotry and fanaticism. With the exception of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh none of the sultans of Bijāpur showed intolerance towards their Hindu subjects. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I., a staunch Sunni, showed great preference for Hindus over Pardesi Muhammadans,¹⁵ and 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I. interested himself in Hindu 'sanyāsis' and priests. Like Akbar he used to delight in discussing philosophical problems with them and rewarded them liberally.¹⁶ Ibrāhīm II. even came under the suspicion of being a devotee of the Hindu goddess of learning, Sarasvatī, and was known, and is still remembered in the Deccan, by the Sanskrit epithet Jagadgurū,¹⁷ (जगद्गुरु). The legend on his copper coins بلبل 'Protector of the weak',¹⁸ a pure

¹⁴ Ferishta II., 39, 57, 206.

¹⁵ Ferishta II., 49.

¹⁶ T.M. 43a; B.S. 79.

¹⁷ B.S. 279; Gaikwād, 20-21; Rājwāde XV., 25.

¹⁸ J.A.S.B. (N.S. 1922), 37-38. I have seen some of these coins in the Prince of Wales Museum, Bombay.

Sanskrit phrase, bears eloquent testimony to the influence of Hinduism on him.

The 'Adilshāhī sultans put into practice the tolerance which they felt towards their Hindu subjects. Hindu temples in various parts of the kingdom were given liberal endowments by the kings.¹⁹ Sometimes a Hindu noble would make similar endowments,²⁰ and this practice was not interfered with. Pandharpur, the centre of the democratic Bhakti cult,²¹ was in the 'Adilshāhī kingdom. The place was never disturbed by the rulers. The Hindu priestly classes were left to practice their profession in peace, their hereditary rights were scrupulously upheld and lands were given to them for their maintenance or arrangements were made with state officials by which they were given small cash payments.²² One Joshi family known to the present writer still holds 'Adilshāhī 'firmāns' confirming the grant of a small yearly income on them and the right to practice their priestly profession in certain villages in the Konkan.²³ Another Joshi family near Rājāpur got their living from 'inām' lands confirmed to them by the 'Adilshāhs.²⁴ Many of the grants made to the priestly

¹⁹ B.I.S.M., II., 21, 53; S.P.S.S. I., 78, 137.

²⁰ S.P.S.S., I. 81; Shahāji, 97-98.

²¹ See Chapter VI. ante and chapter XI of H.M.P., I.

²² S.P.S.S., I., 2, 14, 45, 72, 120-21, 161-62.

²³ B.I.S.M., II. 11.5-7. I have verified these facts from the members of this Joshi family known to me in Bombay. The cash payments have lapsed long since.

²⁴ History of the Joshi family (वृत्तिविजय जोशी यादवकर), folios 1-2.

classes by Shivāji and his descendants were mere confirmations and continuations of those bestowed during 'Adilshāhī rule.²⁵

The general life of the Hindu community was left to itself under 'Adilshāhī rule. No attempts were made to superimpose the culture of the rulers on their Hindu subjects. The traces of Persian influence on the Marāthī language and of the Muhammadan dress on the dress of the Marāthās were due to the people themselves and have been discussed in another chapter. Such Hindu institutions as obtained in the villages were left untouched, possibly because the Muhammadan rulers had no alternative system of village administration. But the real reason was that it was impossible for the Muhammadans to change the life of the people sanctified by tradition that had its roots in the ancient past. The Deccan sultanates wisely understood this cardinal fact as is shown by the policy they adopted towards their Hindu subjects.

The only 'Adilshāhī king who adopted an active policy of suppression of the Hindus was Muhammad 'Adil Shāh.²⁶ But even he seems to have been aware for a time that the Marāthās were the backbone of his kingdom, and he was careful not to violate any of the practices followed by his predecessors. Thus we find that he continued the grant of the 'inām' lands to Hindu

²⁵ cf. "कसबो कसबो ये स्वर्गीय ब्राह्मणांस पूर्ण आदरसाहजे करीवो किंयेन वृत्ति होया."

Grant of Shivāji in June, 1924. Also B.I.S.M. Proceedings Vol., 232-35, I.140.

²⁶ The B. S. 350-55 discusses in detail the measures of the anti-Hindu policy of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh. Cf. Sarkar: Shivāji, 31.

temples made during the reign of his father Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. But his religious zeal proved greater than his statesmanship and he succumbed to the idea of spreading the glory of Islām, unmindful of its reactions on the Marāthās. The most odious innovation of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh was the imposition of the hated 'jaziya'.²⁸ No other 'Adilshāhī sultān had adopted this policy, for they knew that it was sure to create resentment among their subjects. The Marāthās felt the 'jaziya' an insult as well as a burden and its imposition was to a great extent responsible for alienating them from the 'Adilshāhī throne. Under no circumstances should they have been subjected to the humiliating payment of the 'jaziya', least of all at a time when there was growing in the Deccan a movement for Marāthā solidarity. It was here that Muhammad 'Adil Shāh failed, he failed to understand the strength of the rising tide of Marāthā patriotism and his unwise policy only helped to bring the Marāthās closer together under the leadership of Shivājī.

Social and Religious life:- It has already been observed that the majority of the population under 'Adilshāhī rule was Hindu. Among them the caste system existed substantially in the same form as to-day. Though the European travellers were unfamiliar with the ramifications of this system peculiar to India, they have noted that the community was divided into various classes

²⁷ B.I.S.H., II., 21, 53; S.P.S.S., I., 137.

²⁸ B.S. 355.

and they often mention the Brāhmins and the Banians - the Banias of modern times - or the trading class. Dr Fryer even mentions the Lingāyat sect of Canara.²⁹ Indirectly of course Linschoten notes the water-tight divisions of the Hindu community when he says that there were in it various classes such as Barbers, Carpenters, Gold and Silver smiths, etc., and when he further observes that every one of them followed his ancestral occupation and married into his own class.³⁰

Brāhmins were the highest caste and "were of great authority among the Indian people." They were, as even to-day they are supposed to be, at the top of the social order. Their influence was and is due mainly to the fact that they were the priestly class, and all religious ceremonies, which form such an important aspect of Hindu life, could be performed only through their agency. They were the link between the bulk of the population and the ultimate deity that gave absolution. The social and religious importance of the Brāhmins was thus founded on the religious beliefs of the Hindu society.

Some Brāhmins were in the service of the state, but most of them earned their livelihood by practising the priestly profession in their villages. The profession ran in the family, so that after the death of the village priest, his son succeeded to his position. This right of hereditary priesthood was

²⁹ Fryer II., 77.

³⁰ Linschoten I., 257, 258.

recognised by the state. As the priests, the Brāhmins were also in charge of the temples dedicated to various deities.

Besides being priests, the Brāhmins practised as physicians.³¹ Dr. Dellon, who was in the Deccan about 1675, found that their methods were rough and ready and that they had no knowledge of anatomy. "Their skill is confined to a certain number of receipts which they have received by tradition from certain of their ancestors." However, by constant observations of the diseases peculiar to the country they were able to remedy them in a much more efficient way than a learned foreign physician like Dr. Dellon.³² Tavernier noted that there was a scarcity of physicians in the Deccan.³³ This may be due to the fact that many people chose to have a disease remedied by recourse to the witch doctor who claimed to exorcise the evil spirit which, according to superstition, was supposed to have caused the malady. Moreover, each family had its own stock of medicinal herbs as cures for common ailments.³⁴

The most important section of the population was the Marāthās. There were among them two chief divisions, the Marāthās proper and the Kunbis. The former preferred military service or some kind of employment in the administration of the

³¹ Linschoten I., 248; Ferishta I., 527.

³² Dellon, 232-33.

³³ Tavernier I., 240.

³⁴ Fryer II., 80-81; Tavernier I., 240. Cf. R.E. Enthoven The Folklore of Bombay, 169, 263-80.

state. Village headmen and other village officers belonged to this class. The forts in the 'Adolshāhī kingdom were mostly commanded by them. Some of them were also cultivators of the soil. The Kumbis were exclusively agriculturists. Other castes had their place in the social order and their particular professions. Thus the words potter or barber signified both the caste and the profession. It is only now that these rigid social barriers are breaking down. In short, social organisation in the Deccan was much the same as in other parts of India. Its special features that led to the rise of the Marāthās under Shivājī, have been dealt with in an earlier chapter.

The phase of life which struck the European travellers most was the manners and customs of the Hindus and their superstitions. Nothing peculiar to the Muhammadans was noticed except the 'parda' system among their women.³⁵ The manners and customs of the Hindu population and their superstitions make interesting reading and show how Hindu society is static. It is only with the beginning of the twentieth century, when the liberating and rationalising influence of India's contact with the West began to assert itself, that Hindu society realised that modifications in its organization were essential.

The first thing that the travellers noticed when they

³⁵ The Muhammadan community in the Deccan has been discussed in Chapter I.

started their journey in the country was the number of temples or 'pagodas' which housed the idols of the Hindus. The country was full of such temples. The idolatrous practices of the Hindus evoked unanimous condemnation on the part of the European travellers.³⁶ These were not the only new things that met their eye. The barbarous custom of widow burning (*सती*) was extensively practised. The Portuguese did try to put a stop to this inhuman custom in Goa and even the sultans of Golconda and Bijāpur seem to have made an attempt to discourage it.³⁷ But it persisted with full vigour well into the nineteenth century till it was suppressed by Lord William Bentinck.

Child marriage was universal³⁸ and the religious ceremonies were the same as to-day. There were processions and feasts, but the celebrations lasted for a longer time than they do to-day.

The recreations of the people were of the simplest kind. There were two types of itinerant entertainers who went from village to village exhibiting their art. These were the snake-charmers and the acrobats.³⁹ Cock-fighting was a common sport in the villages of Canara.⁴⁰ Big game was always

³⁶ Linschoten I., 227, 289-300; Fitch, E.T.I., 15; Mocquet, 240; Thevenot iii., 73, 81; Tavernier I., 157-58; Fryer I., 311.

³⁷ Commentaries II., 94; P.D.V. 85; Thevenot iii. 85; Mocquet 242.

³⁸ Linschoten I., 258; Fitch, E.T.I., 16; Thevenot iii. 83. The custom is not so rampant to-day, and among the educated classes, as a rule, it is not observed.

³⁹ Linschoten I. 225; Peter Mundy, 255

⁴⁰ Fryer II. 68-69.

available in the forests, but it was only royalty and nobility that went on hunting expeditions.⁴¹

There were annual fairs (*मेला*) which gave the peasantry a much needed holiday. There are many days in the Hindu year which are specially set apart for such celebrations. Friends from various parts of the country met on such occasions and exchanged gossip. These fairs relieved the monotony of the villagers' life. Among Muhammadans such occasions were known as 'fairs' (*عرس*) and they centred round the tomb of some well-known saint. The tomb of Syed Muhammad Giasu Daras at Gulbarga, the famous Muslim saint of the Deccan, was a favourite shrine where annual fairs were held and many 'Adil-shahi sultans attended these celebrations from time to time.⁴²

Another important institution among the Hindus was the 'Kirtana' (*कीर्तन*). This was a kind of philosophical discourse and was divided into two parts; one part consisted of a story from one of the epics of India and the main discourse was on a topic connected with it. Thus a 'Kirtan' was devised to meet the needs of both young and old. It was held in the village temple at night and lasted for about two to three hours. The person who gave the discourse was known as (servant of God) and he moved from village to village affording both entertainment and instruction. The was a

⁴¹ Fryer II., 69-71; Pyrard II., 347; Ferishta II. 7, 99.

⁴² M.N. 24; Cf. Ferishta II. 46.

Brāhmin. Even more popular than these discourses were the ballads which were sung by wandering minstrels. They described the exploits of popular heroes, not of the dim past but of the present, exploits which were fresh in the minds of the people. But the ballad was a creation of the seventeenth century and was mainly devoted to describing the adventures of Shivāji, his followers and his successors.⁴³

Dress, Food and Housing:- The dress of the lower class of the Hindus was nothing more than a piece of cloth round their loins and the women also were as scantily dressed. As a rule they were barefooted. The higher classes were better clothed. Brāhmīns wore a kind of gown (अंगरखा) and a turban with a length of cloth round their shoulders. The dress of the Marāthās was closely modelled on that of the Muhammadans. The Moslem dress was more or less a copy of that worn in Muhammadan countries. It consisted of tight-fitting trousers, shirts and large coats of silk or cotton, pointed turbans and two pieces of cloth, one used as a belt round the waist, and the other thrown over the shoulders. The Muhammadans came from cold countries and were used to fuller clothing than the Hindus. Moreover, as the ruling class, they were better off ^{average} than the ^{average} Hindus and could afford better clothes. Their shoes were pointed in front and open above. The dress of the

⁴³Cf. Sarkar: Shivāji, 12.

Muhammadan women was very similar to that of the men and like women in all Muhammadan countries they went about in veils.⁴⁴

Hindu women of the upper classes were very fond of ornaments and took pleasure in bedecking themselves with nose rings, anklets, necklaces and bracelets on each arm. The women of the poorer classes who could not afford these found a substitute in glass bangles which they wore on their arms.⁴⁵ Even men were not above an occasional gold ring hanging in their ears.

The houses of the people conveyed the same impression as their dress. The houses of the majority of the population were poor, mean structures, devoid of any furniture. But the houses of state officials, merchants and the wealthy classes were comfortable and well furnished. They boasted of cupboards, chests and bedsteads.⁴⁶ One peculiar thing some of the travelers noticed about the furniture was that under the leg of every piece there was a stone or wooden cistern full of water.⁴⁷ This device was evidently intended to keep off ants and other insects. Another hygienic device in the domestic arrangements

⁴⁴ Varthema 114, 118; Barbosa I., 179, 181; Linschoten I. 260-61, 269; Pyrard II. 136-37; Fryer I. 88; II. 117-18.

⁴⁵ Linschoten I. 247-49. A description true to the letter to this day.

⁴⁶ Jourdain 198; Mandelslo 74; Thevenot 111.83; Linschoten I. 261, 303.

⁴⁷ Linschoten I. 303; Mocquet 241.

was the use of cow-dung in spraying the floor of the houses. It was mixed with water, made into a thick paste and the floor and sometimes the walls of the houses were dressed with it. This was popularly supposed to keep away certain insects and was also considered as a preventive against certain diseases.⁴⁸ Pietro Della Valle even thought of introducing this practice in Italy.

Among the Hindus, the Brāhmins and Baniās were vegetarians. Their staple food was rice, millets, various pulses, vegetables of all kinds and butter and ghee. Other castes of the Hindus were not forbidden to eat meat or fish. The Marāthās were meat eaters; they of course abstained from eating beef, for according to Hindus the cow is the most sacred animal. Fish was plentiful in the Konkan; it was eaten fresh and was also salted and dried to be eaten with rice. Dr Fryer noted that boiled rice, 'nashany' and millets were the common food of the ordinary people. Various fruits produced in the country and many kinds of preserves formed part of the diet of the general population, but they were of course not the staple items of food and their consumption is no indication of the standard of life. Muhammadans were meat eaters and only pork was forbidden to them - as even to-day it is - on different grounds than beef to the Hindus. The pig, according to them,

⁴⁸ Linschoten I.226; Fitch, E.T.I.14; Mocquet 241a; P.D.V.230-31.

is an unclean animal. Wheat formed an important item in their diet as it did in other Muhammadan countries. Altogether the Muhammadan menu was more varied and richer than that of the Hindus.⁴⁹

The use of metal utensils for dining was not common. As a rule Hindu meals were served on banana leaves or on the leaves of the banyan tree which were stitched together by means of fine pieces of straw or reed cut very thin and sharp (पत्रावली) while curries were served in a cup made out of similar leaves.⁵⁰ The Muhammadans ate their food in a much more elaborate way and made use of metal utensils.

The most popular after-dinner item among all classes was chewing the betel-leaf. This is known as the 'pān' and was eaten in exactly the same fashion as it is to-day, dressed with lime and with a small amount of betel nut, 'kāth', cardamoms, mace, a clove or two and perhaps some nutmeg. This habit was so popular and so widespread that even Portuguese men and women acquired it. It was not only an after-dinner habit; people chewed the 'pān' at all times of the day and royalty and noblemen had attendants who accompanied them everywhere with all the necessary materials for making 'pān'.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Linschoten I.223; II.11-12, 26; Barbosa I.181; Pyrard II.105; Thevenot III.81; Fryer I.209, II.119.

⁵⁰ Linschoten I.225; Pyrard II.364; P.D.V. 327; Mocquet 241a.

⁵¹ Barbosa I.168; Colloquies 474; Linschoten II.64-67; Fryer II.110. Cf. Manucci I.62; Pyrard II.362-63; Dellen 68-69.

The betel-leaf also entered into the social life of the people. Etiquette demanded that a host shall present his guest with a 'pān' before the latter departed. When a king sent an envoy on any mission he usually presented him with a ceremonial 'pān' to wish him success.⁵²

Condition of the people:- From the description of the dress, food and housing of the people the conclusion seems inevitable that the general condition of the people was not the same as it is to-day. Judged by present-day standards it falls considerably short of the minimum that is necessary for the life of the Indian peasant.

The standard of life of the Brāhmins, the better-class Marāthās and the Muhammādans was such as could enable them to live in comfort and afford the amenities of life as they were understood at that period. They could have better food, better clothing, better houses than the peasant; but it was the peasant, the Marāthā Kunbī, who was the real unit of the population and his condition was not at all satisfactory.

The agrarian system was undoubtedly oppressive to the cultivator, the wages of the labouring classes were very low and their standard of life in general was much lower than that of the peasant and labourer of to-day.⁵³ No doubt there were occasional periods of peace and prosperity for the peasant.

⁵² Linschoten II.68; Colloquies 474-75. Cf. Ferishta II. 27.

⁵³ Cf. I.D.A. 279-80; also Report on the Enquiry into the Rise of Prices in India I.154,185.

Barbosa was enthusiastic about the condition of the peasantry in the Konkan. This was at the beginning of the sixteenth century. But the picture soon begins to change, so that about the end of that century Linschoten observed that the condition of the cultivating classes was very deplorable.⁵⁴ For most of the two hundred years that he was under 'Adilshāhī rule, the peasant lived in perpetual fear of marauding armies of a hostile sultanate, or the Mughals, or sometimes even of rival nobles belonging to the kingdom itself. Moreover, recurring wars had affected both agriculture and trade, and the economic resources of the kingdom towards the close of the 'Adilshāhī regime had been considerably depleted. However careful the 'Adilshāhī sultans were for the welfare of the peasants, they never attempted to reform the agrarian system. The rapacious revenue farmer and constant fears of war completely stifled the enterprise of the peasant. It was small consolation for him that his brothers under Mughal rule and in the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar were labouring under similar disabilities.⁵⁵

It is quite possible that this economic factor weighed with the Marāthās when they gave their support to Shivājī. Possibly, they thought that under a Marāthā government their economic conditions would improve.

⁵⁴ Barbosa I.166,178. Cf. I.F.C. Nikitin 12. Linschoten I. 260-63.

⁵⁵ Cf. I.D.A.98-99.

Dissatisfied peasantry, financial ruin and an inefficient administration made the task of Shivāji and Aurangzib easy and hastened the fall of Bijāpur.

CHAPTER X.

ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND TRADE.

Agricultural production and other food resources, etc.:-

Agriculture was, as to-day it is, the main occupation of the people. The kingdom can be divided into three regions agriculturally, the Konkani littoral, the western portion of the main plateau and the rest of the country. Each of these divisions had its distinctive crops. On the whole the Bijāpur dominions were fertile and successive travellers have testified to the richness of the soil.¹ It must, however, be noted that the districts adjoining the Sahyādri range were and are not so fertile as the other parts of the Deccan plateau.²

Of the methods of agriculture we have only one or two contemporary references. One is from Barbosa when he describes the cultivation of rice around Bhatkal in the Canara country and the other from Garcia de Orta on tillage in the Deccan uplands behind Goa.³ Very little labour was spent in tilling and very little manure used. This does not mean that the use

¹ Nikitin, I.F.C., 12; Varthema, 117; Barbosa I. 166, 178; Fryer II. 67, 77.

² Cf. I.G.I., I. 43.

³ Barbosa I. 92; Colloquies, 308.

and efficiency of manure (mostly cow dung) were not known to the peasant, but most of it was used as fuel. Nor does it follow that agricultural methods were either primitive or backward.⁴ Till the beginning of the present century there was no agricultural revolution in India and methods of agriculture were probably not very different in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from those^{which} obtained at the close of the nineteenth.⁵

The country was well provided with cattle for agricultural purposes as well as for milk and meat.⁶ As a rule the farmer cultivated two crops in a year, the monsoon (Kharif) crop and the winter (rabi) crop. The two principle millets 'jowār' and bājra, sesamum, cotton 'tuār' and other pulses form the monsoon crop; and gram, barley, cotton, linseed, wheat and sometimes 'jowār' are the cold season crops.⁷ The accounts of European travellers about crops in various parts of the kingdom lead us to conclude that in a general way the country produced the same staple crops as it yields to-day. The only change seems to have occurred in the production of pepper in the Konkan. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries considerable

⁴ Cf. J. A. Voelcker: Report on the Improvement of Indian Agriculture (1893), Chapter II., chapter VII. 93-96; The Indian Famine Commission Report (1901), 112-13.

⁵ Cf. I.A.D., 101, 111; Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India (1928), 5.

⁶ Ain, I. 149; Linschoten, I. 300.

⁷ I.G.I., III. 9-10, XIII. 251.

quantities of this commodity were produced in this part and exported from Rājāpur, Dābhol and Vengurla. But the Konkan does not produce much pepper to-day. However, the Canara country around Kārwār and Bhatkal still maintains its production of pepper as in the 'Adilshāhī days.'⁸

The principal crop of the coastal strip was rice, a crop which has been cultivated in this and other parts of India from the very earliest times. It is essentially a crop of a hot climate with plenty of rain and the coastal possessions of Bijāpur from Dābhol to Bhatkal fulfilled these requirements. Rice was, and is, the staple crop and the chief item of food of the people in this part. Various varieties of rice were grown, the best of which was known as 'jirésāl'.⁹ Tavernier pronounced a very favourable opinion on the rice at Vengurla. Besides rice the other food-crop of the coastal territory was 'nāchani', a small millet with not much nutritive value. It was cultivated on the slopes of hills in soil which was not fit for rice and was used as food by the poorer people who ground it into flour and made from it a kind of bread.¹⁰

Commercially pepper was the most important article produced in the Konkan and in the Canara country during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Like rice this crop also thrived in a humid, hot climate with plenty of rainfall. The great centre

⁸ Cf. Watt, 896.

⁹ Varthema, 120; Linschoten I., 245-46; P.D.V., 296, 327; Tavernier, I. 148; Thevenot, 111.73; Fryer II., 76.

¹⁰ Colloquies, 266; Fryer, II., 76.

of pepper production was the Canara country around Bhatkal and Kārvār, but the districts adjoining Vengurla and Rājāpur in the Konkan also produced ^a considerable quantity of pepper in those days.¹¹ Though the country round Vengurla was renowned for its cardamoms, in the production of this article also the Canara country round Kārvār and Bhatkal showed superiority over the Konkan.¹²

Pepper and cardamoms were as a rule grown together with the betel palm which yields the betel nut, an after-dinner necessity in an Indian household. The habit of chewing this nut along with the betel leaf and some spices was apparently prevalent with a much greater vigour in those days than it is to-day. Moreover, the 'pān', as this composition was called, was a great feature of the social life of those days. The betel nut was thus an important article in the domestic and social life of the people and it also played an important part in the religious ceremonies of the Hindu population. The production of the betel nut, like the production of pepper and cardamoms, was a special feature of the coastal territory from Chaul and Dābhol to Bhatkal.¹³ The betel leaf which, along with the betel nut, was the essential ingredient of the 'pān' was cultivated in many parts of the country.¹⁴

¹¹ Linchoten I.73; Lancaster, 197; Mandelslo, 174; Tavernier II 11; I.G.I., XXII.153, 356; E.F.I. (1655-60), 240, (1668-69), 108; Dillion, 56, 67.

¹² Colloquies, 100, 108; Linchoten II.87; Tavernier I.149, II.10; Dillion, 67. Cf. Watt, 511.

¹³ Colloquies, 193, 474-75; Fryer II.42. Cf. I.G.I., III. 94;

¹⁴ See next page. (Continued on following page)

Two other articles produced exclusively in the coastal regions of the kingdom were coconut and cashew nut. The coconut tree grows in the sandy tracts where rice cultivation is not possible. It is one of the most useful of Indian trees and Linschoten calls it "the most profitable tree of all India." The kernel of the nut was and is used in various articles of food. When dried it is known as copra and lasts for a considerable length of time. It yields oil which was used for cooking purposes as well as for lighting. The tree also yields a kind of country wine (tādī). The shell of the nut cut into two halves was turned into drinking cups and was used as ladles with wooden handles. It was useful to the goldsmith in his trade as fuel. The tree furnished thatching material for houses; coir ropes extensively used in the ships were manufactured from it and also mattresses.¹⁵ The tree is as much used to-day as it was then.

The cashew nut was originally brought by the Portuguese from Brazil. The soil around Goa proved very hospitable to it, so that within a short time its cultivation grew to a considerable extent. The plant gives a fruit soft and yellow when

¹³ (continued from previous page) Barbosa I., 168; Linschoten II. 64-68.

¹⁴ Linschoten II., 63; Fryer, II., 42.

¹⁵ Colloquies, 138-40; Linschoten II., 43-48; Dellon, 62-65; Cf. Fitch, E.T.I., 13-14.

when ripe, with a sweet but slightly acrid juice. The nut grows at the end of the fruit,¹⁶ and is roasted and eaten. But the cashew nut industry was only in its infancy at that time; to-day it is one of the most profitable occupations in the Konkan.

Fish of many varieties, "pleasant and sweet to eat", was plentiful on the Konkan coast. There were also many kinds of shell-fish. The fish was salted and dried so that it kept for a long time. It formed an important item in the diet of the non-vegetarian section of the population of the Konkan.^{16a}

The staple crops of the Deccan plateau were various kinds of millets, most important of them being 'jowār' and 'bājra'. Among the pulses grown the principle kind was 'tuār', but many other kinds of pulses including gram or chick-peas were extensively cultivated. A certain amount of wheat also was grown in this region.¹⁷ It is popularly supposed that the cultivation of wheat was introduced into the Deccan with the advent of the Muhammadans and that Firūz Shāh Bahmanī encouraged its extension. Wheat was not the staple food of the people of the Deccan but of the Muhammadans who could not live without it. It is, therefore, quite possible that under Muhammadan rule

¹⁶ Linschoten II.27-29. Cf. Watt, 65-66.

^{16a} Linschoten II., 11-12, 26; Pyrard II., 105.

¹⁷ Barbosa I.159-60, 165; Rajwādē XV.123-27. Cf. I.G.I., III, 33-35. VIII.166, 180-81.

in the Deccan the area under wheat cultivation increased.

The black soil of the Eastern portion of the plateau is specially suited to the cultivation of cotton and is known as black cotton soil. Under 'Adilshāhī rule there was a steady and regular production of cotton¹⁸ which provided raw material for the prosperous centres of cotton industry situated in various parts of the kingdom.

Sugar-cane was extensively cultivated in various parts of the kingdom and a coarse kind of sugar was manufactured from it. Some of it was also used for eating, and the sweet juice of the sugar-cane, as it was crushed in the mill, was a popular beverage.¹⁹

Tobacco was introduced into India by the Portuguese. Till the beginning of the seventeenth century it was unknown in northern India, though in the Deccan it seems to have acquired a firm footing by then. Asad Beg, the envoy of Emperor Akbar to Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. of Bijāpur, saw tobacco in that capital for the first time.²⁰ During the reign of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II. (1656-1672) it had become quite an important crop from an economic point of view, and 'Alī reserved to himself the right of revenue derived from it,²¹ unlike other sources

¹⁸ Pyrard II.136,364; Thevenot, 111.73.

¹⁹ Colloquies, 94; Thevenot, 111.73; Varthema, 120; Richard Bell (I.A. XXXV.210).

²⁰ Wāqī'a. 65a.

²¹ See 179-80 ante.

of revenue which were entirely in the hands of the local 'jāgīrdār'. Tobacco had come to be looked upon as an amenity of life and Dr. Fryer found the Muhammedan gentry of the kingdom greatly addicted to it. They used to smoke it through the 'hūkāh', that elaborate pipe known as the hubble-bubble.²²

There were various kinds of fruits grown in the kingdom, but flowers do not seem to have been very plentiful. The most notable fruit of the country was the mango. Garcia de Orta found it "very toothsome" and Linschoten was pleased by its "very pleasant taste". Fryer spares no words in praising it. "When ripe the apples of Hisperides are but fables to them; for taste the nectarine, the apricot and the peach fall short."²³ The mango tree grew in abundance round Goa, in the uplands of the Deccan and in the Canara country. The mango, while raw, was preserved and pickled in various ways and the pickles were used by the people as a savoury with their food.²⁴

Besides the mango there was the banana or the Indian plantain and the 'jāmbu', a very pleasant fruit. There were oranges and lemons and other citrous fruits and many kinds of melons. Grapes grew in the uplands of the Deccan.²⁵ The special fruit of the Konkan was the jack-fruit (फुल्ल). When ripe, it

²² Fryer I.88.

²³ Colloquies, 286; Linschoten II.25; Fryer II.84.

²⁴ Colloquies, 288; Linschoten II.25-26; Pyrard II.367; Dellon, 66. The uses of the mango are the same to-day.

²⁵ Colloquies, 284, 303; Linschoten II.30-34; Pyrard II.364-65.

yields very sweet pulp full of stones.²⁶ Two varieties of fruits which grew in the Deccan and other parts of India were first brought to the country by the Portuguese, the pineapple which is known by the Portuguese name ananas and the papaw.²⁷ The latter fruit is very much like a melon and contains sweet and slightly acrid meat.

There was an abundant variety of vegetables. Linschoten makes special mention of cucumbers and radishes. The vegetable which was acquiring rapid popularity in the country during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and which is now most common throughout India, was the potato. Like the cashew nut, the pineapple and the papaw, the potato also owed its introduction into India to the Portuguese who brought it from South America. In the Deccan it is known by the Portuguese name batata. Linschoten found it extensively cultivated and at that time it seems to have been more popular with the Muhammedans than with the Hindus.²⁸

The tamarind tree was common in the Deccan and tamarind obtained from it was used in flavouring food. It was salted and preserved in sugar as a condiment. It was used for medicinal purposes and some quantities of it were exported to

²⁶ Colloquies, 235-36; Linschoten II.21-23; Pyrard II.366; Dellon, 65-66.

²⁷ Linschoten II.17-20,35; Pyrard II.365. Cf. P.D.V.,134-35; Watt, 66,269.

²⁸ Linschoten II.42,36-37; Fryer II.76. Cf. Watt, 1028.

Persia, Arabia and Portugal.²⁹ Ginger was put to similar uses like tamarind and was grown around Dābhol, in the Canara country and generally all along the coast.³⁰

Myrebalans (मिरबल) were common both in the Konkan and Linschoten gives five varieties which were grown in the uplands. Three of these were used only for medicinal purposes, one for tanning leather and the fifth for making condiments by preserving the fruit in sugar.³¹ There were many other medicinal herbs grown in the Deccan.³² A certain amount of poppy was also cultivated and opium produced from it to be used for medicinal and smoking purposes.³³

Industries:- Indigo was produced around Dābhol in small quantities. Most of it seems to have been used by the local cotton weaving industry, but some of it was exported.³⁴

Sugar was produced both in the uplands of the Deccan and in the Canara country and was exported from Rājāpur and Bhatkal. In quality, though superior to the very rough 'jāgra', the English factors considered it much too coarse for England; they however, carried it to Persia and Arabia.³⁵

²⁹ Colloquies, 423-24; Linschoten II.120-22; Mandelslo, 149; Mocquet, 241a; Fryer II.75.

³⁰ Colloquies, 224; Linschoten, II.78-80; Fryer II.76.

³¹ Colloquies, 317-18; Linschoten II.123-25; Pyrard II.361; P.D.V., 233-34.

³² Colloquies, 32-34; Linschoten II.126-32; Fryer II.76.

³³ Linschoten II.113-14; Fryer II.76.

³⁴ Jourdain, 198, 233; Linschoten II.91. Cf. I.G.I., III.69-70.

³⁵ Varthema, 120; Barbosa I.56, 64, 188; Thevenot, III.73; E.F.I. (1642-45), 276, (1651-54), 36, 37.

The kingdom of Bijāpur had a flourishing cotton and silk weaving industry. Cotton, as we have seen, was produced in the uplands of Deccan and Canara and the silk required by the weavers was imported from China. The curious feature of this industry in the northern part of the kingdom was that it was situated around the ports, so that the cotton required for it had to be transported from the Deccan uplands. It is possible that in the uplands also there were towns where the weaving industry flourished, but the travellers, most of whom restrict their observations to the coastal territory, say nothing about them. The ports of the Konkan around which the industry flourished were, Chaul, Dābhol, Rājāpur and Vengurla, where the cotton weaving industry survives to this day. At these centres cotton and silk stuffs were manufactured in great abundance and of many varieties and various colours. The cotton goods of these places were in great demand in Persia, Arabia and some parts of East Africa.³⁶ The state took active interest in the weaving industry and the weavers were granted exemption from certain taxes.³⁷ In the southern part of the kingdom the English factors found the cotton weaving industry flourishing at Hubli and Lakshmeshwar and in the country behind Kārvār.³⁸

³⁶ Varthema, 114-15; Barbosa I.64, 129; Colloques, 95; Linschoten I.63-64; Fyrard II.136, 211, 235, 258, 364; Jourdain, 198; Mandelslo, 8, 73-74; Tavernier I.149; Dellon, 56.

³⁷ B.I.S.M., III.1.15-16.

³⁸ E.F.I. (1655-60), 239, 240, (1668-69), 108.

Calicoes and muslins were the principal varieties of cotton cloth produced in the Deccan. The weaving of the first variety was fairly common throughout India, but the muslin industry was localised in Deccan and Bengal. On the Konkan coast Dabhol, Rājāpur and Chaul specialised in calicoes and muslins, while Vengurla produced coarse cotton cloth for the home market.³⁹ The southern centres of the weaving industry also produced calicoes and, in addition, seem to have specialised in carpet weaving and allied industries. It also seems that the 'sāris' and other cloths required by women were produced in and around Dhārwar.⁴⁰

About the organisation of the cotton weaving industry we have very little information. It seems probable that it was financed by the middleman or the Bania who kept in close touch with the market and the requirements of the exporters.⁴¹ The English went to the mart towns for the purchase of pepper, cotton goods, etc., and usually entered into negotiations with a local merchant whom they appointed as their broker. A prominent figure in the mart towns of Bījāpur was Benidās the broker employed by the English. Bimaldās and Vitthal Gontī

³⁹ Varthema, 114; Jourdain, 198; Tavernier I.149; From Akbar to Aurangzib, 56.

⁴⁰ Cf. I.G.I., III.153, 166-67; Belgaum D.G., 555.

⁴¹ Linechoten I.252-53; Pyrard II.177, 249.

were two other brokers who did business for the English factors.⁴² The brokers were financed by the foreign traders, and the producers of pepper and the cotton weavers were in their turn financed by the brokers. The English factors found that the calicoes manufactured by the weavers were of short dimensions only and if they wanted large sized cloth, the only alternative before them was to finance the weavers with the cost of altering their looms in order to make the cloth broader.⁴³ This shows that the weaving industry depended for its finance on an outside agency.

Saltpetre was produced in considerable quantities in different parts of the kingdom. It was an essential constituent of gun-powder of the period. The substance is a by-product of human and animal life under conditions which are now regarded as unsanitary but which prevailed widely during the seventeenth century. The immediate vicinity of each village was thus a perfect laboratory for the formation of salts in the earth which after the rainfall were brought to the surface of the earth and when dried were collected and purified as saltpetre.⁴⁴ The English factors made more than one attempt to refine saltpetre locally and then export it. But the experiments failed as the cost of refining proved too

⁴² E.F.I. (1634-36), 175, 292, (1637-41), 237, (1646-50), 252, 327.

⁴³ E.F.I. (1655-60), 241, (1668-69), 109. Cf. (1642-45), 39.

⁴⁴ Cf. I.G.I., III.155; From Akbar to Aurangzib, 118.

excessive.⁴⁵ They, therefore, continued to buy and export unrefined saltpetre. A certain amount of borax also was produced in the kingdom and most of it seems to have been used for dyeing cotton goods, but some quantities of it were occasionally bought by the English merchants for export.⁴⁶ The centre of the saltpetre and borax trade was Rāybāg.

Golconda possessed the best iron deposits in India, raw iron from which was in great demand in Persia and at Damascus. But the kingdom of Bījāpur also possessed iron deposits on a modest scale.⁴⁷ Vijayanagar had a good supply of iron and saltpetre and the kingdom of Bījāpur used to import considerable quantities of these commodities from the Hindu Empire.⁴⁸ Bījāpur undoubtedly benefitted from the iron deposits in Vijayanagar when, after 1565, it annexed much of the territory belonging to the Hindu Empire.

The kingdom of Bījāpur had some deposits producing precious stones like sapphires, garnets, jaspers,⁴⁹ etc., but the most important item in this category was diamonds. The existence of diamond mines in Bījāpur has been noted by all the travellers who visited the kingdom during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries⁵⁰ and according to them the kingdom of Golconda

⁴⁵ E.F.I. (1646-50), 79, 186. (1655-60), 379.

⁴⁶ E.F.I. (1642-45), 135.

⁴⁷ I.G.I., VII.152-53, XXI.253. Cf. E.F.I. (1634-36), 209.

⁴⁸ Barbosa I.188; Biker II.185.

⁴⁹ Colloquies, 354, 360; T.M., 320b-321a.

⁵⁰ I.F.C., Conti, 21; Varthema, 118; Barbosa I.202, II.221; Pyrard II.36; Terry, 109; Tavernier II.43-48; Fryer II.97.

possessed much richer diamond deposits than Bijāpur. We have two independent contemporary accounts of the diamond mines and their condition in the kingdoms of Bijāpur and Golconda, one from Tavernier and the other from an anonymous Englishman who visited these mines about 1675 and whose account of them was published by the Royal Society in the Philosophical Transactions in 1677. Both of them were diamond merchants and they give detailed information about all the aspects of the diamond mining industry.

There were in all fifteen diamond mines in the kingdom of Bijāpur the principal of which was situated near Ramallikota or Raolconda as it is called by Tavernier and the English merchant. The Bijāpur diamond deposits were situated in rocky veins in sandy soil. With small iron bars the workers used to dig into these veins and bring out the earth embedded in them which was then sifted and searched for what it contained. The maximum length reached by the miners was about 16 feet. The digging for diamonds was done in a very crude way, so that in the process of being dug up the diamonds suffered and developed flaws. Such diamonds were then cut into smaller ones by the cutters. The unit of weighing diamonds was the mangellin which, according to Tavernier, was equal to 5 grains or 1.25 carats. Diamonds weighing over a mangellin were rare, though stones of that weight and even of more weight were occasionally

obtained. The diamonds produced from the Bijāpur mines were generally of excellent crystalline water, but in size and weight they were not equal to the Golconda diamonds.⁵¹ There were numerous diamond cutters near the mines to cut and polish the diamonds. But their work was of a crude kind and they were unable to give the diamonds such lively polish as the craftsmen of Europe did.⁵²

The diamond mining industry was in the hands of Gujarātī merchants. The mines were the king's property and were farmed to intending prospectors. The merchant marked off a piece of land and purchased its mining rights from the king's officers. In addition to the price he paid for this privilege he had also to pay to the king 2 per cent on all his sales. Many labourers flocked to the mines and were employed by the prospectors. There were also a number of skilled workmen to prepare the diamonds for the market after they were dug out of the mines. The finished product was sent by the merchants to their agents in Surat, Goa, Bijāpur, Agra, Delhi and other places. Tavernier found a high sense of business honesty among the diamond merchants. The government at Bijāpur gave them fair treatment. The Bijāpur diamond prospectors were a prosperous community and were altogether much better off than their colleagues in Golconda.⁵³ After the fall of

⁵¹ Tavernier II.43-44; Philosophical Transactions XII.912-13.

⁵² Tavernier II.44-45.

⁵³ Tavernier II.46; Philosophical Transactions XII.915-16.

Bijāpur and Golconda not much is heard about their diamond mines. It seems possible that towards the close of the seventeenth century they were exhausted.

The rate of wages at these diamond mines struck Tavernier as being very low; according to him a labourer was paid only 3 pagodas per annum⁵⁴ or about a rupee per month at the then rate of exchange. But a bonus of about a pagoda was paid to the labourer who brought out a large and valuable stone. This was not the only incentive as the labourer had no scruples in secreting a diamond on him and selling it to somebody. In order to prevent such practices watchmen were employed by the owners of the mines.⁵⁵ The level of wages throughout the kingdom was low, so that alternative employment to working in the diamond fields was not specially attractive. Moreover there was always the chance of a fortunate find and a handsome bonus or an undetected theft and its subsequent proceeds. These factors were sufficient inducement to ensure an adequate supply of labourers at these mines.

Trade:- The 'Adilshāhī kingdom suffered a great set-back in respect of trade and shipping at the very beginning of its existence. The Portuguese came to India towards the close of the fifteenth century, and in 1510 Albuquerque conquered Goa from Bijāpur. Goa was at this period one of the principal

⁵⁴ Tavernier II.46. The figure refers to the labourers not to the skilled artisans as Moreland supposes (I.D.A., 152).

⁵⁵ Tavernier II.46-47.

emporiums of trade on the western coast of India and attracted merchants from different parts of Asia. In consequence of its opulence and flourishing trade it offered a great temptation to the Portuguese who had come to the East determined to wrest from the Muhammadans their commercial monopoly.

The sea-borne trade of the kingdom was of two kinds, the trade between Bījāpur ports and Persia, Arabia and East Africa and the maritime trade with Surat, Cambay and Diu in the north and the Malabar ports in the south. Before the arrival of the Portuguese the trade of the Arabian Sea was entirely in the hands of the Muhammadans and the trade of the Far East was shared by them with the Chinese.⁵⁶ Even after the Portuguese came to India they did not capture all the trade at once. But they asserted their supremacy by compelling the Muhammadan shipping to possess Portuguese permits.⁵⁷ without which no ships were safe. After the decline of the Portuguese power towards the close of the sixteenth century and before the English had established themselves on the western coast of India, Bījāpur shipping showed considerable revival and seems to have recovered for a time at least much of its former advantage.⁵⁸ But this revival was short-lived. Very

⁵⁶ Varthema, 114, 115; Barbosa II. 153, 164; Linschoten II. 130.

⁵⁷ Linschoten II. 67-68; Caesar Frederick, Hakluyt II. 342; Pyrard I. 440, II. 206-07; Jourdain, 198.

⁵⁸ Jourdain, 198; Lancaster, 123, 177; Best, 163; Fitch, E.T.I., 46; I.D.A., 207.

soon much of this trade passed into English hands and the rest of it was shared between the Dutch, the Portuguese and the Muhammadans. Similarly after the English had established their supremacy, the passenger traffic between the Deccan ports and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea showed a distinct preference for English ships.⁵⁹

Though Goa was lost to Bijāpur much of the export and import trade of the 'Adilshāhī kingdom passed through this port. After the loss of Goa, Dābhol became a very important port in the kingdom. Vengurla and Rājāpur were two other ports which rose to importance during the seventeenth century, being developed by the Dutch and English traders respectively. With the expansion of the kingdom new ports were acquired by Bijāpur. Thus Chaul became an 'Adilshāhī possession by the treaty of 1636; Kārvār and Bhatkal were gained during the early stages of the southern campaign; last of all Porto Novo and Negapatam on the Coromandel coast were acquired sometime after the annexation of Jinjī. But almost all these ports were lost to Shivājī between 1660 and 1675, so that during the reign of Sikandar 'Adil Shāh the only port belonging to the kingdom was Porto Novo,⁶⁰ and this too was threatened by the Marāthā occupation of Vellore and Jinjī.

The sea-borne trade was mostly in the hands of the Portuguese during the sixteenth century and Muhammadan merchants

⁵⁹ E.F.I. (1634-36), 40, 99, 166, 212, 258, (1642-45), 73, 116, 309, (1646-50), 110, (1651-54), 73, (1655-60), 224; Mandelslo, 10. Cf. Tavernier I.5.

⁶⁰ Fryer II.58, 68.

used to transport their wares either in Portuguese ships or to a certain extent in ships from Arabia, Persia or Bijāpur ports. During the seventeenth century, however, much of this trade was captured by the English. The temporary prosperity which the 'Adilshāhī ports enjoyed in this respect, during the early years of the seventeenth century, soon disappeared and in 1639 Mandelslo found that "They hardly send three or four wretched bottoms to Gamroon."⁶¹ Once the goods were landed at the ports, their distribution in different parts of the country was done by Hindu merchants, many of whom were Gujarātīs.⁶² An import duty of eight per cent was levied on all goods entering Goa.⁶³ Indeed the Bijāpur government seems to have made an attempt to attract ships to Dabhol by levying a customs duty of only three and a half per cent as compared with eight per cent at Goa.⁶⁴ The Portuguese also imposed a duty of eight per cent on all goods exported from Goa.⁶⁵ No further information regarding imposition of duties at 'Adilshāhī ports is available. Nor have we any information about the quantities of the articles imported.

Horses were one of the principal items of import into

⁶¹ Mandelslo, 74. Gamroon is Gombroon, then a prosperous port in the Persian Gulf.

⁶² Linschoten I.252-53, 256-57; Pyrard II.177, 213, 249.

⁶³ William Barret, Hakluyt II.410; Mandelslo, 86.

⁶⁴ Mandelslo, 74.

⁶⁵ William Barret, Hakluyt II.410; Mandelslo, 86.

the Deccan. The country produced an indifferent breed of horses compared to those of Persia and Arabia. Hence good horses were in great demand in the sultanates of the Deccan as well as in the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar. This trade was in the hands of Persian and Arab traders. The great port for this trade in the Persian Gulf was Ormuz and the main reason why Albuquerque wanted to conquer Ormuz in 1508 was to monopolise the trade that passed through it. A detailed description of the horse trade and how it influenced the relations between Bijāpur and the Portuguese has been dealt with in a preceeding chapter. Ornamental harnesses, richly embroidered and inlaid with gold and silver threads, which were in demand by the nobility for ceremonial purposes, came from Persia and China.⁶⁶

An enumeration of the articles of import into the kingdom - as also in other parts of India - shows the limitations of the demand. The main items of imports were horses, precious metals, spices, dried fruits, raw silk, ivory and coral, copper, lead and quicksilver in certain quantities, velvets, satins and similar cloths and a number of luxury goods. The common people ate food and wore clothing produced in the country and their needs being easily satisfied, there was no extensive demand for products from abroad.

Gold came into the kingdom from Mozambique and Sofala

⁶⁶ Pyrard II.75.

in East Africa and from Zeila in Abyssinia and silver from Mozambique and Japan.⁶⁷ Silver was also brought by the Portuguese from Portugal where in its turn, it had come from South America. Also the silver 'lāris' that came into the Konkan ports from Persia were much in demand by the silversmiths⁶⁸ as they were made of very pure, clean, soft and ductile silver. These precious metals were obtained in return for cotton goods and other Indian merchandise in demand in East Africa.⁶⁹ Japanese silver was paid for by carrying cotton goods to Siam, exchanging them for Siamese skins and hides and carrying them to Japan for its silver.⁷⁰

Various kinds of dried fruits were brought to Bijāpur ports in the ships that transported horses from Persia and Arabia. The three principle varieties mentioned are dates, raisins and almonds. The Portuguese do not seem to have interested themselves in this trade and during the sixteenth century it was mostly in the hands of Arab traders. But with the decline of Muhammedan shipping this trade, along with much of the trade of the Arabian Sea, passed into the hands of English merchants.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Varthema, 86, 291; Linschoten I. 33, 270; Castanheda, Kerr II. 317, 427, 516; Pyrard II. 233; Mocquet, 229a; E.F.I. (1637-41), 299.

⁶⁸ Pyrard II. 174, 193, 211.

⁶⁹ Linschoten I. 270; Castanheda II. 427; Pyrard II. 231.

⁷⁰ From Akbar to Aurangzib, 65.

⁷¹ Barbosa I. 64-65, 70, 94; Linschoten I. 48; Pyrard II. 211, 237; E.F.I. (1634-36), 134; (1646-50), 115.

Spices imported into the kingdom were cloves, mace, nutmeg and cinnamon. Some cinnamon was grown in Malabar, but it was of inferior quality as compared to the Ceylon variety and almost all the cinnamon imported into the kingdom came from Ceylon.⁷² The other three articles came from the island of Banda and the Moluccas in the Far East.⁷³ Camphor came from China and Borneo, the latter source producing the better article.⁷⁴ Dried rhubarb roots came from China by way of Tartary and Persia. They were used in the Deccan for medicinal purposes and were given to horses to keep them fit.⁷⁵

The Deccan produced a little lac, but neither in sufficient quantity nor of such quality as to meet the approval of the craftsmen engaged in lacquer work. Lac was used by Indian craftsmen to dress furniture and woodwork. It was imported into the Deccan from Pegu in Burma.⁷⁶ Chaul was a well-known centre of lacquer work industry. Pegu sent to Goa another article, very useful and much appreciated by the people of the Deccan. This was the Martaban jar named after the town of Martaban in the kingdom of Pegu where evidently they were manufactured. These jars were admirably suited for

⁷² Colloquies, 132; Tavernier II.14. Cf. Pyrard II.358; Mandelslo, 92; Dellon, 67.

⁷³ Colloquies, 72-73; Linschoten II.81-82; Pyrard II.166, 169, 357; E.F.I. (1634-36), 231, (1637-41), 238. Cf. Watt, 528, 791.

⁷⁴ Linschoten II.117-18; Fitch, E.T.I., 46. Cf. Colloquies, 87; Pyrard II.169.

⁷⁵ Colloquies, 390-92; Linschoten II.101.

⁷⁶ Linschoten II.89-90; Mandelslo, 74; Varthema, 222, 238; Barbosa II.158; Colloquies, 240; Thevenot iii.112.

preserving the mango pickles, a condiment common to every household.⁷⁷

Ambergris and frankincense came from Arabia and East Africa. Both these articles were used for medicinal purposes. The Hindus must have used frankincense for burning before their deities, as this is a practice of long standing amongst them; the Muhammadans also burnt it for religious purposes. Ambergris was used by the Muhammadan nobility to flavour their food.⁷⁸ Linschoten noted that it was "mixed with musk and other sweet things, whereof they make fine apples and pears wrought about in silver and gold, which they bear in their hands to smell upon and in hafts of knives and handles of poniards."⁷⁹

The Portuguese imported lead into Goa in certain quantities⁸⁰ and some of it undoubtedly found its way into 'Adilshāhī territory. But the amount available for Bijāpur does not seem to have been adequate to meet the demand. The same was the case with tin and about 1620 the English factors, while exploring the possibilities of trade in Bijāpur, found that these

⁷⁷ Linschoten I.101; Bowrey, 193. See also Hobson-Jobson, 559-60.

⁷⁸ Barbosa I.65, II.7-8; Colloquies, 447, 448; Linschoten I.33, II.92, 99; Terry, 197. Ambergris is a secretion formed in the intestines of the sperm whale and often found floating in the sea on the coast. Frankincense is the exudation of a balsamiferous tree peculiar to the east coast of Africa and south coast of Arabia. Watt, 64, 173.

⁷⁹ Linschoten II.93. Cf. Mocquet, 229a.

⁸⁰ Pyrard II.211.

two commodities were in great demand at Dābhol.⁸¹ The Dutch also were not slow to notice this demand and both English and Dutch merchants continued to import supplies of lead and tin into the kingdom. The major share of the trade was in the hands of the English who usually traded for cash, but on one occasion at least resorted to barter, taking commodities produced in the kingdom in return for supplies of lead and tin. The ports where these two metals were imported were Dābhol, Bājāpur and Vengurla. Some quantities were sold locally and the rest carried to the markets at Rāybāg and Hubli.⁸² Other metals imported were copper and quicksilver from Arabia. Another commodity carried along with these two was vermilion dye. Barbosa found that these articles were imported mostly at Dābhol and thence distributed inland.⁸³

Many kinds of rich cloths were in demand in the kingdom by a small minority, mostly the nobility. These were velvets, satins, scarlet cloths and damasks. These came mostly from Arabia, though Caesar Frederick notices a certain amount of velvet and scarlet cloth imported at Chaul from Portugal.⁸⁴ Some quantities of woollen cloth were imported into Goa and thence into Bājāpur by the Portuguese.⁸⁵ During the seventeenth century the English merchants found that there was a

⁸¹ E.F.I. (1618-21), 69, 233. Cf. Bowrey, 194.

⁸² E.F.I. (1634-36), 149, (1637-41), 231, 237-38, (1642-45), 250, (1646-50), 93, 134, 250, (1655-60), 241, 379, (1668-69), 109.

⁸³ Barbosa I. 165, 56; E.F.I. (1655-60), 241.

⁸⁴ Linschoten I. 256; Caesar Frederick, Hakluyt II. 344. Cf. Barbosa, II. 76; E.F.I. (1618-21), 54.

⁸⁵ Pyrard II. 211.

demand in the kingdom for broadcloth.⁸⁶ No mention of this variety is found in the accounts of the travellers during the sixteenth century. It seems probably, therefore, that the English were the first to introduce it into the kingdom. At any rate they developed the trade in this commodity to a considerable extent. It was brought to Dābhol and Rājāpur and transported inland to Rāybāg,⁸⁷ the most important mart in the kingdom. The silk-weaving industry of Chaul and Dābhol was supplied with its raw material from China.⁸⁸

Coral was imported into the kingdom both as beads and in lump by Dutch and English merchants,⁸⁹ the unfinished coral being made into beads by native craftsmen. The English found this a very profitable trade as there was great demand for coral beads by all sections of the population, the beads being used mostly for decorative purposes. In one instance the English factors sold two chests of coral at Rājāpur at 100 'pagodas' per maund or more than double its cost.⁹⁰ Ivory

⁸⁶ Jourdain, 194; E.F.I. (1618-21), 69, 233.

⁸⁷ E.F.I. (1634-36), 149, (1637-41), 231, 237, (1651-54), 71, (1655-60), 241.

⁸⁸ Colloquies, 95; Linschoten I. 64; E.F.I. (1634-36), 231, 270.

⁸⁹ E.F.I. (1618-21), 265, (1637-41), 231, 237, (1642-45), 210, 230, (1646-50), 93, 330, (1668-69), 271.

⁹⁰ E.F.I. (1651-54), 84. Cf. also (1634-36), 49.

came from East Africa and was used for the beautiful ivory work turned out by Indian craftsmen.⁹¹ They preferred it to Indian ivory as it was closer in grain and not so liable to turn yellow as the Indian.⁹² Ebony wood was also imported into Goa from Mozambique in East Africa.⁹³

Besides these imports there were various articles of luxury imported into the kingdom of Bījāpur. Like the demand for satins, velvets, etc., the demand for these articles also was limited to a small number of the population, most of them members of the nobility. Pearls came from Persia, the pearl fisheries of Baherin in the Persian Gulf being even then famous. These pearls were superior to those obtained near Ceylon and Cape Camerin and naturally were preferred to the inferior variety.⁹⁴ Rubies and other precious stones came from Pegu and also from Cambay and Calicut where in their turn they had been imported from abroad.⁹⁵ Musk came from China and rose-water and saffron from Persia and Arabia.⁹⁶ These Muhammadans used these articles particularly rose-water and saffron at home and on all ceremonial occasions. The Hindus also copied this practice, so that to-day no marriage

⁹¹ Colloquies, 181; Linschoten I.33,270; Pyrard II.224,231.

⁹² Cf. I.G.I. III.191.

⁹³ Linschoten I.33; Pyrard II.224,231,362; Hocquet, 229.

⁹⁴ Barbosa I.82; Linschoten II.133; Tavernier II.95.

⁹⁵ Barbosa II.154,202,217; Linschoten II.139-42.

⁹⁶ Barbosa I.47,56; William Barret, Hakluyt II.409; Pyrard II.359; Mandelslo,8.

or similar celebration is performed without the guests being regaled with both, rose-water being sprinkled on their dress and saffron used in ointments and also in food. Some sandal wood was produced in the Deccan, but sandalwood of best quality came from the Far East. Sandalwood paste was extensively used by the Hindus in the daily worship of their idols and generally by the population during hot weather. The paste was mixed with water and applied to the body for its cooling effect,⁹⁷ a practice observed by some people to this day.

There was considerable demand for porcelain ware from China.⁹⁸ The Muhammadans used more household utensils than the Hindus and must have absorbed the supplies of chinaware coming into the kingdom. Porcelain utensils were in extensive use in the royal household at Bijāpur. From Pyrard's description it appears that the use of chinaware was spreading and it is possible that the better class Hindus also had started using these utensils.

Among occasional articles of import were mirrors, wines and English toys.⁹⁹ Though drinking of wine was forbidden to strict Muhammadans, the kings of Bijāpur rarely observed

⁹⁷ Barbosa II.209-10; Colloquies, 398; Linschoten II.103; Fitch, E.T.I., 46.

⁹⁸ Colloquies, 95; Linschoten I.129; Pyrard II.176. Cf. Caesar Frederick, Hakluyt II.344. For Bijāpur palace china see Bijāpur Architecture, 66 and plate XXXII.

⁹⁹ Pyrard II.211; E.F.I. (1634-36), 290.

this injunction. There were also some imports of swords, guns and gunpowder. The English merchants during their early intercourse with Dābhōl observed that there was a demand at that place for sword blades, and in later years they sent into the kingdom small supplies of guns and gunpowder.¹⁰⁰

In enumerating the imports into the kingdom mention must also be made of slaves. Before the advent of the Portuguese the trade in slaves, like all other trade, was in the hands of the Arabs. Slaves were brought from Abyssinia and East Africa and sold at Goa.¹⁰¹ Many of the Portuguese officials kept slaves and there was for them a demand in the Deccan sultanates. They were employed in the royal households and in the households of the Muhammadan nobles. The practice of keeping slaves was not prevalent among the Hindu aristocracy. The lot of a slave in a Muhammadan household was not bad. He was looked upon as a member of the family and treated well. In royal service he could aspire to any office if he displayed merit. Many of the Abyssinians in the Deccan were originally slaves, but had risen to eminence in the sultanates because of their ability.

Among the articles of export from the kingdom pepper and cotton goods were the most important. As already noted,

¹⁰⁰ Pyrard II.211; E.F.I. (1618-21), 233; (1655-50), 370, 375. Cf. (1668-69), 222, 246.

¹⁰¹ Varthema, 86; Linschoten I.33-34; Pyrard II.65, 224, 231.

pepper grew in abundance in the Konkan and in the Canara country. It is one of the oldest of Indian exports, having been conveyed to Europe from the Malabar coast from the very earliest times. The great marts where all pepper was brought and sold to the exporters were Rāybāg and Athnī in the uplands behind Konkan and Hublī adjoining the Canara country.¹⁰² In its days of prosperity, Revington, the English factor at Rājāpur, considered Rāybāg the greatest market in the Deccan. During the sixteenth century most of the pepper exported from the kingdom seems to have passed through Goa.¹⁰³ But during the seventeenth century when the English and to some extent the Dutch joined in the sea-borne trade of the Arabian Sea, they developed this trade in the Bījāpur ports.

Indeed during the seventeenth century the English demand for pepper was much greater than the demand for it by the Portuguese during the sixteenth. To the English also goes the credit of expanding the trade in cotton goods and saltpetre. This impetus to its trade undoubtedly brought to Bījāpur renewed prosperity. The Bījāpur ports which showed increased activity in response to the increase in the volume of trade were Dābhol, Rājāpur and Vengurla; the trade of the Canara country of course passed through Kārwar, where the English

¹⁰² Mandelslo, 72; Tavernier I.147; Fryer II.68; E.F.I. (1655-60), 236, 240.

¹⁰³ Barbosa I.178; Linschoten II.73.

had established a factory, and through Bhatkal virtually an 'Idilshāhī port as the nāyak of Ikerī to whom it belonged became a vassal of Bijāpur in 1637. Pepper was bought by brokers employed by the English factors at Rāybāg and other marts inland and exported from Dābhol and Rājāpur¹⁰⁴ to Persia, and Arabia and to England and other European countries. In 1637 Bornford, the representative of the English company at Rājāpur, was assured by the governor of that port that it was capable of exporting annually 3,000 candys (approximately 700 tons) of pepper.¹⁰⁵ Revington dreamt of making Rājāpur the greatest centre in the Deccan for the export of pepper, cotton goods, saltpetre, etc.¹⁰⁶ But the disorder in the kingdom and the occupation of the Konkan by Shivāji frustrated his plans. After the decline of Rājāpur and Dābhol, the pepper trade of the Canara country received further impetus as the English merchants bought more pepper from the country around Kārvār and Bhatkal.

The price of pepper at Rāybāg was usually 10 or 11 'lāris' per maund of 26 lbs and at Dābhol about 14 'lāris'.¹⁰⁷ As ten Bijāpur 'lāris were equal to a 'pagoda', we can say that the approximate price of a maund of pepper at Rāybāg was one 'pagoda'. This works out at 12 'pagodas' per 'gunny' (गुन्नी)

¹⁰⁴ E.F.I. (1637-41), 12, 34, 237, (1642-45), 10, 205, 311, (1646-50), 13, 34, 48, 71, 216, 248, 327, (1651-54), 252, 28. Also Lancaster, 197; Tavernier II.11; Dellen, 56-57.

¹⁰⁵ E.F.I. (1637-41), 12.

¹⁰⁶ E.F.I. (1655-60), 353.

¹⁰⁷ E.F.I. (1634-36), 212, (1655-60), 247. Cf. (1646-50), 203.

in Marāthī) of 12 maunds which was the unit the English favoured for this commodity. In the Canara country in 1668 the price of pepper was $11\frac{1}{2}$ pagodas per 12 maunds at Hubli.¹⁰⁸ Sometimes the price of pepper soared very high and in 1640 it had gone up to 21 'pagodas' per 'gunny'.¹⁰⁹ But by the end of 1644 it was falling¹¹⁰ and the continued exports of pepper make it evident that it never reached such a level as to render the trade in pepper unprofitable. The rise in price was temporary and must have been due to the increase in demand by the English and Dutch.

Cotton goods manufactured in the kingdom were carried to Persia, Arabia and Mozambique in East Africa by Muhammadan and Portuguese traders.¹¹¹ During the first half of the seventeenth century both Dābhol and Rājāpur sent out large quantities of many kinds of cotton cloths to Persia and Arabia,¹¹² but the English merchants who carried this trade considered the cloth as too fine for England. In the Canara country also cotton cloth was produced at Hubli and Lakshmeshwar and was exported by the English from Kārwār.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ E.F.I. (1668-69), 109.

¹⁰⁹ E.F.I. (1637-41), 237.

¹¹⁰ E.F.I. (1642-45), 214.

¹¹¹ Barbosa I. 64, 129; Linschoten I. 270; Pyrard II. 72, 235.

¹¹² Lancaster, 197; Mandelslo, 8, 74; E.F.I. (1618-21), 138, (1642-45), 311, (1646-50), 34.

¹¹³ E.F.I. (1655-60), 239; (1668-69), 108-09.

Another important article of export from the Bijāpur kingdom was saltpetre. It was produced in the kingdom all along, but the credit for developing its export ^{trade} is all due to the English merchants. The Portuguese apparently made no attempts in this direction. The English bought crude saltpetre at Hāybāg and exported it from Rājāpur.¹¹⁴ Most of it seems to have been sent to England. No information is available to show the amount exported from Bijāpur ports annually, but the English merchants bought considerable quantities of the commodity from time to time. In one instance in 1640 they bought 250 candies or 5,000 maunds (58 tons) of saltpetre at Hāybāg at $8\frac{3}{4}$ 'pagoda' per candy, to be transported to Rājāpur and thence to England.¹¹⁵

The Konkan as the producer of rice was also in a position to export it to the same countries to which other commodities from the kingdom were exported, namely, to Persia, Arabia and East Africa. There was a continuous export trade in this article during both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹¹⁶ Sugar of a crude kind was exported from Chaul, Dābhol, Rājāpur and Bhatkal to Persia and Arabia,¹¹⁷ but the English considered it too coarse for England.

¹¹⁴ E.F.I. (1642-45), 10, (1646-50), 48, 71, 327, (1651-54), 36, 72, 104, (1655-60), 236.

¹¹⁵ E.F.I. (1637-40), 237.

¹¹⁶ Barbosa I. 56, 64, 178; Linschoten I. 25; Pyrard II. 235; Lancaster, 199; E.F.I. (1642-45), 226, (1646-50), 37, 116, (1651-54), 71, 72.

¹¹⁷ Barbosa I. 65, 64; E.F.I. (1637-41), 88, (1642-45), 276, (1651-54), 71, 72.

Cardamoms were the most important among the spices exported. They were first carried by the Portuguese from Goa to Portugal and from there spread over other European countries,¹¹⁸ but they were exported to Persia also. During the first half of the seventeenth century, thanks to the enterprise of the English factors at Rājāpur, that port did considerable export trade in this commodity.¹¹⁹ Dry ginger was exported from Goa and Dābhol,¹²⁰ but it does not seem to have been an important article of trade. Dried myrobalans were exported from Dābhol to Portugal¹²¹ during the sixteenth century. Tamarind was salted and sent to Persia, Arabia and Portugal.¹²² The last three items do not figure in the commodities carried by English from Bijāpur ports during the seventeenth century.

Among occasional exports were indigo and gum-lac from Dābhol and seed-lac from Kārvār,¹²³ borax and sulphate of

¹¹⁸ Colloquies, 108, 100.

¹¹⁹ Letters Received V.235; E.F.I. (1642-45), 10, 35, 205, 216, 248, (1646-50), 34, 327, (1651-54), 30, 71, 120, 252, 280.

¹²⁰ Barbosa I.178; Linschoten II.78; E.F.I. (1634-36), 134, 149, 206.

¹²¹ Barbosa I.56; Colloquies, 317-18; Linschoten II.123-25.

¹²² Barbosa I.56; Colloquies, 423; Linschoten II.120-21. Cf. Lancaster, 199.

¹²³ Barbosa I.56; Lancaster, 197; Jourdain, 233; Mandelslo, 8; E.F.I. (1634-36), 134, 149, (1661-64), 29, (1668-69), 113.

copper, some turmeric and 'cussugba' or the Indian safflower, affording oil-yielding seeds as well as a dye, from Rājāpur.¹²⁴ Both Dābhol and Rājāpur sent out coconuts and copra in English ships to Surat and these articles were also exported to Persia and Aden during the sixteenth century.¹²⁵

Apart from the trade with Persia, Arabia, East Africa and some European countries, Bijāpur ports were also engaged in coastal trade with Gujarāt ports in the north and Malabar ports in the south and the Maldive islands. The items of export to Gujarāt were rice and coconuts and imports from Gujarāt were leather manufactures, carpets and wooden furniture.¹²⁶ Exports to the Maldive islands from Bijāpur^{were} rice, cotton cloth and other products of the Deccan and the Maldives in return sent various coconut products, particularly coir ropes which were extensively used in ships.¹²⁷ Exports to Malabar consisted of rice, cotton goods, millets, pulses and some wheat in return for which Malabar sent to Bijāpur vermilion, copper, quicksilver, a special kind of cured betel-nut (मैकली सुपारी in Marāthī) and some coconuts and coconut products.¹²⁸ This trade was carried by ships belonging to Bijāpur ports, and by

¹²⁴ E.F.I. (1637-41), 87, 88, 110, (1642-45), 135, 136, 161, 212.

¹²⁵ Barbosa I.56; Colloquies, 142; Linschoten II.48; E.F.I. (1637-41), 101.

¹²⁶ Barbosa I.129; Linschoten I.56. Cf. Mandelslo, 31.

¹²⁷ Pyrard I.236, 242.

¹²⁸ Barbosa I.159-60, 164, 167, 169-70; Colloquies, 196; Caesar Frederick, Hakluyt II.344; Best, 34, 41; Mocquet, 236b.

Gujarāt, Malabar, Portuguese and English ships. Inland trade consisted in carrying Konkani commodities to the uplands or Dēsh and bringing the produce of the Dēsh into the Konkani. This transport of commodities from Konkani to the uplands and vice versa was in the hands of professional carriers known as Vanjārās who carried the merchandise on pack-oxen.¹²⁹

A review of economic conditions of the kingdom:- The first half of the seventeenth century was undoubtedly a period of comparative peace and prosperity for the kingdom. But it was the royal treasury, the nobility and the trading classes who seem to have benefitted by it, the share of the cultivator and the cotton-weaver being almost negligible. In 1612 Jourdain found Dābhol a prosperous trade centre with a thriving cotton-weaving industry. The governor and the great men (these must be state officers other than the governor and the merchants) were well off, but he found that the condition of the average people was poor as in all other parts of India.¹³⁰ Many other travellers have made similar observations. The revival of trade brought more income to the royal treasury as also did the expansion of the kingdom in the south. But after the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh this prosperity disappeared; it may even be said that the signs of Bijāpur's decline became evident during the last years of the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh himself. The loss of the coast-line to Shivājī, the rebellions

¹²⁹ Barbosa I.163, 181, 203; Colloquies, 368; Mandelslo, 75; Thevenot 111.73; Tavernier I.32-33. Cf. Ferishta I.611; Burhān (I.A.XXVIII.190), 'Ain I.149. See also Hobson-Jobson, 114-15.

¹³⁰ Jourdain, 198-99.

of the Hindu 'nāyaks' of the south, constant wars with the Mughals and civil war in the kingdom depleted the revenues, completely ruined trade, stifled the enterprise of the cultivator and thus brought about the economic breakdown of Bijāpur. By 1661 the trade of Hājāpur was at a standstill and in 1673 Dr. Fryer found the trade of Chaul totally ruined.¹³¹ The revenue of Bijāpur under Muhammad 'Adil Shāh was estimated at 7 crores and 84 lakhs of rupees (2 crores and 24 lakhs of 'pagodas' in Bijāpur currency) besides $5\frac{1}{4}$ crores of rupees in tribute due from vassal 'rājās' and petty chieftains.¹³² Under Sikandar 'Adil Shāh the tributes from the Hindu 'nāyaks' had ceased and many of the 'Adilshāhī officers had become virtually independent. Almost all the fertile tracts of the north had been occupied by the Mughals and the Konkan and Canara country along with most of the southern dependencies by the Marāṭhās. The economic condition of the kingdom had become deplorable and its annual revenue had dwindled down to a mere seventy lakhs of rupees.¹³³ There was no reserve in the treasury to pay even the handful of the army that was left in Bijāpur. Under such circumstances the kingdom could not hope to hold against Aurangzib's determination and it had no alternative but to surrender its independence to the Mughal Emperor.

¹³¹ E.F.I. (1661-64), 30, 229; Fryer I. 198-99.

¹³² B.S., 347; Sarker: Aurangzib IV. 155; Sir-ul-Mutākkharīn,

¹³³ Sir-ul-Mutākkharīn, IV. 174.

CHAPTER XI.

CULTURAL ASPECTS OF 'ĀDILSHĀHĪ RULE.

Buildings:- The 'Ādilshāhī sultāns have left behind them a reputation as builders second only to the Mughal Emperors of Delhi; and one of them at least is responsible for a building unique of its kind, a building which shows a wonderful originality of design unsurpassed by any other building in India. This is the Gol Gumbaz, the tomb of Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh, built at the order of that sultān.

The Gol Gumbaz stands on a platform to the east of the city near the Pādshāhpur gate and by its colossal proportions and height dominates the landscape for miles around. It is a square building surmounted by an immense dome of solid masonry and with octagonal towers at each of its four corners crowned by small domes. Narrow staircases wind up through the corners of the building where the towers join it, and passages lead out of them into each story of the towers and into the gallery at the base of the dome. Enclosed by the four walls is a single apartment, very impressive to the visitor as he enters it. The dimensions of this chamber are 135 feet 5 inches square at the floor level, which thus covers an area of

18,337.67 square feet. This is the largest space covered by a single dome in the world, the next largest being that of the Pantheon at Rome of 15,883 square feet.¹

But the most remarkable achievement in connection with this stupendous pile is its dome. "The great size of the dome and the neat and perfect manner in which by means of cross-arching and pendentives, the square walls have been worked up to meet it, are the most notable features of the building."² This unique feat of engineering skill has evoked the unstinted admiration of European experts like Fergusson, Cousens and Havell. In the case of the Pantheon at Rome the dome is built over a circular building, but in the case of the Gol Gumbaz the dome is placed on the square hall of the sepulchral chamber and the walls of the hall, as they rise up, are so contracted as to afford the most ingenious and at the same time the most sound support for the immense dome built over them. The technical description of this daring engineering achievement can best be given in the words of Fergusson. "The most ingenious and novel part of this dome is the mode in which the lateral or outward thrust is counteracted. This was accomplished by forming the pendentives so that they not only cut off the angles, but that their arches intersect each other, and form a very considerable mass of masonry perfectly stable in itself;

¹ Bijāpur Architecture, 102; Ferguson II.274.

² Bijāpur Architecture, 100.

and by its weight acting inwards, counteracting any thrust that can possibly be brought to bear upon it by the pressure of the dome. If the whole edifice thus balanced has any tendency to move, it is to fall inwards, which from its circular form is impossible; while the action of the weight of the pendentives being in the opposite direction to that of the dome, it acts like a tie and keeps the whole in equilibrium, without interfering at all with the outline of the dome."³ This form of dome building is the happiest thought of dome building yet come to light, for "in the Pantheon and most European domes a great mass of masonry is thrown on the haunches, which entirely hides the external form, and is a singularly clumsy expedient in every respect compared with the elegant mode of hanging the weight inside."⁴

In the centre of the building, on a raised platform, are the duplicates of the six tombs of Sultān Muhammad 'Adil Shāh and members of his family. The real tombs where the bodies lie are in the vault immediately below accessible by a staircase under the western door.

The outside measurements of the building including the towers are 205 square feet and its total height above the platform, upon which it stands, is 198 feet 6 inches. The exterior diameter of the dome is 144 feet while the interior diameter

³ Fergusson II.274-75.

⁴ Ibid., 275.

is 124 feet 5 inches,⁵ and according to Vincent Smith, this is the second largest dome in the world,⁶ the first being of course the dome of the Pantheon at Rome.

Apart from its construction, another remarkable feature of the dome is its whispering gallery, 109 feet above the floor and hanging out 11 feet from the walls, though in the subdued light of the chamber it looks like a cornice running round the wall. As the visitor ascends the stairs and enters the gallery even the smallest sound is exaggerated and produces the most weird effects. The slightest whisper or ticking of a watch goes round with distinct clearness and a loud sound like a sudden sneeze or a clap is reverberated like thunder. The present writer has counted at least five distinct echoes after stamping once on the floor of the gallery. It is said that the vibrations of the railway traffic which passes not far from the Gol Gumbaz has affected the acoustic properties of the building and also its fabric.

What strikes the observer most about this massive pile is its simple grandeur and constructive boldness. Muhammad 'Adil Shāh certainly succeeded in raising the most conspicuous mass of masonry in India, indeed according to Cousens "one of the greatest in the world".⁷ In this connection the inscription

⁵ Bijāpur Architecture, 100.

⁶ Smith, 177.

⁷ The Architectural Antiquities of Western India, 77.

on the gold and copper coins of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh⁸ should be of interest:

جهان ز این دو محمد گرفت زینت و جاه

یک محمد مرسل دوم محمد شاه

"The world from these two Muhammads received beauty and dignity. The first is Muhammad the apostle, the second Muhammad Shāh." It is possible that in ordering this legend to be inscribed on his coins Muhammad 'Adil Shāh had in his mind his achievement as the builder of the Gol Gumbaz.

No record exists either in inscriptions or in histories available to us of the name of the designers and architects responsible for this building, nor is there any information as to how long it was in building, though popularly the task is supposed to have occupied ten years. The designers and architects were most probably foreigners from Persia and Turkey⁹ and they accomplished their task with the help of Indian assistants.

Another notable architectural achievement at Bijāpur is the Ibrāhīm Rauza, a group of buildings comprising the tomb of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. and members of his family and the mosque adjoining it. The two buildings face one another with a fountain - now dry - between them. The group stands upon a high platform within a great square enclosure, which was a royal garden at one time. It is situated just outside the city walls.

⁸ J.A.S.B., B.S. (1910), 684, (1925), 43-44.

⁹ Cf. Smith, 177.

a little distance from the Mecca gate.

Both the tomb and the mosque are noted for their uniform delicacy, their rich cornices and graceful minarets. The sepulchral chamber of the tomb is a square each side being 39 feet and 10 inches and each of its four walls has a doorway flanked by two windows. The most notable feature of these walls are the fan-lights above the windows. These are filled with beautiful perforations of Arabic letters forming extracts from the Quran. What is curious in this tomb is its flat ceiling. It is made up of square slabs of stone without apparent support. Cousens calls it "a most daring piece of work carried out in defiance of ordinary rules of construction."¹⁰ Evidently the architect knew what he was doing; the ceiling has stood the test of time and is thus an eloquent testimony to its originator's skill. Over this is a room with a convex ceiling, but with a curvature so slight as to render it almost flat; and the whole structure is crowned by an admirably proportioned dome.

The walls of the exterior of the tomb, and the ceiling of the open verandah which surrounds it, are covered with sentences from the Quran, mingled with wreaths of flowers, enclosed in panels with borders of different exquisite patterns. The whole of the Quran is said to be carved on the four sides of this elegant structure, thus harmonising the

¹⁰ Bijapur Architecture, 72.

art of the architect and the sculptor and producing a rich effect. Altogether this group is the most elaborately carved of all 'Adilshāhī buildings. Fergusson describes it to be "a group as rich and picturesque as any in India, and far exceeding anything of the sort on this side of the Hellespont."¹¹ That Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh was conscious of the beauty of this group of buildings is evident from an inscription over the northern door of the tomb: "Heaven stood astonished at the elevation of this building, and it might be said when its head rose from the earth that another heaven was created. The garden of Paradise has borrowed its beauty from this garden and every column here is graceful as the cypress tree in the garden of purity. . . ."¹²

From an inscription on the southern door we know that the architect of the Rauza was one Malik Sandal and the cost of the tomb was 150,900 'hūns,¹³ (£56,587 10s. in English money, taking the then value of the 'hūn' as 7 shillings and 6 pence). If, as seems intended, the inscription refers only to the tomb, the cost of the whole group must have been in the neighbourhood of a hundred and fifty thousand sterling.

Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh started building the Rauza as the last resting place for his wife Tāj Sultāna. The king died in 1627 and Tāj Sultāna in 1633. Both of them are buried in

¹¹ Fergusson II.273.

¹² Bijāpur, D.G., 610.

¹³ Bijāpur Architecture, 75.

the ~~mausoleum~~, along with their three young children and the mother of the king. The Ibrāhīm Rauza was thus commenced under similar circumstances to the Tāj Mahāl and had been already completed before Shāh Jahān started on his scheme. Architecturally Havell finds a close connection between the Ibrāhīm Rauza and the Tāj, "for Ibrāhīm's mosque and tomb were the first Muhammadan buildings in which the 'bulbous' or lotus-leaf type of dome is used on a large scale, as it is in the Tāj Mahall";¹⁴ and he puts forward the suggestion that Ibrāhīm Rauza "must have been among 'the famous buildings' which were discussed by Shāh Jahān's master-builders before the general scheme of Mumtāz Mahall's tomb was decided."¹⁵

Ibrāhīm Rauza stands in complete contrast to the Gol Gumbaz. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh had carried his decorative style to its utmost limit and had left no chance for his son to surpass him in this line. Muhammad 'Adil Shāh, therefore, struck a new line altogether and thought of a building as massive as the Ibrāhīm Rauza was decorative; and he succeeded in producing an even more unique building than the Ibrāhīm Rauza. Frankly the Gol Gumbaz impressed the present writer more than the Ibrāhīm Rauza. It requires an expert to appreciate the full beauty of the latter, whereas the massive grandeur of the former attracts and holds the attention even of the most

¹⁴ Indian Architecture, 193.

¹⁵ Ibid.

incurious.

Other Bijāpur buildings have been described at great length by Cousens in his *Bijāpur Architecture*. There are several palaces in the citadel and other buildings erected by the 'amirs' of the Bijāpur court. In the south-east quarter of the town is the Jāmi Masjid occupying the largest area of any building in the city. Its dome is generally looked upon as the best proportioned in Bijāpur.¹⁶ A notable building is the unfinished tomb of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II., with its purely Gothic arches, and constructed on an elevated basement of 215 feet square. If completed it would have been an imposing building on the lines of the Jāmi Masjid.¹⁷ But the reign of 'Alī was comparatively short (1656-1672) and during it the kingdom was being heavily drained of its economic resources. It is possible that 'Alī would have been able to complete this mausoleum during his reign had he ^{had} sufficient funds at his disposal. Its unfinished condition signifies that the decline of Bijāpur had begun soon after the accession of 'Alī II.

In dealing with 'Adilshāhī buildings mention must also be made of Bijāpur water-works. These were, in their day, perfect and abundance of pure and wholesome water was brought into the city from two sources, one from Torwah, four miles to the west, and the other from Begam Talāo, a large reservoir, to the south.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Bijāpur Architecture*, 58.

¹⁷ Cf. *Bijāpur Architecture*, 108.

¹⁸ *Bijāpur Architecture*, 120-21; T.M., 91b-92a; *Guldashta*, 129b-130b.

The kings of Bijāpur, like other Muhammadan kings of India, had a special fondness for the presence of water and they knew full well and appreciated the cooling effects of tanks and cisterns of cold water in and around their dwellings. This practice of having cisterns was common to members of the nobility and other citizens of the capital, for in the ruins of these buildings we can see even to-day the cisterns known as 'hauzas'.

Water was brought from the Begam Talāo through earthen pipes and distributed throughout the city in cisterns and the citizens obtained their water supply from them. From Torwah water was brought in a subterranean channel and similarly distributed. Besides these public cisterns or 'hauzas' many households had their own wells. Water-works were also constructed in various towns in the kingdom at the order of the Bijāpur kings.¹⁹ Thus some money at least seems to have been spent on useful public works.

Literary developments:- The 'Adilshāhī sultans of Bijāpur, like other Muhammadan kings of India, were great patrons of refinement. At the Bijāpur court poetry was held in high honour and if a poet turned out a couplet off hand his fortune was made.²⁰ Painters and musicians found encouragement under the direct patronage of the kings, who themselves knew how to draw, were proficient musicians, besides being well skilled in

¹⁹ I.G.I., XIII. 222-23; Bijāpur, D.G., 663; Itihās Sangraha, III. 111.92.

²⁰ Cf. Ferishta II.8.

various handicrafts. Ibrāhīm II.'s love of music is well known. Asad Beg, Akbar's envoy to Bijāpur found him "wrapt in music" and Pietro Della Valle noticed that under his patronage music had greatly advanced in Bijāpur.²¹ Calligraphy was considered an accomplishment too and never failed to evoke royal praise. Both Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh and his son Ismā'il have left a few verses behind them²² and Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. is the author of a treatise on Indian music called Kitāb-i-Mauras.²³ 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II. also, in spite of his troubled reign, found time to compose a few verses.²⁴

Of all the 'Adilshāhī sultāns Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. was the greatest patron of learning and men of letters from all parts of India and from Persia flocked to his court. Of course every 'Adilshāhī king took pride in maintaining scholars at his court, but the literary figures of Ibrāhīm's reign are the most outstanding and particularly two of them, Ferishta the historian and Zuhūrī the poet and prose writer, are well known and are studied in India to this day. I have, therefore, given a detailed account of these two. The histories of Bijāpur written under the patronage of 'Adilshāhī kings have already been dealt with in the introduction.

Ferishta, whose name is Muḥammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh, was a

²¹ Wāqī'a, 55b; P.D.V., 117.

²² Ferishta II., 24, 47.

²³ B.S., 249-50. A copy of this MS. is in the Prince of Wales Museum, Bombay.

²⁴ B.S., 432.

native of Astrābād in Persia and came in his youth to the Deccan along with his father Ghulām 'Alī Hindū Shāh, also known as Ghulām 'Alī Astrābādī after his native town. The date of Ferishta's arrival in the Deccan is not certain, but he was at the Nizāmshāhī court till 1589 when, probably owing to the disorder in the Ahmadnagar kingdom, he went to Bijāpur. At the 'Adilshāhī capital he was received with honour by Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. It was Ibrāhīm who suggested to Ferishta the idea of his history, remarking that no competent person had written a general history of India, excepting Nizām-ud-dīn Bakshī (this was the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*) and this was brief and incomplete, especially concerning the Muhammadan dynasties of the Deccan.²⁵ Ferishta on his part had already planned such a history while he was at Ahmadnagar, but was unable to carry out his idea owing to the paucity of material there and the difficulty in acquiring it from different parts of India.²⁶ Working as he did under royal patronage at Bijāpur, he was able to collect various manuscripts to be used as sources for his history. He gives a list of thirty-five histories which he has used in preparing his work and besides these there are many others quoted and referred to in the body of the book. Much of the account of the Deccan sultanates, however, was written by the author without the help of any written sources; he depended on oral traditions, accounts related to him by

²⁵ Ferishta I., 5.

²⁶ Ferishta I., 4.

various persons and, most important of all, his own observations as an eye witness to various incidents.

Perishta certainly succeeded in producing a remarkable book, we may even say monumental. His history deservedly ranks first among the general histories of India and is the main source of all the later works of that class. The work is divided into twelve books with an introduction and a conclusion and deals exhaustively with the Muhammadan dynasties in various parts of India, from Kashmir to the Deccan, from Sind to Bengal. Its special value, of course, lies in the accounts of the Bahmani kingdom and the Deccan sultanates that followed it. The style of the work is simple with a natural flow and it does not suffer from that abundance of words which marks the histories written at Delhi. The result is that the reader has not to struggle with the language to find out what the writer is saying, an ordeal he has to undergo often in studying Mughal historians. The directness of his style may be due to the fact that, arriving as he did from Persia, he was unaffected by the peculiar vices of Indian scribes. This directness of style is shared by Rafi-ud-din Shirazi, also a Persian. As contrasted to these two the style of Syed Nurullah, the author of the history of the reign of 'Ali II. and a native of the Deccan, seems verbose and ornamental to a degree. Another merit of Perishta's work is its historical perspective. He has collected and collated all his material which he presents with

impartiality and makes no attempt to justify each and every action of his royal patron and the 'Adilshāhī kings.

Ferishta's history is the most universally known in India and it is found in many parts of the country, particularly in the Deccan, under two other names, *Gulshan-i-Ibrāhīmī* and *Tārīkh-i-Maurasnamā*, both names indicating that they were given in honour of Sultān Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. It is a fact very little known that Ferishta also compiled a book on the exposition of Indian systems of medicine, after reading the works of Indian physicians. So far as the information of the present writer goes this work is not known in India; the British Museum copy²⁷ seems to be the only one that has yet come to light.

The date of Ferishta's death is uncertain. In dealing with Bijāpur history he does not go beyond 1596, but he brought his task to a close in 1609 and presented his history of Ibrāhīm in the same year. He even mentions a later date 1019 A.H. (1610) in connection with trading concessions given to the English by Emperor Jahangir.²⁸ According to Briggs he must have died soon after this date.

The other writer of Bijāpur, whose works are still studied by the Persian-knowing population of India, is Zuhūrī. His proper name was Mullā Mūr-ud-dīn surnamed Tarshizī after his native town Tarshiz in Khorāsān and Zuhūrī was his pen name. He is both a prose writer and a poet. Almost all his work is

²⁷ Or. 2865.

²⁸ Ferishta II.709.

extant and much of it is lithographed and published. Ferishta is studied for his historical merit whereas Zuhūrī is read for his literary qualities, his poetic similies and his prose style being much admired in India.²⁹

Zuhūrī had acquired a reputation as a poet in Persia before coming to India. He arrived in the Deccan in 1580 and stayed for some time at the court of Burhān Nizām Shāh II. of Ahmadnagar. Here probably he heard of the munificence of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. and came over to Bijāpur where he at once became a prominent member of Ibrāhīm's literary circle. The poet-laureate of Ibrāhīm, at this time, was Maulānā Malik Qunī with whom Zuhūrī came much in contact. Young Zuhūrī became a favourite of the poet-laureate and married his daughter. Malik Qunī also is a notable poet, but is not so well-known as his famous son-in-law. Both Zuhūrī and Qunī were killed in an affray about 1615.

Zuhūrī's prose works are the three prefaces he wrote to the Kitāb-i-Nauras of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II. These are Nauras, Gulzār-i-Ibrāhīm and Khān-i-Khalīl and are collectively known as Sēh Nasr Zuhūrī - the three essays (or prose compositions) of Zuhūrī and are eulogies of the royal patron. These are written in a rich and ornate style and various editions of them, with notes and commentaries, have been lithographed at

²⁹ For notices on Zuhūrī see Rieu, 741-42; Sprenger, 112, 125-26; F.A., 301a-312a.

Cawnpore and Lucknow during the last century. The three pre-faces are much in favour with University authorities in India and extracts from them are often prescribed for University examinations. Similarly Forishta also finds a place in the curriculum in Indian Universities.

Zuhūrī was a prolific poet. While in Ahmadnagar he wrote a Sāqī Nāma in praise of Burhān Misām Shāh II. for which he received a handsome reward. The rest of his poems are found in one volume called Kulliyāt-i-Zuhūrī or the collected works of Zuhūrī. The Kulliyāt contains the qasidas, masnavis and rubā'is written by the poet. The Sāqī Nāma is lithographed. The Kulliyāt does not seem to have been published, but manuscript copies of it are common in India. Zuhūrī's characteristics as a poet are his imagination, his descriptive ability and his use of similies and metaphors.³⁰

Zuhūrī was well known as an eminent writer even in his own days. Faizi, the poet and philosopher of Akbar's court and brother of Abu'l Fazl, thought very highly of his literary abilities. Zuhūrī's fame had spread to Persia also, for Sā'ib, the poet-laureate of Shāh 'Abbās II., acknowledges his influence and pays him a glowing tribute.³¹

Thus Zuhūrī was both a poet and a prose writer of distinction, a combination which distinguished him from his contemporaries. According to Prof. Ghani "Zuhūrī may be placed among

³⁰ Ghani III., 197-202.

³¹ Ghani III., 187, 190.

those fortunate few who enjoy a universal fame, and are redognised, both in India and Persia by contemporary and later critics, as masters.³²

Though Marāthī literature during the 'Adilshāhī régime flourished without royal patronage, mention must also be made of the Marāthī poets in the kingdom. For, as has already been noted, they represented the social, political and religious thought of the Marāthā people who formed the bulk of 'Adilshāhī subjects.³³ The most prominent figures among them are Tukārām, Rāmdās and Wāman Pundit. Besides these, various minor poets and other scholars found patronage with Marāthā Sardārs. Shahājī himself entertained many learned men who had assembled round him from various parts of India.³⁴ Both Tukārām and Wāman Pundit completed their literary work independent of any patronage, but Rāmdās was granted 'ināms' by Shivājī when he established his independence. All their literary output is in verse, for Marāthī prose, as a form of literature, is a much later development.

Tukārām (1608-1649) is the greatest poet-saint of Mahārāshtra. As has been already said, he belonged to the Bhakti school. He was by caste a Sūdra and by occupation a retail grocer at Dēhū, a village sixteen miles to the north-west of Poona. He was persecuted by the Brāhmīns as the Bhakti creed,

³² Ghani III., 194.

³³ See Chapter VI. ante.

³⁴ Shahājī, 190-200.

in which he so firmly believed, aimed a blow at the very prestige of the Brāhmins as leaders of society; and he was bitterly opposed by his wife on account of his religious convictions. Finally, however, Tukārām's character and influence were established and he was offered patronage by Shivāji which he gracefully refused.

Tukārām's memory is well preserved among the Marāthī speaking people. He composed his poems in the 'abhang' metre and they are known as 'abhangas'. Each 'abhang' is a verse complete in itself and deals with a particular theme such as morality, sin, ritualism of the Brāhmins, care of God for his devotees, surrender to God, pilgrimage of life, etc. The 'abhang' varies in length from eight to twenty lines, but some of the 'abhangas' are much longer. Brāhmins and Sūdras alike are familiar with these 'abhangas' and every Marāthī-speaking person knows some of them at least by heart,³⁵ because they possess that essential quality of all good poetry memorability. Their form is simple enough; an irregular rhymed metre which makes itself felt to the ear and the reader easily finds that their author is an unlearned man struggling with the mysteries of faith. But every word is set down with great force and sincerity. "They are rudely constructed but full of force, and above all they embody to the

³⁵ The present writer knows many of the 'abhangas' of Tukārām by heart as also the poems of the other poets dealt with here.

fullest extent the pure teaching of the doctrine of Pandharpur."³⁶

Tukārām has no philosophical system to propound except the teaching of the Bhakti cult emphasising the love of God and brotherhood of man. He is a plain man of the people who had set out, under the limitations of his age and class, to find a faith sufficient for himself and his countrymen. And the reverence for his name and his teaching and the popularity of his 'abhangas' in Mahārāshtra bears ample testimony that his influence is still strong.

Just as the poems of Tukārām influenced the social thought of Mahārāshtra, the poems of Rāmdās influenced its political ideas. Rāmdās is never tired of denouncing Muhammadan rule in Mahārāshtra and exhorting the Marāthās to establish their independence.³⁷ Though born at Paithan (1608) outside the kingdom of Bijāpur, he spent most of his life at Chāfal and Parli in Satāra district. He came in contact with Shivājī about the time the young Marāthā started his independent career and became a great influence in the latter's life. Rāmdās died within a year after Shivājī.³⁸

Rāmdās's preaching did not concern the Bhakti cult but the political conditions of the Marāthī-speaking people. His work - the Dāsbodh - by which he is best known, deals with

³⁶ H.M.P., I.182.

³⁷ Mahārāshtra-Sārasvat, II.4,20. Cf. the famous couplet of Rāmdās
मराठा नितुम्ह देवनावा | महाराष्ट्र धर्मावाटवावा।

³⁸ H.M.P., I.183-94.

such subjects as self-discipline and organization with a view to prepare the Hindus for independence. The Dāsbodh is written in 'ovī' metre, the same metre as of the sacred book of the Hindus, the Bhagvad Gītā. Rāmdās's influence was widespread in his days, but to-day his work is read only by the literate people whereas almost all the people of Mahārāshtra whether literate or illiterate are familiar with the 'abhangas' of Tukārām.

Wāman Pundit has left behind a considerable number of poems which are in great favour among the educated classes to-day. Wāman was and is essentially a poet who appeals to the intellect, whereas Tukārām and Rāmdās appeal to the sentiment of the Marāthā people. Wāman Pundit, as the appellation Pundit signifies, was a scholar in the Sanskrit language and had attained great proficiency in Persian. He was born in Bījāpur during the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh with whom he was a great favourite. The Sultān wanted Wāman to turn a Muhammadan, but the young man refused, left Bījāpur and went to Benaras, in those days the seat of Hindu learning. At Benaras he studied with the Pundits and returning to Bījāpur, followed the occupation of a Joshi or village priest and astrologer at Koregaon in Satāra district where he died about 1675.³⁹

Wāman has drawn on the epics of the Hindus, Rāmāyana and Mahābhārat, for his poems and has also translated in Marāthī the works of some Sanskrit poets. Unlike Tukārām his expression

³⁹ Mahārāshtra-Sārasvat, II.49; Navanīt, 88.

at every step, shows the influence of Sanskrit and it is for this reason that his appeal is not so wide as Tukārām's. Also unlike Tukārām he uses various metres for his poems with equal ease and grace. He is the author of a treatise on the Bhagvad Gītā known as the Yatharth Dīpikā (the illuminator of the right meaning) written in the 'ovī' metre, the same metre as of the Gītā. But the bulk of his composition is written in the rhyming 'āryā' metre and he shows such a mastery of his craft that he is known as 'rhyming Wāman' (यमकशा आत्मनः).

The influence of Persian on Marāthī:- The natural result of Muhammadan rule in the Deccan was the influence of the language of the rulers on the language of the people of the Deccan. The cordial relations existing between the Hindus and their Muhammadan rulers, the employment of ^a large number of Hindus in state service, the use of the vernacular for keeping accounts and records, the general policy of toleration that was practised, all these factors tended to bring Persian and Marāthī closer together, with the inevitable result that the Marāthī language acquired many Persian words and idioms which have now become a part of that language. Mr. Rājwādē says that during the seventeenth century nearly forty per cent of the words used by ^{the} upper classes of the Marāthī-speaking population were Persian.⁴⁰ Even to-day there are many Persian words and idioms in use in Marāthī and there are many Marāthī

⁴⁰ Aitihāsik Prestāvanā, 382-83.

idioms and phrases which are only Marāthī equivalents of Persian expressions. This clearly proves that the effects of the impact of Persian on Marāthī were far-reaching and are in evidence to this day. Altogether the influence of Persian on Marāthī was all for the best of the latter language, as it has not only been enriched in vocabulary but it has acquired expressions of courtesy and refined forms of address which did not exist in it before it came into contact with Persian. Thus the influence of Persian on Marāthī manifests itself in three ways, in vocabulary, in idiom and in syntax and I have given a few examples of each.

There are so many Persian words in Marāthī in their original form or in some corrupt form that it is not possible to give here an exhaustive list. These have been completely assimilated in the language, so that the ordinary Marāthī-speaking person to-day is completely unconscious that he or she is using words which did not exist in the language before the advent of the Muhammadans in the Deccan. Such words as

अकूल (عقل), अजान (عجب), अस्मान (آسمان), कयास (قیاس), कर्ज (قرض),
 खाली (خالی), गर्ज (غرق), गुदस्ता (گذشته), गुलाम (غلام), गुमट (گنبد),
 जनावर (جانور), जहान्नी (زبان), दाम (دا), दानव (داخل), दफ्तर (دفتر),
 फ़ियाद (فریاد), रिवाज (روز), वजन (وزن), सभई (शमे),

to give only a few examples, are in everyday use. We may say that approximately ten per cent of the words in the Marāthī language to-day are pure Persian words or Marāthī corruptions

of Persian words.

The most conspicuous example of the use of Persian phrases in Marāthī is in the approved Marāthī form of addressing letters. The styles of address **उद्दिष्टी प्रसन्न राजमान्य राजश्री** and **परिपक्वमूर्ति** are nothing but translations of the Persian forms **داع دولت مقبول دولت صاحب گنج شاهان** and **مشفق مهربان**. Similarly the concluding sentence in a formal Marāthī letter **बाहुत काय लिहिणें तरी सूत असा न बाहुत काय लिहिणें विनंती** are translations of **زیاده چه نویسم شما خود** and **زیاذه چه نویسم حد ادب**. Similarly certain phrases used in Marāthī legal documents are mere transliterations of Persian phrases, e.g. **राजी खुशीने व अकूत हुषारीने**.

Let us now see how Marāthī syntax and style have been affected by Persian. In Marāthī documents and state papers we come across at every step expressions like **किहू, मौजे, परगणे** etc. etc. In pure Marāthī they should be **किहू, मौजा, परगणा** but the form in use is the Persian form. Some common expressions like **क्षपय सनाणे** and **होक मारणे** are nothing but literal translations of Persian expressions **کسح خوردن** and **بانگ زدن** respectively. Also certain Persian adjectives and adverbs are common in Marāthī and are used every day, e.g. **हर एक, बोदित, गैरसाह, वागणूक** etc. and some others are formed from original Marāthī words by Persianised suffixes, e.g. **ऐरदार, कावेबाज, गुलामागीरी** etc.

Possession is shown by the Persian suffix *والی* and so we get words like *दौलतनाम, नसीबनाम, किंमतनाम* etc.

Instances of this kind could be multiplied but the foregoing examples will show how Persian has influenced Marāthī in its vocabulary, phrases, idioms and syntax.⁴¹

Muhammadian rule in the Deccan also affected the Marāthā dress. The Marāthā nobility adopted the fuller clothing of the Muhammadans and began to use tight trousers, coats, shoes, etc., as used by their Muhammadan colleagues. But this influence of dress was not so powerful as the influence of language; the former has now vanished, but the latter will remain so long as Marāthī language lives.

The 'Adilshāhī dynasty can claim for itself a fair share in the cultural past of India. The kings of Bijāpur have given us two of the most notable buildings in India, the Ibrāhīm Rauza and the Gol Gumbaz; they have also given us the monumental history of Ferishta and the literary works of Zuhūrī. By far the most important cultural aspect of 'Adilshāhī rule, so far as the Deccan is concerned, is the influence of the language of the 'Adilshāhī court on the language of the people of the Deccan, the influence of Persian on Marāthī.

⁴¹ It is interesting to note in this connection the influence of English on Marāthī which has given rise to new words in the language to express the meaning of English words. English has also influenced to a slight extent Marāthī idiom and syntax.

CONCLUSION.

The causes of the decline of the kingdom of Bijāpur were political, administrative, economic. These have been discussed in the preceding chapters. That the 'Adilshāhī rule, along with that of the Golconda sultanate, lasted for nearly two centuries is, however, not surprising - there was no power sufficiently strong to overthrow it. That it succumbed to the great onrush of Mughal Imperialism under Aurangzib and Marāthā nationalism under Shivājī was only inevitable.

APPENDIX.

LINEAGE OF YŪSUF 'ĀDIL SHĀH.

The founder of the 'Ādilshāhī dynasty is commonly credited with being a descendant of the royal Ottoman line. Ferishta says that Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh was the son of Murād II. (1403-1451). After the death of Murād, Yūsuf, who was then a child, was carried to Sāva in Persia to escape the general slaughter of claimants to the Ottoman throne ordered by Muhammad II., Murād's son and successor. Young Yūsuf was educated at Sāva and from there he came to the Deccan in 1460.¹ He rose to eminence at the Bahmanī court and after the murder of Mahmūd Gāvān in 1481 became the leader of the Pardesi party in the Bahmanī kingdom.

Apart from Ferishta other independent evidence from Turkish and Persian histories does not throw any light on the origin of Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh. Histories of Turkey consulted by

¹ Ferishta II.2-4. At the Bahmanī court Yūsuf was known as Savāī, an appellation corrupted by the Portuguese into Sabayo, Sabaio or Çabaio. The meaning of this title is obscure. It is explained either as an adjective formed from Sāva or an Indian adjective meaning "one and a quarter man". Such use of the word is not uncommon in the Deccan. One of the Peshvas used the style savāī, Peshva Savāī Madhocrāo. Sir E. Denison Ross in his "Index to the Arabic History of Gujarāt" conjectures the meaning of savāī to be "alter ego". See also C.H.I., III. 416; Hobson-Jobson, 778-79.

the present writer fail to provide any clue as to the existence of a son of Murād II. who had to leave Turkey under circumstances mentioned by Ferishta.² In these circumstances we have to be content with the statement of Ferishta. He is supported by Fizūnī Astrābādī, the author of *Futūḡāt-i-‘Adilshāhī*.³ According to Astrābādī, Ferishta is further supported by two of his contemporaries, Mullā Daud Bīdarī and Maulānā Hasham-ud-dīn Kandhārī.⁴ It is clear that when Astrābādī wrote his chronicle, i.e., during the reign of Muhammad ‘Adil Shāh, the claim of the ‘Adilshāhī dynasty to Ottoman lineage was well known in the Deccan and was accepted as valid. In later years the Mughal historian Khāfī Khān also accepted this theory.⁵ It is interesting to note in this connection that never once did the Mughal Emperors or any of the Deccan sultans cast doubts on the Turkish ancestry of the ‘Adilshāhī kings.

Ferishta quotes a very significant incident which further supports his theory.⁶ After the marriage of Bibī Satī, Yūsuf ‘Adil Shāh's daughter, to prince Ahmad Bahmanī, she accompanied her husband to Bīdar. What happened on one occasion is related by an old woman named Jawāhar whose mother was of the Bahmanī

² Von Hammer, however, in his genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty, says that Murād II. had a brother named Yūsuf. *Histoire De L'Empire Ottoman*, I.508.

³ F.A., 7b.

⁴ F.A., 12a.

⁵ K.K., III.267.

⁶ Ferishta II.4-5.

family and father a descendant of the great saint Shāh Ni'amatullāh Valī. The account was related by Jawāhar to Shāh Jamāl-ud-dīn Husain Anju, who in his turn related to the historian Ferishta. The account is as follows: Once Jawāhar was in Bīdar attending a feast in the palace on which occasion all the royal ladies were present. At the time of the feast prince Ahmad's wife Bibī Satī claimed precedence over all the other ladies. At this one of the Bahmanī princesses asked why this should be. Upon which Bibī Satī replied that her position was greater than that of any Bahmanī princess. The Bahmanī princesses were only the daughters of the kings of the Deccan, whereas she was the grand-daughter of the Sultān of Constantinople. When Anīr Barīd heard this he went to the trouble of sending envoys to Constantinople to ascertain this claim which, if it proved false, would have provided him with a triumph over his rival kingdom. But to his great discomfiture the envoys returned from Constantinople having got full corroboration there of the princess's claim. Ferishta also relates⁷ that he heard the story of Yūsuf's lineage from Mirzā Muhammad of Sāva who was the son of Mirzā Ghīās-ud-dīn Muhammad, the vazir of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh. In view of all this evidence and the lack of any to prove to the contrary, we must accept Ferishta's version of the origin of the 'Adilshāhī dynasty as an established fact.

⁷ Ferishta II.4.

Grant Duff, who had access to some Bijāpur manuscripts which are no longer available, in describing the early life of Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh at the Bahmanī court, calls him the Turkish servant of Mahmūd Gāvān.⁸ Garcia de Orta, who lived at Goa for many years in the middle of the sixteenth century, who was a personal friend of Burhān Nizām Shāh I. of Ahmad-nagar and who was familiar with the Deccan of his day, also says that Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh was a Turk.⁹

Legend in the Deccan supports Ferishta as the 'Adilshāhī kings are still spoken of as Turkish Pādshāhs.

⁸ B.M., Add. 29,209, 420a.

⁹ Colloquies, 72.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

A.D.V.	The Aravida Dynasty of Vijayanagar.
A.N.	*Alangirnāma.
A.S.M.	Administrative System of the Marāthās.
*Ain.	*Ain-i-Akbari.
Annals.	Annals of the East India Company.
B.I.S.M.	Bhārat Itihās Samshodhak Mandal. (Journal of the Indian Historical Research Institute, Poona)
B.M.	British Museum.
B.H.	Bādshāhnāma.
B.S.	Basātīn-us-Salātīn.
Bijāpur Archi- tecture	Bijāpur and its Architectural Remains. Archeo- logical Survey of India. Vol. XXXVII. Imperial Series.
Burhān	Burhān-i-Maāsir.
C.C.I.M.C.	Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum, Calcutta.
C.C.P.M.L.	Calcutta of the Coins in the Provincial Museum, Lucknow.
C.H.I.	The Cambridge History of India.
Commentaries	The Commentaries of the great Afonso Dalbuquerque, etc.
D.G.	District Gazetteer.
E.D.	Elliot and Dowson.
E.F.I.	The English Factories in India.
E.H.D.	Early History of the Deccan.
E.T.I.	Early Travels in India.

Marāsilāt.	Marāsilāt-i-Qutbshāhī.
Mission.	La Mission du Madure. (In the History of the Nayaks of Madura.)
O.C.	Original Correspondence.
P.D.V.	Pietro Della Valle.
* R.C.	Rādhāmādhav-vilās Champū.
S.B.	Shivabhārat.
S.C.C.I.M.C.	Supplementary Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum, Calcutta.
S.I.M.	Studies in Mughal India.
S.P.S.S.	Shivakālīn Patrasār Samgraha (Letters of Shivājī's time).
Storia.	Storia do Mogor.
T.A.A.	Tārīkh-i-'Alī 'Adilshāhī.
T.D.	Tārīkh-i-Dakhan.
T.F.S.	Tārīkh-i-Firūzshāhī.
T.M.	Taskirat-ul-Mulūk.
T.M.Q.S.	Tārīkh-i-Muhammad Qutbshāhī.
Tuhfat.	Tuhfat-ul-Mujāhidīn.
Tuzuk.	Tuzuk-i-Jahāngīrī.
Wāqī'a	Wāqī'a-i-Asad Beg.

* P.P.

Parnāl Parvatagrahana (The Conquest of Panāla).